The University of Maine

DigitalCommons@UMaine
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Fogler Library

Summer 8-19-2022

Self-Regulation, Emotion Regulation, & Social Problem-Solving:
Common & Distinct Pathways to Depression
Michelle L. Buffie
University of Maine, michellebuffie@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Developmental Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Buffie, Michelle L., "Self-Regulation, Emotion Regulation, & Social Problem-Solving: Common & Distinct
Pathways to Depression" (2022). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 3623.
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/3623

This Open-Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.

SELF-REGULATION, EMOTION REGULATION, & SOCIAL PROBLEM-SOLVING:
COMMON & DISTINCT PATHWAYS TO DEPRESSION
By
Michelle L. Buffie
B.A. Augustana University, 2013
M.A. University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, 2017
M.A. University of Maine, 2019

A DISSERTATION
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(in Clinical Psychology)

The Graduate School
The University of Maine
August 2022
Advisory Committee:
Douglas Nangle, Professor of Psychology, Committee Chair
Cynthia Erdley, Professor of Psychology
Rebecca Schwartz-Mette, Associate Professor of Psychology
Jordan LaBouff, Associate Professor of Psychology
Craig Mason, Professor of Education and Applied Quantitative Methods

© 2022 Michelle L. Buffie
All Rights Reserved

ii

SELF-REGULATION, EMOTION REGULATION, & SOCIAL PROBLEM-SOLVING:
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By Michelle L. Buffie
Dissertation Advisor: Douglas Nangle, Ph.D.
An Abstract of the Dissertation Presented
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
(in Psychology)
August 2022
The present study examined the relationships among three psychological constructs: selfregulation (SR), emotion regulation (ER), and social problem-solving (SPS), and their
connection to depressive symptomology. SR, ER, and SPS arose from independent, wellestablished literature bases and each has demonstrated links to psychopathology. The theories
underlying these constructs, however, suggest overlap in their operationalization and
measurement. Despite these concerns, no empirical investigations to date have examined the
measurement and predictive validity of measures of SR, ER, and SPS in the context of one
another.
Undergraduate students aged 18-29 (N = 592) completed three self-report measures each
of the constructs interest, as well as a measure of depressive symptoms. First, a confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) was conducted, and four rival CFAs reflecting differing levels of
convergence and divergence were tested against one another. Then, the best fitting measurement
model was used to test a latent variable structural equation model (SEM). Findings from the firstorder CFA model indicated that seven out of nine measures loaded on to their intended factors.
Contrary to prediction, the bifactor model was identified as the best-fitting CFA model. This
suggests that each construct is comprised of distinct variance, as well as common

variance that is shared among all nine measures. Interestingly, only the common factor variance
and distinct variance of ER significantly predicted depressive symptoms in the final SEM model.
This study was the first to demonstrate and explore the high levels of convergence among
SR, ER, and SPS as commonly measured in practice. Overall, the results indicated a substantial
amount of shared variance and offered a complicated picture of construct validity. It appears that
measures often used to assess these constructs are capturing more common features than
investigators may be aware of, which has notable implications for the interpretation of findings.
Future investigations that include a multitrait-multimethod examination of common and distinct
pathways from SR, ER, and SPS to depressive symptoms would serve to further clarify these
relationships.
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CHAPTER I
FOUNDATIONS
The present study examined the relationships among the constructs of self-regulation
(SR), emotion regulation (ER), and social problem-solving (SPS). These relationships and their
connection to depressive symptomology were explored during emerging adulthood in a sample
of undergraduate students. This chapter contextualizes later coverage of the targeted constructs
by providing a foundation in development, psychopathology, and measurement. First, the
developmental period of the present sample, emerging adulthood, is defined and discussed.
Development specific to neurological, cognitive, emotional, and social domains is highlighted.
Next, the onset and prevalence of psychopathology during emerging adulthood is described, with
a focus on depression. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the measurement of
psychological processes in relation to construct, convergent, and discriminant validity. In
subsequent chapters, SR, ER, and SPS will be connected to development, psychopathology, and
measurement with an emphasis on elements unique to each construct. Gender differences are
highlighted throughout. Notably, significant gender differences have been found for some of the
constructs of interest in the present study, particularly ER and depressive symptoms (e.g., NolenHoeksema, 2012; Salk et al., 2017). Key for the present study was the degree to which these and
any other identified gender patterns reflect differences in construct structure and/or differences in
the relationship between the constructs and depressive symptoms.
Development
Defining the Developmental Period
The present study focused on the transition from adolescence to adulthood. This
transition is marked by significant change across almost all domains of functioning. It represents
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the maturation and junction of higher-order processes, including SR, ER, and SPS, and the
underlying skills that comprise them (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Taylor et al., 2015).
Defining the transition from adolescence to adulthood is not as straightforward as it may seem.
Some theorists conceptualize it as a continuous progression (e.g., Bynner, 2005), while others
call for re-labeling it as a distinct developmental period (e.g., Arnett, 2000). Complicating the
matter further are a variety of labels used to describe overlapping age ranges, such as ‘late
adolescence’ (ages 15 to 20), ‘youth’ (ages 15 to 25), or ‘young adulthood’ (ages 17-28; Sawyer
et al., 2018). Given this overlap in labels and the intended focus on the transition between
adolescence and adulthood, the age range of interest for the present study was specified as 18 to
29 years old. This period is most closely captured by the term ‘emerging adulthood’ proposed by
Arnett (2000). In order to provide a context for better understanding this developmental period,
Arnett’s (2000) Theory of Emerging Adulthood is described next.
Arnett’s Theory of Emerging Adulthood
Twenty years ago, Arnett (2000) proposed the concept of emerging adulthood, a distinct
period between adolescence and adulthood characterized by exploration of “love, work, and
worldviews” (p. 469). The motivation behind this proposal stemmed from Arnett’s observation
that individuals within this age range had drastically shifted in terms of demographics in the
preceding fifty years (2000). In the past, the transition from adolescence to adulthood was
associated with more cohesive trends: not as many individuals attended college, more people
began long-term careers shortly after their secondary education was complete, and people were
more likely to establish a family of their own. Instead, at the turn of the twenty-first century,
young adults were encouraged to not feel pressured to fall into a particular role. This observation
prompted Arnett (2000) to consider the alternative focus of this age group.
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Arnett’s theory emphasizes five characteristics that distinguish emerging adulthood from
other developmental periods:
1. Identity exploration, answering the question “who am I?” and trying out various life
options, especially in love and work;
2. Instability, in love, work, and place of residence;
3. Self-focus, as obligations to others reach a lifespan low point;
4. Feeling in-between, in transition, neither adolescent nor adult; and
5. Possibilities/optimism, when hopes flourish and people have an unparalleled
opportunity to transform their lives (Arnett, 2015, p. 9).
In recognizing these distinguishing features, Arnett (2000) was one of the first to suggest that
emerging adulthood represents a unique stage of the lifespan during which long-term trajectories
are substantially influenced. From this perspective, emerging adulthood is characterized not
solely as a transition, but as a starting place of possibilities. This begins with loosened role
expectations, such that the encouragement to consider different roles (e.g., education, career,
family) provides autonomy for the individual to influence their own trajectory (Arnett, 2015).
Indeed, recent trends in role expectations have been shown to be far less rigid during emerging
adulthood than during any other developmental period (Shulman & Nurmi, 2010).
Loosened expectations help to set the stage for emerging adults to explore their identity,
particularly in terms of trying out different paths. Arnett (2015) compares this idea to Erik
Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development, which suggests that during the adolescent period,
the individual is working through the stage of identity versus role confusion (Feldman, 2017).
The major task of this stage is to recognize one’s sense of self and the skills, qualities, or beliefs
that one values as well as connect these features with long-term goals. Erikson also described an
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extension of this period that he termed psychosocial moratorium, during which individuals had
more freedom to experiment with different roles (Feldman, 2017). Both Arnett’s (2015)
perspective and this portion of Erikson’s theory speak to the increased autonomy emerging
adults often experience, which creates space for deepened identity exploration.
The transition out of the caregiving environment can look quite different across
individuals, leading to varying degrees of instability (Arnett, 2015). For example, financial,
familial, or other environmental influences might strongly impact an emerging adult’s options
during this period. In addition, trying out different paths likely contributes to overall feelings of
instability, in that roles are assumed with the knowledge that they are trials or temporary in
nature. Increased independence and loosened expectations also contribute to a self-focus during
this time (Arnett, 2015). Upon leaving the caregiving environment, individuals are able to make
decisions that primarily impact only themselves. Having this ability allows for consideration of
what roles they want to pursue without putting others’ needs before their own. It is likely that the
variability in demographics and relative instability leads to emerging adults feeling in-between,
as they might have passed some milestones on the transition to adulthood, but not others (Arnett,
2015). For example, an individual may have moved out of the caregiving environment but might
remain financially dependent on caregivers.
The course and experience of emerging adulthood can also vary based on gender. It is
important to note that the majority of psychological research on gender differences has been
limited by a gender binary perspective and does not account for the existence of a gender
spectrum (Hyde et al., 2019). In addition, the differences between biological sex and gender
identity are often neglected. The present study utilized the term ‘gender’ for all related past
research to reflect the influence of social and cultural norms. Indeed, the development of gender
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identity and gender role socialization can have long-term impacts on the choices and trajectories
of emerging adults (Cunningham, 2001; Halim et al., 2011). For example, some researchers have
suggested that the development of autonomy is more encouraged for males in comparison to
females (Sneed et al., 2006). This could underlie differences in trajectories after leaving the
caregiving environment, as females have been found to be more family-oriented than males (Tsai
et al., 2013). Evidence suggests that contact with family decreases for both males and females
across emerging adulthood; however, it has been found to decrease at a faster rate for males as
compared to females (Sneed et al., 2006). Males and females also differ in their response to
stress; for example, females are more likely to lean on and foster social support networks (Fiori
& Denckla, 2015). Considering these differences in combination, gender identity could have a
potentially large impact on the trajectories initiated during emerging adulthood.
While the term emerging adulthood has become widespread, several developmental
theorists disagree that this period signifies a unique stage of the lifespan. Specifically, some have
argued that the proposed characteristics associated with emerging adulthood do not generalize to
those 18- to 29-year-olds who do not pursue higher education (Bynner, 2005). Differences
between students and non-students have been observed in the domains of occupation, finances,
and parenthood; however, no differences seem to emerge regarding employment status or rates
of marriage (Mitchell & Syed, 2015). Thus, it is likely there are several trajectories for emerging
adulthood that differ across students, non-students, and graduates (Zorotovich & Johnson, 2019).
As the present sample was specific to undergraduate students, distinguishing features of this
population are described below.

5

Undergraduate Students as Emerging Adults
It is important to emphasize that the developmental period of emerging adulthood is not
synonymous with a population of undergraduate students. That being said, a significant portion
of emerging adults do engage in post-secondary education. Between the years of 2000 and 2017,
the rate of enrollment in 2- or 4-year collegiate institutions for 18- to 24-year-olds increased
from 35% to 40% (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2019). The enrollment for
individuals in this age range who identify as female has significantly increased. In 2017 the rate
of enrollment for females was 44% as compared to 37% for males (NCES, 2019). Educational
attainment for 25- to 29-year-olds has correspondingly increased at all levels across the last two
decades: as of 2018, 93% of this age group obtained a high school diploma, 47% obtained an
associate degree or higher, 37% obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher, and 9% obtained a
master’s degree or higher (NCES, 2019).
The collegiate environment seems to foster the social norms necessary for the experience
of emerging adulthood, including time and space for identity exploration, expansive
opportunities for learning, and increased exposure to different social groups (McAdams & Guo,
2014). Additionally, aspects of this environment contribute to the instability and shifting
demographics theorized to impact emerging adults (Arnett, 2015). First, the course of education
for college students can differ dramatically; students might delay starting, take time off, or never
complete their degree (Arnett, 2016). The ability to change majors also allows students to shift
directions before committing to long-term careers. Second, the work/life balance across students
is varied; for example, some students are required to support themselves financially, while others
can accept unpaid internships. Third, residential arrangements are varied across students and
across time; this period reflects the highest rate of moving as compared to other developmental
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stages (Arnett, 2015). Fourth, the distance between the individual’s residence and family of
origin may vary widely, differentially impacting their supportive relationships. Finally, the
opportunity for new relational experiences is increased, such that individuals are exposed to a
wider range of possibilities for friendship or romance (Arnett, 2016).
Development in Emerging Adulthood
During emerging adulthood, development occurs across all domains, which substantially
influences the maturation of SR, ER, and SPS. Before describing development in specific
domains, two points are important to consider. First, it is critical to account for the influence of
past development, such that biological and environmental events that impacted development in
childhood and early adolescence indirectly influence development into emerging adulthood
(Sroufe, 2007). Second, the cascade model of development highlights the importance of
understanding connections and reciprocal influences between different domains of functioning
(Masten & Cicchetti, 2010). For example, early cognitive development might have an impact on
later social development through both direct and indirect influences. The accumulating nature of
development and the cascade model are important to consider when examining the maturation of
higher-order processes. This is because lower-order skills are the building blocks for higherorder processes, and because higher-order processes are often comprised of skills that involve
multiple domains. As such, development across neurological, cognitive, emotional, and social
domains related to the higher-order processes of SR, ER, and SPS is described in more detail in
the following sections. Gender differences are also highlighted.
Neurodevelopment. With the increasing complexity of technology and corresponding
advancement of neuroimaging, researchers are better able to understand the changes in neural
development associated with the transition from adolescence to adulthood. Structurally, cortical
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grey matter volume appears to decline, while cortical white matter volume increases through
adolescence, with rates of change for both plateauing in the mid-twenties (Foulkes & Blakemore,
2018). This pattern corresponds with change in overall cortical thickness, surface area expansion,
and alterations in underlying microstructure. These structural changes are facilitated by the
neural processes of myelination, synaptogenesis, and synaptic pruning, which continue into
emerging adulthood (Taber-Thomas & Pérez-Edgar, 2015; Taylor et al., 2015).
Significant development occurs in the frontal and prefrontal regions through emerging
adulthood (Schmithorst & Yuan, 2010; Taylor et al., 2015). Longitudinal studies have
demonstrated an association among frontal lobe structural change, cortical maturation, and the
improvement in neural functioning from puberty into emerging adulthood (Bava et al., 2010).
Functional studies of the frontal and prefrontal regions suggest these areas are critical for
executive functioning, reflecting changes in increased self-awareness and self-reflection
(Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Taylor et al., 2015). Specifically, changes in neural activity
have been connected to related shifts in cognitive, emotional, and social factors, including risktaking, reward processing, and theory of mind (Crone et al., 2016; Moriguchi et al., 2007;
Silverman et al., 2015).
The prefrontal regions are thought to mature last in terms of neurological development,
which corresponds to the increase in goal-directed behavior and decrease in risk-taking behavior
observed later in emerging adulthood (Taber-Thomas & Pérez-Edgar, 2015). Further,
connections between the frontal and limbic regions are continuously developing during this time,
such that the prefrontal cortex increases its regulatory influence on the limbic regions. This
corresponds to increased integration of cognitive, emotional, and social functioning and is a key
step in the shift to future-oriented behavior (Taber-Thomas & Pérez-Edgar, 2015).
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Cognitive Development. Though the well-established theorist Jean Piaget suggested that
cognitive development ends with the formal operational stage in adolescence (Feldman, 2017),
others have suggested that cognitive processes continue to develop into emerging adulthood in a
stage referred to as postformal thought (Despotović, 2014; Labouvie-Vief & Diehl, 2000).
Adolescents develop the ability to think abstractly and engage in formal reasoning processes;
however, these skills are not enough to problem-solve in dynamic and multifaceted environments
(Feldman, 2017). Postformal thought is based on the increasing complexity of what right versus
wrong might mean in a social and cultural context. Thus, logic and subjectivity are both required.
Emerging adults must learn to integrate experiences, morals, and values into thought processes
and be able to accept the incongruencies and ambiguities of social situations (Despotović, 2014).
Postformal thought is posited to influence not only decision-making in conflict situations but
also one’s representation of the self, emotions, and values (Labouvie-Vief & Diehl, 2000).
Another key area of ongoing cognitive development in emerging adulthood is risk-taking
behavior, or choosing the response with the most variability in potential outcomes (Crone et al.,
2016). This involves behaviors such as substance use, sexual promiscuity, and adrenaline-related
behaviors like fast driving or extreme sports. Risk-taking is thought to peak in late adolescence
and early emerging adulthood (Pharo et al., 2011). Investigation of contributing factors to risktaking have identified feelings of invulnerability and a bias towards optimistic thinking, or the
perception that outcomes will be more favorable for oneself than for others (Lapsley & Hill,
2010). Comparisons of adolescents and emerging adults have revealed that feelings of
invulnerability and perceptions of favorable outcomes were highest in emerging adulthood
(Millstein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002).
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Emotional Development. Given the inherent instability associated with emerging
adulthood, it is not surprising that this developmental period is characterized by accompanying
emotional insecurity (Zimmermann & Iwanski, 2014). Hormonal changes occurring during
puberty contribute to a high level of emotional variability through late adolescence (Crone &
Dahl, 2012). Adolescents might experience emotional highs and lows that rapidly change, and
they might react more strongly to the experience of these emotions than adults would (Feldman,
2017). This variable experience of emotions is not yet stable upon entering emerging adulthood
(Zimmerman & Iwanski, 2014). In addition, the experience of negative emotions, such as anger
and sadness, increases through adolescence and then gradually declines through emerging
adulthood (Galambos et al., 2006). Characteristics of the emerging adulthood stage, such as high
rates of moving, role transitions, and ambiguous expectations, likely influence the increased
experience of negative emotions and contribute to the instability of this age period (Arnett,
2015).
In addition to a high level of emotional insecurity, underlying mechanisms involved in
processing emotional information are still developing into the early twenties (Ahmed et al.,
2015). Sensitivity to rewards has been shown to increase through late adolescence and decline in
the early twenties (Urošević, et al., 2012). The increasing control of the limbic system by the
prefrontal cortex allows for better integration of social and reward information, serving to reduce
the incentive for riskier rewards and increase the incentive for prosocial rewards (Taber-Thomas
& Pérez-Edgar, 2015).
In addition, emotional insight, particularly awareness and identification of emotions in
oneself and others, increases through emerging adulthood (Zimmerman & Iwanski, 2014). This
ability is vital to the process of risk evaluation and decision making, as each possible response
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option is associated with positive (approach) and negative (avoid) affective components (Rivers
et al., 2013). When both the knowledge of nuanced emotional states and the experience in
identifying them is lacking, as it is in late adolescence and emerging adulthood, making complex
decisions is difficult and is more likely to lead to risky behaviors (Rivers et al., 2008).
Social Development. Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development suggests that after
individuals move through the identity versus role confusion stage, they move into the intimacy
versus isolation stage, which focuses on developing close, intimate relationships with others
(Feldman, 2017). Through emerging adulthood, social relationships increase in their complexity,
intensity, and importance for mental health and well-being (Taylor et al., 2014). The transition to
independence from the caregiving environment allows more flexibility to spend time with peers
and bolsters dependence on close friendships and romantic relationships (Smits et al., 2011). In
light of shifting environmental demands and ambiguous role expectations during this time,
maintaining close relationships requires increased social competence (Arnett, 2015). Social
competence refers to the use of skills and available social information to achieve desired
outcomes (Taborsky & Oliveira, 2012). In emerging adulthood, this is reflected by being
accepted by self-selected friends and having the ability to expand one’s social network if desired
(Shiner et al., 2002). To accomplish these goals, individuals must be able to understand others’
perspectives and emotional experience.
The skills of theory of mind, or the ability to understand another person’s perspective,
and empathy, or the ability to understand another person’s feelings or emotional experience,
continue to undergo functional improvement into emerging adulthood (Dumontheil et al., 2010;
Valle et al., 2015). Emerging adulthood presents new social challenges and requires the
individual to take on multiple perspectives at once, moving towards a societal perspective
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(Lapsley & Woodbury, 2016). This requires strong, flexible skills in self-understanding and the
ability to separate oneself from others. In addition, empathy skills mature throughout this period,
allowing the individual to better identify and relate to the emotional experience of others (Smits
et al., 2011). Theory of mind and empathy abilities appear to improve and mature with
accumulating experience and increased integration of cognitive, emotional, and social neural
systems (Taber-Thomas & Pérez-Edgar, 2015).
Gender Differences in Development. Regarding gender differences during this period,
large-scale analyses have demonstrated that, beginning in adolescence, differences between
males and females are present across several indicators of brain-behavior relationships (Gur &
Gur, 2016). This is thought to reflect differences in neural structure and connectivity. However,
the authors noted that the differences were not large enough that male and female brains would
be considered more different than alike (Gur & Gur, 2016). Cognitively, consistent findings
indicate that males engage in higher levels of risk-taking than females; evidence suggests this
may be because females are more likely to perceive a negative outcome than males (Figner &
Weber, 2011). This is connected to higher levels of punishment sensitivity observed in females
(Cross et al., 2011). In terms of emotional development, gender differences have been found in
the expression and experience of emotion (Deng et al., 2016). In particular, females are more
likely to exhibit internalizing emotions, whereas males are more likely to exhibit externalizing
emotions (Garnefski et al., 2005). Gender differences have also been demonstrated in the
trajectory of psychosocial development; for example, males and females move through stages of
identity and intimacy development at different rates (Montgomery, 2005). Overall, this evidence
of gender differences indicates a potential for gender role socialization and gender identity
development to have cascading impacts across domains of development.
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Psychopathology
Ongoing development across domains culminates in the maturation of higher-order
processes in the late twenties, including SR, ER, and SPS. The solidification of these processes
during an inherently instable period, such as emerging adulthood, creates an opportunity for
things to go awry. That is, the long-term trajectories initiated during this time could function to
accumulate negative consequences for the individual, potentially contributing to the onset of
psychopathology. Aspects of general psychopathology during emerging adulthood will be
discussed, with attention given to the influence of the undergraduate environment. Then,
depression will be specifically highlighted.
Adjustment in Emerging Adulthood
Both positive and negative consequences can result from the unstructured and potentially
turbulent course of emerging adulthood. Given that this period is characterized by inherent
instability and a multitude of possible trajectories, some of those trajectories might include
significant increases in the experience of personal hardship, interpersonal conflict, and resulting
distress (Arnett, 2015). The accumulation of these experiences in combination with ongoing
identity development can lead to confusion and isolation for emerging adults (Arnett et al.,
2014). In addition, more opportunities for risk-taking behavior are available, which can have
long-term implications spanning into adulthood (e.g., unprotected sex, addiction, incarceration).
These factors can function to set the stage for psychopathology. For example, the experience of a
stressful life event has been connected to the onset of multiple disorders (e.g., Horesh et al.,
2008; Keyes et al., 2011), and stress during emerging adulthood is thought to contribute to an
increase in symptoms that may have been subthreshold in adolescence (Schulenberg et al., 2004).
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Substantial evidence has suggested that the age of onset for many forms of
psychopathology occurs in the teens and twenties (Kessler et al., 2007). For emerging adults in
the United States, the most notable diagnoses include mood, anxiety, and substance use disorders
(Arnett et al., 2014). Twelve-month prevalence rates of psychological concerns for ages 18-25
are as follows: 17.7% severe psychological distress, 8.4% major depressive episode, 15.8%
alcohol dependence or abuse, and 7.7% drug dependence or abuse (Adams, et al., 2014). These
rates are lower for ages 26-34: 13.9% severe psychological distress, 7.1% major depressive
episode, 11.4% alcohol dependence or abuse, and 4.2% drug dependence or abuse.
Psychopathology in Undergraduate Students
The circumstances for undergraduate students present unique influences on
psychopathology during emerging adulthood. Although undergraduate populations have
historically been considered ‘healthy’ samples (e.g., DeRight & Jorgensen, 2015), accumulating
findings have raised questions regarding the overall mental health of today’s students (Conley et
al., 2014). College students’ scores on clinical scales of the MMPI-2 assessing wide ranges of
psychopathology have reportedly been increasing (Twenge et al., 2010). Studies focused on
university counseling centers have observed increases in the frequency and severity of mental
health concerns in student populations, including mood, anxiety, and perhaps most notable, selfharm and suicidal ideation concerns (Xiao et al., 2017). A recent study found the 12-month
prevalence rate of any mental disorder for incoming freshman in the United States to be 27%,
suggesting approximately one-fourth of students experience some form of psychopathology
(Auerbach et al., 2018). Females have been found to experience higher levels of internalizing
distress during undergraduate study, whereas males are more likely to exhibit externalizing
symptoms (Conley et al., 2014).
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In addition to the already tumultuous experience of emerging adulthood, undergraduate
students enrolled in the academic years impacted by COVID-19 (2019-2020 and beyond) will
have faced an added layer of uncertainty and stress. Given the disruption in daily life related to
the widespread closing of universities and the potential consequences for health and safety,
clinicians suggest the COVID-19 pandemic could substantially contribute to emotional distress
and maladjustment (Fiorillo & Gorwood, 2020). Due to these concerns, a measure specifically
addressing anxiety related to COVID-19 was included in the present study.
Depression
The present study sought to examine both the unique and shared influences of SR, ER,
and SPS on depression due to its strong connections to these higher-order processes. Depression
is cross-cultural, widespread, and functionally impairing (Kessler & Bromet, 2013). Symptoms
can include depressed mood; anhedonia; changes in appetite, weight, or sleep; psychomotor
agitation or retardation; feelings of worthlessness or guilt; a reduced ability to think or
concentrate; low energy; and suicidal ideation (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).
These symptoms can be episodic or chronic in nature and cause impairment across domains of
functioning. Depression is associated with lower quality of life, interpersonal disruption, and
physical illness and mortality (Ingram et al., 2015).
Major depressive disorder in emerging adults is a significant concern, with 12-month
prevalence estimates at 12.9% and lifetime prevalence estimates at 20.2% for 18- to 29-year-olds
in the United States (Hasin et al., 2018). First-incidence rates during emerging adulthood have
been found to be as high as during adolescence (Rohde et al., 2013). The transition out of the
caregiving environment, increase in autonomy, and inherent instability of emerging adulthood
can create an overwhelming and disruptive experience for some individuals (Edgerton et al.,
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2019). One example of this could be the beginning of undergraduate study; for some individuals,
starting college may represent a significant challenge that often must be faced without the same
social support and resources available in the caregiving environment. Indeed, the concerning rate
of depression holds true for undergraduate populations. In a sample of 14,371 undergraduate
students across eight countries, major depressive disorder was the most prevalent disorder
reported (Auerbach et al., 2018). Specifically, the 12-month prevalence was estimated to be
18.5%, and the lifetime prevalence was estimated to be 21.2% for students (Auerbach et al.,
2018).
It has been consistently demonstrated across diverse samples that females experience
depression at a rate of 2:1 as compared to males (Salk et al., 2017). This gender difference has
been shown to emerge around puberty and persist through emerging adulthood (Rohde et al.,
2013; Salk et al., 2016). There are several theories regarding the underlying mechanisms driving
this gender difference. Some evidence has suggested that females are more likely to report
stressful life events prior to the onset of a depressive episode than males, and this difference was
the most prominent during emerging adulthood (Harkness et al., 2010). Other evidence has found
that emerging adults who experience depression report dissatisfaction with social support and a
gradual loss of friendships (Martínez-Hernáez et al., 2016). It is possible that differences in the
experience of emerging adulthood, environmental stressors, and fluctuating social support impact
depressive symptoms differentially for males and females during this period. Clearly, there are
marked gender differences in depression prevalence in emerging adulthood. Of importance to the
present study was whether the relationship between the common and/or distinct features of SR,
ER, and SPS and depressive symptoms is impacted by gender.
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Given the high prevalence rates and potential for severe long-term consequences, the
examination of depression in emerging adults remains an important area of investigation. Some
researchers have even suggested that the focus of depression research on adolescence may have
caused a lack of focus on the equally important developmental period of emerging adulthood
(e.g., Rohde et al., 2013).
Measurement
The present study examined the validity of SR, ER, and SPS and took steps toward
clarifying their measurement in practice, particularly in relation to depressive symptoms. The
first goal of the study was to assess the construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS by conducting a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) based on three measures of each construct. The second goal
was to examine convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs by testing a series of CFA
models that reflect different possibilities for the underlying structure of the observed variables.
The third goal was to use the best-fitting CFA model to assess how the common versus distinct
features of SR, ER, and SPS relate to depressive symptoms. The purpose of the following
discussion is to place these three interrelated goals in the context of psychological assessment.
Specifically, relevant definitions will be provided and selected approaches to the assessment of
construct, convergent, and discriminant validity in the present study will be summarized. General
issues regarding the assessment of SR, ER, and SPS will also be highlighted. This will help to
contextualize discussions in Chapters II, III, and IV, in which common approaches to
measurement for each construct will be reviewed. Three measures for each construct were
selected for the present study based on the following criteria: (1) aim to capture the overall
construct, (2) connection to theory, and (3) frequency of use in the field.
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Construct Validity
Psychological constructs represent a collection of behaviors, characteristics, or traits that
together form a distinct entity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). The sum of this entity is thought to
reflect more than the individual contributions of each component. For instance, depression may
be conceptualized as including the symptoms of depressed mood, anhedonia, sleep disturbance,
etc., but depression encompasses more than this collection of symptoms. Constructs can be
considered from three levels: theory, operationalization, and measurement (Haynes et al., 2011).
At a theoretical level, constructs are proposed based on a series of observations, qualities, or laws
that comprehensively describe the construct, referred to as a nomological net (Cronbach &
Meehl, 1955). This set of principles functions to explain the construct and is used to inform its
operationalization and measurement.
A considerable obstacle in assessment arises from the fact that many constructs, as well
as the behaviors, characteristics, or traits that comprise them, are largely unobservable or
characterized as latent (Haynes et al., 2011). As such, latent constructs must be operationalized,
or connected to observable variables. These variables need to either directly assess a component
of the construct (e.g., in the case of depression, assessing mood) or a related construct that has
been identified as a contributing factor (e.g., in the case of depression, assessing sleep
disturbance). Observable elements of a construct are required in order to assess variance in the
construct and connect it to outcomes of interest (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Once a construct can
be tied to observable variables that are adequately representative of the construct, a measure can
be developed.
The development of a measure necessitates an examination of how well the measure
captures the theorized construct. At a broad level, validity addresses the question of whether
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variation in scores on a measure is indicative of variation in the variable being assessed (Haynes
et al., 2011). More specifically, the process of determining whether variation in the measure
reflects variation in a latent construct is what Cronbach and Meehl (1955) referred to as
construct validity. While there is no direct test of construct validity, there are several approaches
that can provide evidence that measures are functioning as intended (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
One approach that provides a portion of this evidence is factor analysis (Thompson & Daniel,
1996).
Factor analysis is a statistical technique that can be used to assess the extent to which
observed variables are generated by latent constructs (Byrne, 2016). This is accomplished
through examination of factor loadings (i.e., regression paths) that reflect the strength of the
relationship between variation in observed variables and variation in latent constructs (Byrne,
2016). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used when theory can help to inform these
relationships (Keith, 2019). CFA involves proposing a model that is thought to reflect the
underlying factor structure of the observed variables based on theory (Keith, 2019). In the
present study, SR, ER, and SPS were considered the latent constructs, while the measures used to
assess these constructs were considered the observed variables. Because the measures selected
for the present study were designed with the intention of capturing specific constructs based on
theory, CFA was used to examine the extent to which the measures accomplish this goal
(Thompson & Daniel, 1996). Ultimately, this provided evidence relevant to the construct validity
of commonly used measures of SR, ER, and SPS and addressed the first goal of the study.
Convergent & Discriminant Validity
Another aspect of validity assessment involves examination of the relations and lack of
relations between measures of the construct of interest and other constructs (Cronbach & Meehl,
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1955). Convergent validity demonstrates that the construct (as measured) is related to other
constructs as would be expected based on theory (Foster & Cone, 1995). This could be reflected
in correlations between two measures intended to tap the same construct (e.g., two measures of
depression) or between two measures intended to tap closely related constructs (e.g., depression
and anxiety). Measures should also demonstrate discriminant validity, which indicates that the
construct is not related to or can be distinguished from other constructs (Foster & Cone, 1995).
This could be reflected in two measures of unrelated constructs (e.g., depression and specific
learning disorder) or in two related but distinct constructs (e.g., depression and anxiety).
Convergent and discriminant validity fall along a spectrum, such that measures should be
able to demonstrate associations with related constructs, yet also be able to differentiate distinct
constructs, even if they are related (Foster & Cone, 1995). If measures are not able to distinguish
between related constructs, it suggests there is redundancy in the theoretical or operational levels
of the construct. Redundancy in constructs warrants consideration of the construct’s purpose. If
two constructs are reflective of the same nomological net, it is inefficient to measure and
interpret them as unique constructs (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Further, if the groundwork has
not been put in to demonstrate adequate convergent and discriminant validity for measures of
closely related constructs, then all subsequent interpretations based on these measures may be
flawed (Foster & Cone, 1995). That is, if it is unclear what construct a measure is capturing,
making claims about the connection between that measure and outcomes could be inaccurate or
misleading.
CFA can be utilized to examine convergent and discriminant validity (Keith, 2019). This
is accomplished through testing rival models that represent different possible relationships
between the observed variables and the latent constructs (Thompson & Daniel, 1996). In other
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words, models can be proposed that reflect convergence of observed variables (e.g., all observed
variables load on to one common factor) or divergence of observed variables (e.g., observed
variables load on to distinct factors), as well as possibilities in between (Credé & Harms, 2015).
How well these rival models fit the data can then be assessed through examination of fit indices
to determine which model fits best (Keith, 2019). This provides evidence relevant to the
convergent and discriminant validity of measures of SR, ER, and SPS and addressed the second
goal of the study.
The task of examining convergent and discriminant validity is influenced by the notion of
shared method variance, which suggests that demonstrated relationships between constructs may
be due to similar measurement formats rather than an underlying relationship between the
constructs themselves (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). This becomes a concern when attempting to
interpret relationships between latent constructs (Williams & McGonagle, 2016). This can also
be a concern in considerations of convergent validity, such that the goal of assessing how closely
two measures are related could be inflated by shared method variance. This also applies to
discriminant validity, such that two measures might not be related due to differing methods.
Given these concerns, using multiple methods to examine relationships is considered a more
thorough approach. That more thorough approach, however, also comes with the burdens of
increased time, effort, and resources, making the process more challenging. Thus, the present
study considered convergent and discriminant validity within the context of a shared method.
General Issues in SR, ER, & SPS Assessment
For any construct, the pathway from theory to measurement can proceed in many
different directions. Researchers investigating the same construct may work from different
theory bases. Those agreeing on theory may differ in operationalization. The development of
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measures adds another layer of variability. A whole other set of problems arises when
investigators pursue a given construct in isolation without adequate consideration of closely
related or competing constructs. Maintaining consistency within a construct or distinctions
between related constructs on the path from theory, to operationalization, to measurement is one
of assessment’s major challenges. When the constructs themselves are complex, as is the case
with SR, ER, and SPS, this task is particularly daunting.
While the examination of these three constructs has progressed along separate tracks,
they appear to share a significant amount of theoretical overlap, both in underlying mechanisms
and functional outcomes (Nigg, 2017). In addition, the operationalization of each construct is
varied and sometimes overlapping, for instance the same executive functioning tasks are often
used as indicators of both SR and ER (e.g., Bridges et al., 2004; Duckworth & Kern, 2011).
Considering this overlap, the extent to which SR, ER, and SPS are distinct constructs and are
being measured as such is unclear. In fact, calls for clarification in the measurement of these
constructs have been numerous (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2011; Weems & Pina, 2010; Zhou et al.,
2012).
Given the theoretical similarities among SR, ER, and SPS, a certain amount of
convergence in their measurement is to be expected. However, as noted, concerns arise if too
much convergence across measures exists, such that the distinct constructs of SR, ER, and SPS
are not being captured. Discriminant validity should also be demonstrated to indicate that
although overlap exists, measures of SR, ER, and SPS do indeed represent three distinct
constructs. High convergence and low discrimination between measures calls into question
whether the three constructs need to be conceptualized as distinct entities. Rethinking their
underlying structure may provide more efficiency in their measurement and application.

22

Overlap in the measurement of SR, ER, and SPS not only impacts efficiency, but also has
substantial implications for the interpretation of findings. In order to draw connections between
observed variables and outcomes, fully understanding what the measure captures is critical. For
example, if a frequently used measure of ER mostly captures elements common to ER, SR, and
SPS rather than elements that are unique to ER, then the relationship between that measure and
outcomes will likely be misinterpreted. This is particularly worrisome when a measure is being
used to predict psychopathology, as empirical findings are often used to inform prevention and
intervention approaches. It is rare that measurement concerns are raised when discussing the
limitations of studies. Instead, results are interpreted as ‘ER predicts depressive symptoms,’ even
though the measure of ER might be capturing common features shared with other constructs,
rather than capturing primarily distinct features that are unique to ER.
These concerns were the premise of the third goal of the study, which was addressed by
using the best-fitting CFA model to predict depressive symptoms in a latent variable structural
equation model (SEM). SR, ER, and SPS have been identified as significant contributors to
depressive symptoms (Anderson, et al., 2009; Joormann & Stanton, 2016; Strauman, 2017).
Based on the possibility that measures used to assess SR, ER, and SPS may not be capturing
unique constructs as intended, it is possible their previously established relationships with
depression could be flawed. Using CFA to inform latent variable SEM allowed for the
examination of differences in the common and distinct features of SR, ER, and SPS and their
connection to depressive symptoms. These methods will be described in more detail in Chapter
VI.

23

CHAPTER II
SELF-REGULATION
Decisions made throughout daily life often require more complex processing than one
might think. Each decision can impact personal goals, and this impact can ripple across contexts.
In order to maintain progress toward goals, individuals must consider both the short- and longterm consequences associated with each decision. Given the number of decisions made each day,
balancing these consequences becomes a key process required for adaptive functioning. This
chapter provides an overview of the process of self-regulation, or the ability to monitor, evaluate,
and adjust one’s behavior to achieve desired outcomes and avoid undesired outcomes (Bandura,
1991; Barkley, 1997a). First, the definition, mechanisms, and functions involved in selfregulation are described. Next, two theoretical models that have been influential in the study of
self-regulation are presented. In the final section, key aspects of development, psychopathology,
and measurement specific to the process of self-regulation are reviewed. Gender differences are
highlighted throughout.
Definition & Theory
Defining SR
Broadly defined, regulation refers to the adaptive modulation of behavior, cognition, or
emotion (Nigg, 2017). When this process is facilitated by forces other than the individual, it is
referred to as extrinsic regulation (Thompson, 2011). An example of this is when children rely
on caregivers to provide support through modeling or shaping responses to meet environmental
expectations, such as a caregiver helping a child maintain focus on a homework assignment
(Bernier et al., 2010). As the child gets older, the process of modulating responses becomes
increasingly internal and directed by the self, referred to as self-regulation (SR). SR does not
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represent a single skill or system, but rather a collection of related skills and systems that allow
the individual to adapt to changes in the environment while maintaining progress toward goals
(Nigg, 2017).
The complexity of this process has led to the investigation of SR across several areas of
study within the field of psychology. SR has prolific literature base foundations within social
cognitive (e.g., Bandura, 1991), personality (e.g., Hoyle, 2010), developmental (e.g., Rothbart et
al., 2003; Mischel et al., 1989), educational (e.g., Zimmerman, 1990), and clinical (e.g., Barkley,
1997b; Strauman, 2017) areas of psychology. Due to its widespread application, SR has been
theorized, operationalized, measured, and interpreted in numerous and diverse ways. According
to a review by Nigg (2017), terms used to describe aspects of SR or overlapping constructs
include, but are not limited to: self-control, effortful control, cognitive control,
emotion/mood/affect regulation, executive functioning, delay of gratification, behavioral
inhibition, response inhibition, impulsivity, and risk-taking.
The present study will adopt Nigg’s (2017) definition of SR. Nigg’s (2017) definition
accomplishes clarity that is missing from other conceptualizations in that it is comprehensive
enough to capture the complexity of SR, but also differentiates it from other constructs. Pertinent
to the present study, Nigg (2017) goes beyond defining SR and also provides definitions for
related constructs (Table 1) that help illustrate the theoretical uniqueness of each construct.
Establishing this differentiation is particularly important in light of the present study’s goal,
namely examining the construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS through an assessment of
convergent and discriminant validity. To better assess differences at the measurement level,
common and distinct features must be clarified at the theoretical level. Specifically, SR will be
defined as:
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Table 1
Term Definitions for Constructs Overlapping with SR
Term
Self-control
Effortful
Control
Cognitive
Control
Emotion
Regulation
Executive
Functions
Delay of
Gratification
Behavioral
Inhibition
Response
Inhibition
Impulsivity
Risk-Taking

Definition
The capacity to resist temptation, inhibit a dominant response, or activate a
subdominant response (top-down SR).
A dispositional trait that represents the tendency to be able to employ topdown control to self-regulate (trait level of cognitive control; equivalent to
low-level EFs).
The ability to flexibly adjust behavior in the context of dynamically
changing goals and task demands (equivalent to low-level EFs).
Adjustment of emotional state or expression to meet goals or to maintain
homeostatic or allostatic state; intrinsic and extrinsic.
Top-down cognitive functions involved in the control of behavior, emotion,
and cognition; support goal-directed behavior.
Trait-level ability to postpone the immediately rewarding option in order to
obtain a delayed or future reward.
The bottom-up interruption of a behavior in response to novel, ambiguous,
or threatening stimuli.
The top-down ability to intentionally or effortfully suppress a triggered
behavior to sustain behavior toward a goal.
Nonreflective stimulus-driven action when a later-rewarding goal-relevant
response was also available.
Selection of rewarding behavioral option in the face of high probability of
loss.

Note. Adapted table and term definitions sourced from Nigg (2017, pp. 363-364). EF = executive functions.
Delay of gratification definition was added from Mischel et al. (1989).

“The intrinsic processes aimed at adjusting mental and physiological state adaptively to
context. Encompasses cognitive control, emotion regulation, and top-down and bottomup processes that alter emotion, behavior, or cognition to attempt to enhance adaptation
(or to achieve an explicit or implicit goal or goal state).” (Nigg, 2017, p. 364)
Three important aspects of Nigg’s (2017) definition will be highlighted in the following sections.
First, SR includes bottom-up and top-down processes. This distinction separates components of
regulation that are environmentally driven from those that are driven by the individual. For
example, ceasing eating potato chips after seeing a gym advertisement on television (bottom-up)
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is different than proactively removing all snack food from the house (top-down; Shah &
Kruglanski, 2003). This distinction is important when considering the overlap of SR, ER, and
SPS, because different components of ER and SPS align with bottom-up versus top-down SR.
Second, SR includes behavioral, cognitive, and emotional components (Nigg, 2017). The
pervasiveness of SR across modalities is also mirrored in the processes of ER and SPS. Third,
the function of SR is to achieve a goal state. Specifically, the goal is to maximize the balance of
consequences in the short- versus long-term (Barkley, 1997a). In the above example, this might
involve balancing the satisfaction of eating potato chips (immediate reward) with the long-term
goal of being healthy (delayed reward). This balance is integral to the present discussion, as the
functional outcomes of adaptive versus maladaptive SR represent the connection between SR
and psychopathology.
Bottom-up vs. Top-down SR. Conceptualizations of SR begin with dual-process
models, which suggest that cognitive processes operate on two levels: the first is stimulus-driven
or autonomous, often referred to as bottom-up; the second is effortful or deliberate, often referred
to as top-down (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Bottom-up processes include innate or reflexive
behavior, habituated behaviors, and approach/avoidance behaviors. These are typically the
targets of SR, as they reflect motivation to pursue short-term rewards (Shulman et al., 2016). For
example, an individual’s bottom-up response to stress may be to self-soothe by biting their
fingernails. If they set a goal to reduce this behavior, they will have to focus their SR abilities on
this habituated response. Bottom-up processes can also be regulatory, for instance they can prime
top-down processes (Bargh & Ferguson 2000; Barkley, 1997a) or provide information related to
goals based on learned associations (Nigg, 2017). If an individual identifies staff meetings as an
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environmental stimulus for nail-biting, they can use this information to employ effortful SR
specifically during meetings.
Top-down processes serve to restrain impulses driven by the environment and instead
respond to mental representations, namely goals (Shulman et al., 2016). Top-down processes
include both lower-order executive functions (i.e., response inhibition, attention) that are utilized
in more simple, immediate contexts, as well as higher-order executive functions (i.e., reasoning,
planning) that are utilized in future-oriented contexts (Hofmann et al., 2012). Top-down SR
represents an effortful process engaged by the individual to serve the function of goal attainment
(Nigg, 2017). In the nail-biting example, strategies to adjust behavior could come in several
forms, for instance wearing gloves to block nails, engaging in coping thoughts, or using distress
reduction techniques such as deep breathing. All of these possibilities involve an active,
intentional effort by the individual to adjust behavior to counter the immediate reward (selfsoothing) and work toward the delayed reward (reducing nail-biting).
Modalities of SR. SR encompasses the domains of behavioral action, cognition, and
emotion, both as targets of regulation and as components of the process itself. When the target of
SR is motor control, it is referred to as behavioral regulation (Barkley, 1997a). Behavioral
regulation is often investigated in the context of impulse-control disorders (e.g., Houben &
Wiers, 2009; Wodka et al., 2007). When the target of SR is attention, memory, or decisionmaking, it is referred to as cognitive regulation (Hutcherson et al., 2012). Cognitive regulation is
a primary focus of addiction and dieting literature (e.g., Johnson et al., 2012; Naqvi et al., 2015).
Finally, when the target of SR is one’s expression and experience of emotions, it is referred to as
emotion regulation (ER; Gross, 1998). ER has emerged as a well-established, transdiagnostic
construct of interest (e.g., Sloan et al., 2017) and will be discussed in Chapter III. When SR is
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conceptualized as the overarching construct that encompasses these three subdomains (i.e.,
behavioral, cognitive, emotional), it is referred to as domain-general SR (Nigg, 2017).
In addition to serving as the targets of SR, behaviors, cognitions, and emotions are
integrated within the underlying skills that comprise SR. Each component may be involved in the
process, regardless of the target of SR (Nigg, 2017). For instance, regulating one’s emotional
response to negative feedback might involve the behavioral component of inhibiting the initial
expressive response, the cognitive component of evaluating alternative response options, and the
emotional component of attenuating the experience of frustration (Gross, 2014).
Say, for example, an employee receives negative feedback from their boss and the
employee’s long-term goal is to hold this position for the next several years. When the employee
receives the negative feedback, they would need to inhibit the initial expression of emotion, as
becoming overly upset or saddened in front of one’s boss would likely have negative
consequences. After inhibiting the initial response, the employee might take deep breaths to help
regulate the emotional experience of sadness or frustration. Then, the employee would need to
consider what the best way to respond is; perhaps they could acknowledge the feedback and ask
for action steps. SR is the total process of incorporating these components to reach desired
outcomes (i.e., maintaining employment) and avoid undesired outcomes (i.e., being fired).
Functions of SR. Theorists in the clinical literature have placed particular emphasis on
the function of SR, as that aspect is intricately related to the development and maintenance of
psychopathology (Strauman, 2017). Specifically, SR serves to change an individual’s likelihood
of engaging in a subsequent response, thereby changing the likelihood of related consequences
(Barkley, 1997a). For example, if an individual makes a to-do list the night before a busy
workday, that could serve to increase the likelihood of completing the task list. By flexibly
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adapting one’s behavior and altering subsequent responses, an individual is able to work toward
desired outcomes and avoid undesired outcomes related to personal goals (Strauman, 2017).
However, this process is more complex than simple goal-attainment, as each possible
response option is associated with both immediate and delayed outcomes. SR aims to maximize
future outcomes such that a balance is achieved between short- and long-term consequences for
the individual (Barkley, 1997a). To achieve this balance, individuals must engage in an ongoing
process of monitoring, evaluating, and adapting their behavior. For example, if an individual
smokes cigarettes when feeling down but wants to quit, they would need to monitor the
antecedents and consequences of situations in which they smoke, weigh the immediate reward of
reduced negative affect with the long-term reward of quitting, and implement the adjustments
flexibly across situations (e.g., alternatives to smoking might look different at home versus at
work). Further complicating this process are the influences of intrapersonal biases, interpersonal
tendencies, and the greater social context (Fitzsimons & Finkel, 2010). Perhaps the individual
negatively appraises their ability to find alternative response choices, they might frequently
smoke with friends and do not want them to be disappointed, or they may not be convinced of
the negative health effects of smoking.
Overall, SR is a complicated process that requires several moving pieces to accomplish.
In the following section, the ways through which the underlying mechanisms of SR interact to
achieve the functional outcomes of SR are described. This is accomplished through the
integration of two complimentary models of SR.
Models of SR
As mentioned, the investigation of SR has spanned several areas of study, which has
contributed to different theoretical approaches to understanding SR (Strauman, 2017). Some
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models focus on the underlying mechanisms that comprise SR, others focus on the functional
aspects of SR, and yet others focus on how the mechanisms and functions of SR connect to
psychopathology. In the present discussion, two models of SR will be utilized to describe the
underlying mechanisms and functions of SR. First discussed is Barkley’s (1997a; 1997b) model,
which emphasizes the underlying skills and mechanisms of SR, with a focus on executive
functioning. Second is Bandura’s (1991) social cognitive theory of SR, which emphasizes the
functional aspects and introduces ways through which intrapersonal biases and interpersonal
tendencies can impact SR.
Barkley’s Model of Self-Regulation. Barkley’s model suggests that the underlying
mechanisms of SR are comprised of executive functions (EFs). EFs can be thought of in this
context as self-directed actions that serve to regulate behavior (Barkley, 1997a; Nigg, 2017; see
Table 1). Several other lines of research have provided support for the idea that individual EFs
comprise the overall ability to self-regulate (e.g., Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Hofmann et al.,
2012). For example, evidence suggests that monitoring one’s own behavior relies on attentional
control (Rueda et al., 2005), evaluating consequences relies on working memory (Hofmann et
al., 2008), and adjusting behavior relies on planning and sequencing motor movements
(Sniehotta, 2009). Notably, the sum ability of regulating behavior is greater than individual EFs,
as it requires higher-order, simultaneous integration of multiple skills and systems (Nigg, 2017).
Though other researchers have identified additional EFs that contribute to SR (i.e.,
attention or task switching), Barkley’s (1997a) model highlights five EFs that work together to
influence an individual’s behavior. These include: (a) response inhibition, (b) working memory,
(c) internalization of speech, (d) self-regulation of affect/motivation/arousal, and (e)
reconstitution (Barkley, 1997a). Each component is described in detail in the following sections.
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Response Inhibition. The first component of the model is response inhibition. Barkley
conceptualized this component as inhibiting or stopping an initial response to a stimulus (1997a).
The initial response is referred to as the prepotent response, or the one that has been previously
associated with immediate reward or reinforcement (e.g., biting nails or eating potato chips). For
example, if an individual enters a stressful staff meeting (i.e., the stimulus) and feels an urge to
bite their nails (i.e., the prepotent response), stopping this initial response would be considered
response inhibition. Barkley (1997a) identified response inhibition as a higher-level ability that
affects all subsequent EFs. This is because inhibiting the initial response provides a delay period
between the stimulus and response, which allows for the other four EFs to be employed.
Without the delay period, behavioral responses to stimuli would be controlled only by
bottom-up processes and not effortful control. In the nail-biting example, stopping the prepotent
response of nail-biting allows the individual to consider alternative options, such as taking deep
breaths, that would help work toward the goal of reducing nail-biting behavior. If not for
response inhibition, the individual would only be able to respond to stressful situations with nailbiting. The individual eating potato chips would continue to do so until an environmental
stimulus (i.e., the gym advertisement) interrupts their behavior (which is referred to as
behavioral inhibition; see Table 1). According to Barkley, individuals are unable to maximize
both short- and long-term consequences if they have already acted to maximize the short-term
(1997a). If the individual has already bitten their nails or eaten the potato chips, they cannot
consider those actions in the context of their long-term goals. This ability to pause and reflect on
how one’s actions fit in with goals is thought to be an integral component of adaptive, human
functioning (Bandura, 1991; Barkley, 1997a). The four EFs that are employed during the delay
period in service of goal attainment are described next.
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Working Memory. Working memory is the ability to hold events in mind and manipulate
them for later recall (Barkley, 1997a). Barkley emphasizes the self-directed senses of ‘seeing to
oneself’ and ‘hearing to oneself’ as the major contribution of this component; however, all
senses can be engaged in this process (Barkley, 1997a). The ability to hold sensory information
in mind helps the individual to either replay or imagine possible scenarios attached to different
behavioral sequences in order to evaluate future outcomes. Working memory could assist the
individual in imitating another person’s behavior or generate a novel sequence of behavior. For
example, bringing to mind instances that previously triggered nail-biting (e.g., staff meetings)
and playing out scenarios of different options (e.g., imagining wearing gloves versus taking deep
breaths) would help the individual determine how to adjust their behavior in the future. Barkley
posits that the internal information gained from this component helps the individual to be more
self-aware and better organize their behavior over time (1997a).
Internalization of Speech. The second and closely related component of Barkley’s model,
internalization of speech, refers more specifically to the process of verbal working memory and
is conceptualized as the ability to self-talk (Barkley, 1997a). This is differentiated from ‘hearing
to oneself,’ which would refer more to the re-sensing of verbal stimuli generated from an
extrinsic source. Instead, this component reflects engaging in a dialogue with oneself. For
example, an individual thinking, “Stop! Don’t bite your nails. Remember you are trying to not
bite them,” would reflect internal self-talk. This ability to engage in a conversation with oneself
is particularly important for the evaluative function of SR, such that it helps the individual to
reflect on possible outcomes of their choices (Barkley, 1997a). It allows the individual to think
through alternative ways of responding that align with their goals. This is also a key area in
which internal biases, intrapersonal biases, and the greater social context can influence SR. For

33

instance, thinking, “Don’t bite your nails. Remember you have that important interview coming
up” brings in an element of social desirability.
Affect/Motivation/Arousal. The third component of Barkley’s model, the self-regulation
of affect/motivation/arousal, encompasses the interrelated construct of ER (Table 1). One key
aspect of this component is the ability to inhibit the prepotent, emotional response (Barkley,
1997a). This mirrors the function of response inhibition, such that the ability to inhibit the
initiated emotional expression or response allows for a delay period in which effortful ER
processes can be employed (Barkley, 2015). This allows the individual to take a more objective
stance and consider other people’s perspectives, which helps to integrate the greater social
context into behavioral decisions (Barkley, 1997a). The process of effortful ER will be described
in more detail in Chapter III.
This component of Barkley’s (1997a) model additionally encompasses self-directed
emotions, including elements of motivation and arousal (Barkley, 1997a). Motivation is a
relevant construct in discussions of SR, as maintaining an underlying drive to reach goals is
essential for focus on delayed rewards and long-term goal attainment (Baumeister & Vohs,
2007). If an individual did not hold a desire to reduce nail-biting behavior, SR would not be
required. Barkley (1997a) notes this element is particularly important in the absence of tangible,
external rewards. That is, when rewards are abstract or delayed (e.g., to cease a habit), it is
harder to prioritize them over concrete, immediate rewards (e.g., to self-soothe). Levels of
arousal, or physiological states of activation, are woven into the emotional experience and can
function to motivate action (Barkley, 1997a). Arousal can serve to inhibit or dampen other EFs,
thereby contributing to SR. For instance, arousal has been connected to attentional focus and
memory processing (Kaplan et al., 2012).
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Reconstitution. The final EF component of Barkley’s (1997a) model is reconstitution, or
the ability to analyze and synthesize behavioral responses. This ability is particularly important
for problem-solving, which requires previous behavioral sequences that were unsuccessful
solutions to be broken down so that each component can be evaluated. Then, the behavioral
chain is put back together in a way that generates a novel response with the goal of successfully
solving the problem (Barkley, 1997a). Reconstitution is also critical in that it allows the
individual to adapt to dynamic social environments. Though past behavior sequences might have
been successful in maximizing future consequences for the individual, new social contexts may
create additional challenges.
Say, for example, an individual’s goal was to be more assertive at work. They might
attempt to ask a coworker for a report that was due several weeks ago; perhaps the co-worker is
apologetic in the moment, but still does not send the report. The individual would then need to
consider the elements of the plan that were successful (e.g., talking to the coworker directly)
versus not successful (e.g., failing to hold the coworker accountable). Perhaps the individual
talks again with the coworker and asks for the report by the end of the day, leading to a
successful outcome. This is the function of reconstitution: to disassemble behavior chains and
put them together in sequences that are more likely to be successful.
The components of Barkley’s (1997a) model are arranged in a hierarchical order, such
that response inhibition is conceptualized as a higher-level ability that is required for the other
four EFs to function effectively. This is due to the need for a delay period between stimulus and
response. These five EFs work then together to ultimately influence a component labeled motor
control/fluency/syntax. This component represents the outcome of SR: an orderly, goal-directed
behavior sequence that is controlled by the individual rather than a behavioral response to
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environmental stimuli (Barkley, 1997a). In other words, this outcome represents effortful, topdown responses, rather than reactive, bottom-up responses. This means that all EFs included in
Barkley’s (1997a) model are considered top-down processes. This distinction is important when
considered from the perspective that EFs are intentionally employed by the individual in service
of goal attainment, or in other words, in service of adaptive SR.
Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory of SR. Unlike Barkley’s (1997a) model of SR,
Bandura’s (1991) model focuses less on the mechanisms of SR and more on the functional
aspects of SR. Bandura conceptualized SR as being instrumental to human behavior. He posited
that individuals contemplate goals, consider whether different paths might lead them toward or
away from goals, and determine best routes of action (Bandura, 1991). This coincides with
Barkley’s conceptualization of the function of SR; however, whereas Barkley focused on how
SR occurs, Bandura focused more so on what is actually occurring. In particular, Barkley
described underlying skills that comprise the ability to monitor, evaluate, and adjust behavior.
Bandura described why each of these steps is necessary to achieve desired outcomes (Bandura,
1991; Barkley, 1997a). Bandura’s social cognitive theory of SR divides the process into three
interrelated sub-functions: (a) self-observation, (b) judgement, and (c) self-reaction, that map on
to the ideas of monitoring, evaluating, and adjusting behavior (1991). Each of these subfunctions is summarized below.
Self-observation. The observation sub-function of SR involves the ability to attend to the
antecedents and consequences of one’s own behavior across contexts (Bandura, 1991). This
process is impacted by an individual’s cognitive schemas, goal sets, and social priorities; these
factors influence which behaviors are given more awareness or attention. This sub-function is
key to the process of SR as it provides the necessary data for evaluating and adapting one’s
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behavior to be in line with desired outcomes (Bandura, 1991). Without being aware of different
outcomes that behaviors can lead to across contexts, achieving desired consequences becomes
difficult, if not impossible. For example, an individual identifying that they often isolate when
feeling sad or down would provide valuable information when working toward social goals. Selfobservation allows an individual to identify recurrent patterns and to experiment with different
behaviors and their relation to desired outcomes. This process ultimately provides direction for
subsequent judgement and self-reactive processes (Bandura, 1991).
Judgement. After the behavior is observed, it must be judged as either positive or
negative based on personal and social standards (Bandura, 1991). This step is necessary for the
individual to determine whether the behavior needs to be adjusted or if it will lead to the desired
consequences. The standards utilized to judge one’s behavior are constructed by the individual
and are based on several sources of information (Bandura, 1991). That is, how an individual
appraises situations (e.g., social events are viewed as a time to see friends versus a potential
situation for embarrassment to occur) might influence how they judge behaviors (e.g., comical or
embarrassing). Additional factors beyond personal and social standards that influence how a
behavior is judged include how valued the individual perceives the activity or goal to be as well
as the individual’s locus of control. If the individual views the cause of their success as internal
or self-driven, they will be more likely to monitor and evaluate their own behavior (Bandura,
1991). Conversely, if they view their success as being externally or environmentally caused, they
may be unmotivated to adjust behavior.
Self-reaction. The self-observation and judgement processes provide the necessary
information to determine whether a behavior should be continued, adjusted, or ceased. Then,
self-reactive influences intervene to regulate behavior (Bandura, 1991). Motivation and self-
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incentive play a major role in this process, because if an individual is not motivated to obtain a
certain goal, then the likelihood of them adjusting their behavior accordingly is minimal. This is
true for both desired consequences and undesired consequences, such that both serve to motivate
behavioral adjustment (Bandura, 1991). This component of Bandura’s (1991) model maps on to
the motor control/fluency/syntax model of Barkley’s (1997a) model in that it reflects the
outcome of goal-directed behavior.
An important aspect of the social cognitive theory is the emphasis on the goals and
motivations of the individual. According to Bandura, self-efficacy involves an individual’s belief
in their ability to influence or control their functioning as well as events that impact their lives
(Bandura, 1991). Being aware of one’s own thought processes (i.e., metacognition [Zimmerman,
1995]) and consideration of the potential consequences of behavior (i.e., forethought [Bandura,
1991]) are not sufficient to initiate the regulation of behavior. Rather, both self-efficacy and a
personal sense of agency are required in order to set goals and to maintain motivation long-term
(Zimmerman, 1995).
SR Models Summary. When considered together, these models illustrate the range of
skills and systems involved in the ability to regulate behaviors, cognitions, and emotions. Each
step of Bandura’s (1991) model relies on the skills described in Barkley’s (1997a) model to
potentiate. That is, the steps of observation, judgement, and reaction employ the skills of
response inhibition, working memory, and reconstitution. While other conceptualizations of SR
exist across areas of study, these two models have been influential in the investigation of SR as a
clinical construct (e.g., Strauman, 2017). Combined, these models have been cited by over
15,000 published articles as of 2020 and continue to be drawn from in specialized applications of
SR (e.g., Bridgett et al., 2015; Friedman & Miyake, 2017). Pertinent to the present study, these
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models serve as the foundation for later integration of models of ER and SPS and their combined
influence on psychopathology in Chapter V.
Development
The ability to regulate one’s behavior, cognitions, and emotions emerges in the first years
of life and continuously evolves across the lifespan. It is important to emphasize that SR is a
capacity that develops rather than an inborn trait that is fixed (Sroufe, 2007). Genetic inheritance
plays a role, but early experiences and person-environment interactions serve to shape the
capacity of SR beginning in infancy (Kopp, 1982). SR should thus be viewed as a process that
develops in a similar context to other processes; in other words, the same genetic influences,
early experiences, and person-environment interactions that influence SR development also
impact neurological, cognitive, emotional, and social development and, potentially, the
development of psychopathology (Berger et al., 2007; Sroufe, 2007). The development of these
domains during emerging adulthood, as well as the influence of gender on SR, will be described
next.
SR in Emerging Adulthood
Importantly, the underlying skills and overall capacity for SR continue to develop
through adolescence and are not considered fully mature until adulthood, which corresponds to
the trajectory of frontal lobe development (Bava et al., 2010; Berger et al., 2007). Evidence
suggests that lower-order EFs, such as response inhibition and working memory, reach maturity
in late adolescence, whereas higher-order EFs, such as sequencing and planning, do not reach
maturity until adulthood (Nigg, 2017). This mirrors the observed increase in goal-directed
behavior and future-oriented thinking in emerging adulthood, which are key aspects of adaptive
SR (Taber-Thomas & Pérez-Edgar, 2015).
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Elements of cognitive, emotional, and social development during emerging adulthood are
interwoven with the development of SR. Cognitively, the transition from formal operations to
postformal thought helps the individual progress from rigidly applying rules (i.e., control) and
allows for a higher level of reasoning needed to flexibly apply social rules and expectations (i.e.,
regulation; Despotović, 2014; Labouvie-Vief, & Diehl, 2000). This is particularly important
given the increasingly complex social environment characteristic of emerging adulthood (Taylor
et al., 2014). Balancing consequences becomes complicated when ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’
decisions become grey, as is the case with complex social environments. For effective SR in this
context, heightened theory of mind and empathy skills are required in order to hold multiple
perspectives at once. The individual must be able to link outcomes not only to personal goals, but
also to interpersonal expectations and moral principles (Posner & Rothbart, 2000).
In addition, risk-taking and reward sensitivity decline through emerging adulthood, both
of which influence the outcome evaluation component of SR (Pharo et al., 2011; Urošević et al.,
2012). Reward sensitivity strongly influences an individual’s desired balance between short- and
long-term consequences as well as the degree to which regulation is required (Barkley, 1997a).
These functions are all impacted by an increasing maturation of the connection between the
prefrontal cortex and limbic system during emerging adulthood, which allows the individual to
more effectively integrate social, emotional, and reward information (Taber-Thomas & PérezEdgar, 2015). In other words, over time, it becomes easier for individuals to work towards
delayed rewards rather than always opting for immediate rewards.
Based on evidence from multiple levels of analysis, the developmental trajectories of the
subdomains of SR (i.e., behavioral, cognitive, emotional) converge at maturity in the midtwenties (Bridgett et al., 2015). As such, emerging adulthood appears to be a critical
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developmental period during which the capacity for adaptive SR and related processes are
reaching integration and stability. For undergraduate students, heightened educational demands,
challenges with work/life balance, and variable access to support systems foster an environment
that requires adequate SR abilities to be successful (Arnett, 2015). Given ongoing development
of SR abilities during emerging adulthood and the environmental expectations of undergraduate
students, the present sample sought to represent a range of maturing SR abilities that are actively
engaged as a result of a dynamic environment.
Gender Differences in SR
Investigations of gender differences in domain-general SR demonstrate mixed findings,
particularly in studies of adults (Hosseini-Kamkar & Morton, 2014). In terms of the underlying
mechanisms of SR, little evidence is suggestive of clear gender differences in EF (Grissom &
Reyes, 2019). Some studies have found advantages for males versus females on certain EF tasks,
but no systematic pattern of advantage. Rather than differences in EF or SR ability, some
differences have been identified in the motivation behind behavioral adjustment or strategy use
(e.g., risk-taking, punishment sensitivity; Cross et al., 2011; Grissom & Reyes, 2019). Other
evidence of possible differences has come from developmental studies, which demonstrate a
slight advantage in SR abilities for females as compared to males, particularly in terms effortful
control and delay of gratification, which does not appear to differ as a function of age
(Kochanska et al., 2000; Raffaelli et al., 2005). However, a meta-analysis of 33 studies found
that the effect size for gender differences in delay of gratification across samples was quite small
(r = .06; Silverman, 2003). Another meta-analysis of 277 studies found no gender differences in
EF, a small advantage for females in effortful control (d = .08), and stronger differences in
punishment sensitivity as well as risk-taking (Cross et al., 2011).
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Overall, these findings suggest that while gender differences may exist in components
that contribute to SR (e.g., motivation, strategy use), no clear pattern of gender differences in
underlying ability (e.g., EF) or overall SR have been consistently demonstrated. In particular, the
lack of differences identified in EF indicate a lack of differences in the underlying structure of
SR across genders. That is, even if there are small differences in contributing factors or strength
of abilities, findings do not suggest that the underlying structure of SR is different across
genders.
Psychopathology
SR is a critical component of adaptive functioning across domains. In particular, the
ability to monitor, evaluate, and adapt behavior to be in line with goals has implications for
academic (Nota et al., 2004), occupational (Porath & Bateman, 2006), and social functioning
(Murphy et al., 2004). In addition to direct effects, SR deficits can have a cascading impact, such
that negative effects in one domain can spread to other domains across development (Masten &
Cicchetti, 2010). The accumulation of impairment across domains can lead to increased levels of
stress and challenges with coping. Indeed, the cascading impact of SR deficits has a notable
impact on psychological well-being and overall adjustment (Ryan et al., 1997; Strauman, 2017).
While SR can have a substantial impact, it remains a process that develops alongside other
processes (Sroufe, 2007). This perspective helps to shift the focus away from SR deficits as a
causative factor and instead focuses on the questions of 1) how do SR deficits connect to
psychopathological trajectories and 2) how does the process of SR vary when other features are
present?
SR is considered a transdiagnostic construct, or a construct that is involved in the onset
and maintenance of multiple psychological disorders (Santens et al., 2020; Sauer-Zavala et al.,
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2017). SR has consistently been connected to both internalizing (i.e., directed toward the self)
and externalizing (i.e., directed toward the environment) forms of psychopathology, including
but not limited to mood disorders (e.g., Larson et al., 2005; Strauman, 2017), substance use
disorders (e.g., Zucker et al., 2011), and neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g., Barkley, 1997b;
Nathalie, 2011). The present study focused on a widespread form of psychopathology with a
well-established connection to SR deficits, depression.
SR & Depression
Strauman (2017) presented a model of depression that suggests the onset of a depressive
episode may follow a failure in goal attainment due to deficits in SR. This could be a single
failure to reach a goal that was highly valued or important to the individual (Street, 2002) or a
repeated failure in domains connected to intrinsic motivation for approach-related goals (Winch
et al., 2015). For example, repeated failures to achieve a promotion at work might continuously
diminish the individual’s motivation to devote time and energy toward future promotion
opportunities. According to Strauman (2017), this failure to reach a goal sets the individual up
for a ‘downward spiral,’ such that with repeated instances of failure to reach goals, the
consequences (physiological, cognitive, and interpersonal) increase in severity and pervasiveness
across contexts. For instance, repeated failure to achieve a promotion may lead to maladaptive
thought patterns (e.g., “I am not qualified,” or “What is the point in trying anymore?”). In
addition, continuous, negative events at work could lead to fatigue (Gross, et al., 2011), which
then might impact the individual’s motivation to be social after work. These consequences that
originated in the occupational domain could thus have negative effects on other domains of
functioning, leading to novel, pervasive consequences across contexts.
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Failure in goal attainment across time has negative impacts on the mechanisms of SR,
thereby increasing the potential for subsequent depressive episodes (Strauman, 2017). This could
be related to several factors, such as expectancy of failure, low self-efficacy, or prolonged
negative affect, all of which have been found to impair SR abilities (Bandura & Locke, 2003;
Bridgett et al., 2013; Rasmussen et al., 2006). Overall, Strauman’s (2017) model posits SR
deficits could serve to both initiate and maintain a depressive episode. Indeed, SR has been
consistently identified as a contributing factor to depressive symptoms across several levels of
investigation (Acuff et al., 2019; Carver et al., 2008; Papadakis et al., 2006; Strauman, 2002).
SR, Gender, & Depression
Many investigations have focused on the regulation of emotion in terms of gender and
depressive symptoms, but the evidence for gender impacting the relationship between domaingeneral SR and depression remains unclear (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2004). That is, in the
context of gender and depression, SR is investigated when the target or regulation is emotion, for
example in studies of rumination, stress management, or substance use (e.g., Thayer et al., 1994;
Udo et al., 2009). As a result of this focus, these studies are more informative of the relationships
among ER, gender, and depression rather than domain-general SR. One study found that
together, the perception that one is failing to achieve a valued goal and a ruminative coping style
interacted to exacerbate depressive symptoms for females (Papadakis et al., 2006). This finding
might suggest that elements of domain-general SR (e.g., non-emotional goal attainment) and ER
(e.g., rumination) interact to influence depressive symptoms; however, this sample investigated
these relationships only in females. The lack of examination of this intersection may be due to
the inconsistent gender differences found for domain-general SR previously noted or due to the
focus of investigations on aspects of SR or closely related constructs (e.g., focusing on ER or EF
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components). Overall, past research is not suggestive of a significant impact of gender on the
relationship between domain-general SR and depressive symptoms.
Measurement
The measurement of SR is complicated given that most of the elements that comprise SR
occur covertly and are thus challenging to observe (Barkley, 1997a). Added complexity stems
from the overlap in related constructs (Table 1) and the wide range of components involved,
which has led to a lack of cohesion in the operationalization of SR. Duckworth and Kern (2011)
commented on this issue and noted that instead of ongoing debate within the field regarding the
construct validity of SR, research groups tend to focus on assessment tools that align with their
adopted theoretical approach. This often occurs in isolation without a nuanced consideration of
closely related constructs.
As previously described, the underlying mechanisms of SR (e.g., EFs) are often
conceptualized separately from the functions of SR (e.g., goal attainment). This makes a
comprehensive assessment of SR challenging. In light of this challenge, few assessment
approaches attempt to capture the entirety of SR in one measure. Instead, investigations of SR
often include assessment of either the underlying mechanisms or the overall ability to regulate
behavior. Commonly, these assessments are accomplished through the use of behavioral EF tasks
and self-report measures, respectively. Each of these approaches is reviewed below. Then, the
measures to be utilized in the present study will be specified.
Behavioral EF Tasks
Investigations of SR often include assessments of the individual EFs thought to comprise
SR. Typical assessment of an EF involves a performance, or behaviorally-based task. These tasks
require the individual to perform some action in order to demonstrate an underlying function.
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Meta-analyses have identified the following EFs as being commonly assessed in the context of
SR investigations: behavioral or response inhibition, working memory, planning/sequencing, and
task-switching (Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Hofmann et al., 2012). Tasks frequently used to
measure these functions include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. Inhibition
a. Go/No-Go Task (Newman et al., 1985)
b. Stop Signal Task (Logan, 1994)
c. Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935)
2. Working Memory
a. Operation Span Task (Turner & Engle, 1989)
b. Backwards Digit Span (Wechsler, 2014)
3. Planning/Sequencing
a. Tower of London Task (Shallice, 1982)
b. Porteus Maze Task (Porteus, 1942)
4. Set-Shifting
a. Wisconsin Card Sort Test (Berg, 1948)
b. Trail Making Test-Part B (Partington et al., 1949)
These tasks have been included in varied investigations of SR (e.g., Amodio et al., 2008;
Sarkis et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2002; Todd & Mullan, 2013). Despite the widespread use of
these tasks as indicators of SR, several theorists have raised concerns regarding this practice.
Barkley (2001) argues that the current approach to measuring EFs reflects restricted constructs
that do not account for the adaptive motivations behind the function. That is, an EF employed
intentionally in the service of SR reflects a higher-order effort by the individual to serve some
purpose, which is not captured when isolating the behavior itself (Barkley, 2001). Similarly,
Nigg (2017) suggests that the combination of individual EFs does not equate to the overall
ability to regulate behavior. This is evidenced by interventions that seek to train EFs that do not
consistently generalize to overall behavior change (e.g., Allom et al., 2016; Shipstead et al.,
2010). These perspectives suggest that even investigations that include all the above tasks of EF
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might still be missing the larger picture, let alone investigations that include only a sub-set of
these tasks.
Further concerns arise when considering that measures of EFs are often imperfect in their
reliability (e.g., Paap & Sawi, 2016) and validity (e.g., Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Paap and Sawi
(2016) found that reliability and validity were higher for tasks assessing EFs when only a single
indicator of performance, such as response time, was used; however, this led to a narrowed, or
‘impure’ conceptualization of the EF itself (p. 88). Conversely, when multiple indicators are
used, such as difference scores, lower reliability and validity estimates are found (Paap & Sawi,
2016). Regarding validity, Duckworth and Kern (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of 282 studies
that used different approaches to SR assessment, namely EF tasks and self-report measures, and
found the lowest levels of convergent validity for tasks of EF. This is likely influenced by the
variety of underlying functions assessed (i.e., measures of response inhibition, working memory,
delay of gratification), but is worrisome when considering that, when combined, the tasks are
intended to measure a cohesive construct of SR (Duckworth & Kern, 2011).
Reliability and validity considerations are particularly relevant when behavioral tasks of
EF are used to inform patterns of psychopathology. Evaluating the adequacy of the psychometric
properties for measures that are used to represent an underlying construct is important when
considering construct validity (Byrne, 2016). More specifically, if a collection of tasks that
measure EF is presumed to represent SR, the inference inherent in this practice introduces the
need to evaluate whether the EF tasks are capturing the construct of SR as intended. If the tasks
are already an imperfect measure of the observed variables (i.e., EF), using them to inform an
underlying construct could serve to exacerbate validity concerns. This is critical to consider
when using observed variables to characterize the relationship between a latent construct and an
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outcome, for instance using EF tasks to make statements about the relationship between SR and
depression. If issues of reliability and validity are not considered, a significant amount of error
may be embedded in the relationship that is not appropriately addressed or interpreted.
Self-Report Measures of SR
An alternative approach to assessing individual EFs as indicators of SR is to use selfreport measures that assess the ability to regulate behavior. In contrast to behavioral EF tasks,
self-report measures are better able to assess different components of SR simultaneously. This
often includes questions related to behavioral, cognitive, and emotional components of SR as
well as the outcome of goal attainment (e.g., Carey et al., 2004; Moilanen, 2007). Of note, in part
due to the range of theories and operationalizations of SR, as well as the alternative use of
behavioral tasks to assess EFs, relatively few self-report measures of SR are universally
administered or considered “widely used” (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Rather, individual
research teams often use measures that are more specific to their theoretical foundations (e.g.,
temperament researchers use SR measures grounded in temperament theory; Evans & Rothbart,
2007). With this in mind, the most common approaches to the self-report assessment of SR are
described below, including measurement of overall SR ability, top-down SR, and executive
functions.
Given the complexity of the construct, not many measures attempt to assess the overall
ability to regulate behavior. However, within the clinical literature, two measures have emerged
that aim to accomplish this feat: the Self-Regulation Questionnaire and the Adolescent SelfRegulatory Inventory. The Self-Regulation Questionnaire (Brown et al., 1999) was developed
based on Miller and Brown’s (1991) model of SR in the context of addictive behaviors. Since
then, the measure has been adapted to a short form (SSRQ; Carey et al., 2004) and used in a
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variety of contexts to assess domain-general SR (e.g., Brown et al., 2015; Durand-Bush et al.,
2015; Hong, 2013).
The second measure that aims to capture a comprehensive picture of SR is the Adolescent
Self-Regulatory Inventory (ASRI; Moilanen, 2007). This inventory was specifically developed
based on Barkley’s (1997a) model of SR. Similar to the SSRQ, the ASRI is designed to assess
multiple aspects of SR, including behavioral, attentional, emotional, and cognitive domains
(Moilanen, 2007). The ASRI has demonstrated good psychometric properties and has been used
in investigations of undergraduate populations (e.g., Moilanen, 2007; Moilanen, 2015; Moilanen
& Manuel, 2017; Ramli et al., 2018). Though this measure fills a gap in the literature by aiming
to capture the overall ability to regulate behavior based on Barkley’s (1997a) model of EF, it has
not gained widespread use in the field.
Another approach to SR assessment is to focus specifically on the top-down components
of SR. In particular, this involves measurement of related constructs such as ‘effortful control’ or
‘self-control’ (Table 1). One of the most recognized measurements of effortful control is a
subscale of the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ; Evans & Rothbart, 2007). The effortful
control subscale of the ATQ (ATQ-EC) assesses three related components: inhibitory control,
activation control, and attentional control (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). The ATQ-EC has
demonstrated good psychometric properties and has been used in several studies across adult
populations (Santens et al., 2020; Waegeman et al., 2014).

Several measures have been developed to assess the overlapping construct of self-control,
such as the Self-Control Questionnaire (Brandon et al., 1990), the Self-Control Schedule
(Rosenbaum, 1980), and the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004). These measures
assess the ability to resist temptation and engage in effortful responses. Example items on these
measures include, “I wish I had more self-discipline,” and “I usually plan my work when faced
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with a number of things to do.” The Self-Control Questionnaire is focused more so on healthrelated behaviors than domain-general SR (Brandon et al., 1990). Similarly, the Self-Control
Schedule is somewhat restricted in that it includes several items focused on somatic symptoms
and addictive behaviors (Rosenbaum, 1980).
The Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS; Tangney et al., 2004) was designed in response to
this lack of domain-general self-control scales. The BSCS has been used in several studies since
its development; however, recent examinations of the scale have brought to light concerns
regarding its unidimensional factor structure. Specifically, two factors were identified, restraint
and impulsivity (Maloney et al., 2012). Subsequent investigations have demonstrated that despite
this multidimensional factor structure, the total score of the BSCS remains the most powerful in
predicting outcomes (Lindner et al., 2015). The BSCS has demonstrated good psychometric
properties and has been used in several investigations with undergraduate samples (Manapat et
al., 2019; Tangney et al., 2004).
The final approach to the self-report assessment of SR is through the assessment of EF
via questionnaire. Some of these measures include the Frontal Systems Behavioral Scale (Grace
& Malloy, 2001), the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (Wilson et al., 1996), the Behavior Rating
Inventory of Executive Function (Roth et al., 2005), and the Webexec (Buchanan et al., 2010).
Though self-report measures of EFs may seem like a viable alternative to behavioral EF tasks,
several researchers have raised concerns regarding the construct validity of self-report EF
measures. Buchanan (2016) found that self-report EF measures and behavioral EF tasks did not
correlate as expected, leading to questions of what the self-reports actually measure. Meltzer and
colleagues (2017) echoed this concern that self-report measures are not tapping the same
constructs as behavioral EF tasks. When considering these concerns in combination with the
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previously mentioned interpretation and error that can already be introduced when using EFs as
indicators of SR, using self-report measures of EF may be problematic, depending on the specific
research aims.
Summary of SR Measurement
Importantly, comparative studies of these two forms of assessment have indicated that
behavioral EF tasks and self-report measures do not demonstrate strong overlap and appear to
measure different aspects of SR (Allom et al., 2016; Friedman & Banich, 2019). While this may
be expected given what is known regarding shared method variance (e.g., Campbell & Fiske,
1959), it presents a challenge for investigators interested in capturing a comprehensive picture of
an individual’s SR capacity. Self-report versus behavioral tasks intended to measure SR
demonstrate different levels of reliability (Enkavi et al., 2019), validity (Duckworth & Kern,
2011), and real-world predictability (Eisenberg et al., 2019).
Regarding reliability, Enkavi and colleagues (2019) conducted a meta-analysis of 154
studies and found that test-retest reliability was higher for self-report measures than for
behavioral EF tasks. The authors suggested this was likely due to the much higher within-subject
variability with behavioral EF tasks (Enkavi et al., 2019). As such, they concluded that selfreports are better suited for assessing individual differences than behavioral EF tasks. This
indicates that self-reports are likely more appropriate when assessing long-term, trait-like
processes involved in psychopathology.
Regarding validity, Duckworth and Kern (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of 282 studies
and found that convergent validity was higher for self-report measures than for behavioral
measures. In fact, the authors described self-report measures as having “dramatically stronger
evidence for convergent validity” (p.11). Given this finding, the authors recommended that any
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researchers facing budget, time, or other resource restraints should opt for self-report measures
of SR (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). This is because behavioral EF tasks often require more
equipment and in-person time, but do not appear to give an added benefit of validity.
Finally, Eisenberg and colleagues (2019) conducted a data-driven analysis and found that
self-report measures predict real-world outcomes better than behavioral EF tasks. The authors
used a data-driven procedure to connect both self-report measures and EF tasks to the outcomes
of substance use, diet and exercise, income/life milestones, and mental health. They found that
behavioral EF tasks were much less able to predict these outcomes than self-report measures.
They reasoned this could be due to overlap between the higher-order aspects of functioning
captured in the self-reports and the outcomes that are not captured in the narrowed focus on a
behavioral function with EF tasks (Eisenberg et al., 2019). They also noted the lack of predictive
ability could be due to the ‘contrived nature’ of EF tasks; on the other hand, the stronger
connection between self-reports and outcomes could be due to shared method variance
(Eisenberg et al., 2019). Regardless of the explanation, these findings suggest that connections
between EF tasks and real-world outcomes should be interpreted based on the amount of
variance explained rather than reaching statistical significance.
Present Study Measures of SR
In considering these advantages regarding reliability, validity, and real-world prediction
in addition to the cost, time, and resource benefits, the present study utilized self-report measures
to assess SR. As previously specified, three measures of each construct were utilized based on
the criteria of (1) aim to capture the overall construct, (2) connection to theory, and (3) frequency
of use in the field. The SR measures included in the present study were the SSRQ (Brown et al.,
1999; Carey et al., 2004), the ASRI (Moilanen, 2007), and the BSCS (Tangney et al., 2004). The
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SSRQ and ASRI were selected based on their goal of assessing the overall ability to regulate
behavior. The ASRI in particular was chosen based on its theoretical foundation in Barkley’s
(1997a) model of SR. Finally, the SSRQ and BSCS were selected based on their widespread use
in clinical investigations of SR. All three measures have demonstrated good psychometric
properties and have been utilized in undergraduate populations. They will each be described in
more detail in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER III
EMOTION REGULATION
Emotions are an integral part of human functioning. It is widely acknowledged that
emotions likely evolved to cue adaptive response sets (e.g., Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). That is,
emotions provide valuable information that can be used to guide behavior across contexts. While
emotions are often beneficial, it has also been recognized that elements of the emotional
experience can disrupt adaptive functioning (Gross, 2014). This potential for disruption creates a
need for individuals to be able to monitor, evaluate, and adapt emotional responding, a process
referred to as emotion regulation (ER; Thompson, 1994). The present chapter provides an
overview of the process of ER and speaks to its overlap with SR. First, a brief foundation for
understanding emotions is provided. Then, the definition, mechanisms, and functions of ER are
described. Next, a theoretical model of ER is presented and connected to Bandura’s (1991) and
Barkley’s (1997a) models of SR. In the final section, key aspects of development,
psychopathology, and measurement specific to the process of ER are reviewed. Gender
differences are highlighted throughout.
Definition & Theory
Understanding Emotions
Conceptualizations of emotion have shifted drastically since the assumption that
emotions were subjective interpretations of physiological reactions (James, 1884). It is now
understood that emotions are ways of responding to stimuli in the environment that serve to cue
subsequent adaptive response sets (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). Specifically, emotions are thought
to have evolved as a way to coordinate behavioral, cognitive, and physiological responses to
common situations. Ekman (1992) described these common situations as ‘fundamental life
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tasks,’ such as dangers, achievements, or losses, to which certain ways of responding have been
more successful, evolutionarily speaking, than others.
Although significant debate remains regarding the universality of emotions (Nelson &
Russell, 2013), most theorists agree that emotions tend to differ along the dimensions of valence
and intensity (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). Valence refers to the negative versus positive qualities
of an emotion that prompt approach or avoidance behaviors; this is also congruent with the
dimension of pleasure versus pain (Barrett, 2006). Intensity refers to the degrees or gradations of
emotion that could range from none to a maximum that varies across individuals (Reisenzein,
1994). Differences in the valence and intensity of emotions serve as the basis of information
needed for a particular response set (i.e., behavioral, cognitive, and physiological responses) to
be cued and coordinated. For instance, low levels of joy cue a different response set than high
levels of anger.
Relevant to considerations of SR, emotions are inherently goal-directed (Ochsner &
Gross, 2014). This is because whether a stimulus is appraised as personally relevant triggers the
experience of emotions. An individual seeing a tiger in a cage may not provoke fear; however,
seeing an uncaged tiger running toward them increases its personal relevance and likely triggers
the experience of fear. In many situations, emotions function to direct behavior such that positive
states are increased, and negative states are decreased (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). For example,
an individual may be motivated to decrease anxiety by declining an invitation to speak at an
event. It is important to note, however, that goal states are subjective (Ochsner & Gross, 2014).
For instance, if the individual wants to be a performer, they may seek out events to speak at.
Gross (2014) emphasizes the idea that emotions are tied to the meaning behind situations, such
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that if the situation or the meaning behind the situation changes in terms of the individual’s
goals, the emotion changes as well.
A critical component of emotions is that they initiate impulses to act or not act (Gross,
2014). This could involve surface level behavioral actions, such as facial expressions,
vocalizations, or changes in posture, as well as internal, physiological reactions, such as changes
in heart rate, breathing pace, or metabolic support for motoric action. However, as noted,
emotions depend on personal goals, which can change based on situational meanings (Gross,
2014). Thus, the cued response that may have been evolutionarily adaptive may not be adaptive
in the context of personal goals (Thompson, 1994). This discrepancy between evolutionarydriven emotional responses and personal goals is particularly relevant in dynamic social
contexts. As such, individuals need to be able to modulate the experience of emotions across
behavioral, cognitive, and physiological domains, giving rise to the need for ER (Gross, 2014).
Defining ER
Domain-general regulation refers to the adaptive modulation of behavior, cognition, or
emotion (Nigg, 2017). It is referred to as emotion regulation when the target of regulation is
emotion. ER involves the ability to adjust or maintain the strength of the experience or
expression of emotion (Davidson, 1998). Like domain-general regulation, the process of ER is
considered extrinsic if it is facilitated by forces other than the individual. This occurs in early
stages of development when children rely on caregivers to regulate their emotions, for example
when a caregiver soothes a crying infant (Thompson, 1994). The process of ER becomes
increasingly internalized as the child gets older, following a parallel trajectory to SR (Rothbart et
al., 2011). Given that multiple modalities (i.e., behavioral, cognitive, physiological) are involved
in the experience of emotions, ER correspondingly includes these domains.
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More so than with the investigation of SR, the investigation of ER has progressed in two
complimentary directions of study: the study of wellness and the study of psychopathology.
Studies of ER in the context of wellness often examine mechanisms related to the maximization
of positive emotions and the minimization of negative emotions (e.g., Quoidbach et al., 2010),
which has led to a well-established bridge between ER and positive psychology (Tamir & Gross,
2011). In addition, increasing recognition of the social aspects of ER has prompted theorists to
outline a framework for a distinct form of coping with emotions, referred to as interpersonal ER
(Zaki & Williams, 2013). Similar to SR, ER has also been investigated from social cognitive
(e.g., Ochsner & Gross, 2008), personality (e.g., Stanton et al., 2016), developmental (e.g., Cole,
2014), and clinical (e.g., Sloan et al., 2017) perspectives.
Despite similarities between the widespread investigation of SR and ER, the construct of
ER has suffered less from overlapping terms and definitions than the construct of SR, but the
issue remains. Some have described this as “conceptual and definitional chaos” (Buck, 1990, p.
330, as cited in Gross, 2014). Perhaps one of the most influential theorists in the study of ER has
been James Gross, who has worked to form a cohesive understanding of the construct of ER and
its relation to other constructs (Gross, 1998, 2014; Table 2). Though other theorists have
suggested comparable definitions of ER, the present study adopted Gross’s definition, which is
specified as follows:
“Emotion regulation refers to the processes by which individuals influence which
emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these
emotions. Emotion regulatory processes may be automatic or controlled, conscious or
unconscious, and may have their effects at one or more points in the emotion generative
process” (Gross, 1998, p. 275).
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Multiple aspects of this definition are worth noting. First, like SR, ER can be automatic or
controlled, also referred to as bottom-up or top-down ER (Gyurak et al., 2011). For example, an
individual looking away from a frightening scene in a movie would be considered reactive, or
bottom-up ER, whereas an individual choosing to watch a heart-warming movie to lift their
mood would be considered effortful, or top-down ER. Second, ER involves modulation of the
‘what,’ ‘when,’ and ‘how’ of emotions, which Thompson (1994) describes as influencing the
dynamics of the emotion itself. These might include the onset, rise time, intensity, duration, and
recovery from the emotion (Thompson, 1994). Finally, the element of time is an integral
component of ER; this aspect will be described later in this chapter in the context of Gross’s
(1998, 2015) model of ER. One important aspect that this definition does not capture is the
function of ER, which is to allow flexible emotional responding across contexts. More detail
regarding the bottom-up versus top-down components, emotion dynamics, and function of ER is
presented next.
Bottom-up vs. Top-down ER. The same dual-process principles that govern bottom-up
versus top-down SR also apply to ER (Gyurak et al., 2011). Bottom-up ER can be reflexive or
habituated, prime top-down ER, and provide useful information related to goals. Top-down ER
reflects an effortful process by the individual to engage regulation abilities in service of goal
attainment (Gross, 2014). Unlike SR, ER is unique in that emotions can serve as both the target
of regulation and the modality of regulation (Gross, 2014). Bottom-up and top-down processes
can be involved in both the generation of emotions and the regulation of emotions (McRae et al.,
2012; Ochsner et al., 2009). As a target, emotions can be reactive, such that a stimulus is
presented in the environment that cues an emotional response (McRae et al., 2012). For example,
an individual might experience sadness when a co-worker does not acknowledge them.
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Table 2
Term Definitions for Constructs Overlapping with ER
Term
Affect

Emotion
Mood

Definition
Superordinate term for valanced states; encompasses emotions, stress
responses, and mood.
Includes both negative and positive affective states; involves whole-body
responses to significant events; elicited by specific objects and gives rise to
behavioral response tendencies relevant to these objects.
Includes negative and positive affective states that last longer than emotions;
more diffuse than emotions; may give rise to broad action tendencies such as
approach or withdrawal; biases cognition more than biases action.

Stress

Includes negative (but otherwise unspecified) affective states; involves
whole-body responses to significant events.

Affect
Regulation

Superordinate term for regulating valanced states; encompasses emotion
regulation, mood regulation, coping, and defense mechanisms.

Emotion
Regulation

Process of influencing which emotions one has, when one has them, and
how one experiences or expresses these emotions.

Mood
Regulation

Concerned with altering emotion experience rather than emotion behavior.

Coping

Primary focus on decreasing negative emotions; effortful processes;
emphasis on longer periods of time than emotion or mood regulation.

Defense
Mechanisms

Primary focus on decreasing negative emotions; occur unconsciously; stable
individual differences rather than processes.

Note. Term definitions sourced from Gross (1998, p. 273; 2014, pp. 5-6).

Conversely, emotions can also be generated by the individual, for example recalling an
experience of loss could lead to sadness. In a similar sense, emotions can be regulated via
reactive or effortful processes (Gross, 2014). An individual might turn to walk the other direction
to avoid experiencing anxiety if they unexpectedly run into their boss at the grocery store
(bottom-up ER) or they might choose to go for a run if they are experiencing anger (top-down
ER). Evidence suggests that emotions generated by top-down processes are better regulated by
top-down processes, and vice versa (McRae et al., 2012).
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Modalities of ER. ER involves monitoring, evaluating, and adjusting the ‘what,’ ‘when,’
and ‘how’ of emotions (Gross, 2014). The first element, the ‘what’ of emotions, refers to what
emotion is being expressed or experienced, such as anger, fear, joy, or sorrow, among many
other possibilities (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). The expression and experience of an emotion
involves processes across modalities, including but not limited to cognitive factors, physiological
arousal, executive function activation, and behavioral action tendencies (Thompson, 1994). In
this sense, ER matches SR in its pervasiveness across modalities. An example of ER impacting
the ‘what’ of an emotion might be a caregiver attempting to inhibit boredom and instead feign
interest in a child’s soccer game. The caregiver would need to maintain attention, cognitively
reappraise the situation by reminding themselves things like, “It will be over soon,” and engage
in relevant actions such as clapping and cheering at the appropriate times. By coordinating these
responses, ER works across modalities to facilitate an adaptive response relative to the
individual’s goals (Gross, 2014).
The second element, the ‘when’ of emotions, involves the onset of the emotional
experience (Thompson, 1994). This is closely related to an EF described in the process of SR:
response inhibition. Being able to inhibit the prepotent emotional response can be adaptive in a
variety of contexts (Barkley, 2015). For example, inhibiting the initial response of laughter when
a child is misbehaving and waiting to laugh until the child is out of earshot. This will be
discussed more in the context of Barkley’s (1997a) model later in this chapter.
The third element, the ‘how’ of emotions, refers to altering the way the emotion is
expressed (Gross, 2014). An individual might express anger in a variety of ways, including
initiating a physical fight, yelling, or destroying property. In many cases, these expressions may
be maladaptive; to regulate this emotional response, an individual might inhibit the initial
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tendency, and instead take three deep breaths. Adjusting the format of emotional expression is a
particularly important aspect of social functioning, among other domains (Thompson, 1994).
The remaining emotion dynamics describe the course of the emotional experience. That
is, how long does it take for an emotion to reach its maximum (rise time), where does it plateau
(intensity), how long does it last (duration), and how quickly does it return to baseline (recovery;
Thompson, 1994). Each element of an emotion’s trajectory is reflective of individual differences
(Kuppens & Verduyn, 2015). How quickly an individual becomes angry, what maximum anger
looks like for them, and how long it takes for them to move past the stimulus that triggered the
anger are all subjective variables connected to trait-like, emotional tendencies. Further
complexity stems from the fact that individuals can vary on each dynamic dimension both across
emotions (i.e., different courses for anger versus sadness) and within emotions (i.e., quick rise
time for anger in some situations but slow rise time in others; Davidson, 1998).
Other factors that influence the course of emotions include relevance of the stimulus to
personal goals and values (Verduyn et al., 2013), as well as characteristics of the situation,
including stimulus frequency, intensity, and duration (Verduyn et al., 2012). These factors, in
combination with the individual differences in emotion dynamics mentioned above, help to set
thresholds for emotional experience and expression as well as thresholds for when ER abilities
are engaged (Davidson, 1998).
Functions of ER. As previously stated, emotions are goal-directed in that they serve to
cue adaptive responses (Ochsner & Gross, 2014). However, while the cued response may have
been evolutionarily adaptive in the context of a fundamental life task (e.g., danger, achievement,
loss), it may no longer be adaptive (Thompson, 1994). Nesse and Ellsworth comment on this
discrepancy by noting, “Emotions are often elicited in situations in which they are useless” (p.
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133). Beyond uselessness, Thompson (1994) argues that emotions can be inappropriate in
guiding behavior and thus maladaptive. These points highlight the potential mismatch between
an emotion and a future goal. The mismatch might stem from situational factors, such that with
dynamic social environments, adaptive responses that align with goals may shift over time.
Another possibility is that the mismatch stems from person-specific goals (e.g., evolution or
learning principles might lead to a fear of heights, yet an individual’s goal may be to become a
tree trimmer). This discrepancy between response and goal generates a need for the individual to
engage ER abilities (Gross, 2014).
The process of ER provides humans with a higher-order, future-oriented skill set that is
able to supersede prepotent emotional responses to facilitate goal attainment (Nesse & Ellsworth,
2009). Such goals may be related to a desired increase in positive or decrease in negative
emotions, or they may be connected to non-emotional goals (Tamir, 2016). Examples might
include feigning excitement about a gift to protect a friend’s feelings, attempting to remain calm
when driving in a snowstorm, or persevering through frustration after hitting a writer’s block.
Theorists who view ER from the perspective of utility in general goal pursuit recognize its
fundamental connection with the process of SR (e.g., Tamir, 2009, 2016). In other words, ER
and SR converge when ER is employed in service of non-emotional goals associated with
delayed, rather than immediate rewards.
In order to be adaptive in dynamic environments, emotional responding needs to be
flexible, specific to the situation, and overall helpful for the individual (Thompson, 1994).
Responding reactively based solely on stimulus-response tendencies does not help the individual
work toward long-term goals. For this flexibility to be accomplished, the emotion needs to be
regulated from several different points and perspectives. The ways through which ER
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successfully modulates emotional responding is described next through discussion of Gross’s
(1998, 2015) model of ER.
Models of ER
Gross’s (1998, 2015) theoretical and empirical work has been a notable catalyst in the
exponential growth of ER research beginning in the 1990s. While other models of ER are also
prominent (e.g., Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Thompson, 1994) and are incorporated into the present
study’s conceptualization of ER, no other model is as detailed a framework or widely
investigated as Gross’s process model (1998) and extended process model (2015) of ER (Tull &
Aldao, 2015). In the present discussion, Gross’s (1998) process model will be described first,
followed by the extended process model (Gross, 2015). The overlap between Gross’s (2015)
model of ER and Bandura’s (1991) model of SR will be highlighted. Then, ER will be placed in
the context of Barkley’s (1997a) model of SR and connected to EF.
Gross’s (1998) Process Model of ER. Discussion of Gross’s (1998) model of ER first
necessitates an overview of the modal model of emotions. This refers to the sequence of an
emotional experience from situation, to attention, to appraisal, to response, that occurs across
time (Gross, 2014; left column of Table 3). First, the situation relevant to an emotion occurs,
which could be external or internal. Next, the situation serves to capture attention if it is deemed
relevant to personal goals. Then, the attention-grabbing stimulus is appraised as either positive or
negative in connection to the individual’s goals. Finally, a response is cued across behavioral,
cognitive, and physiological domains.
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Table 3

←Time

Process Model of Emotion Regulation (Adapted from Gross, 2014)
Stage of Emotional Experience
Prior to emotional experience
Situation
Attention
Appraisal
Response

Corresponding ER Strategy
Situation Selection
Situation Modification
Attentional Deployment
Cognitive Change
Response Modulation

The original process model of ER (Gross, 1998) emphasizes that each component of the
modal model of emotion, in addition to selecting the situation itself, can be the targets of ER
abilities. Gross (2014) describes these as ‘families’ of ER strategies. These include situation
selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response
modulation (Gross, 1998, 2014; right column of Table 3). Other than the target itself, the main
component that differentiates these ER processes is the element of time. For instance, situation
selection would occur prior to the experience of emotions, situation modification would occur at
the beginning of the emotional experience, and so on (Gross, 2014). Each of the five families of
ER strategies will be briefly described next.
Situation selection operates by altering the probability of experiencing or not
experiencing an emotion by choosing situations based on their likely emotional impact (Gross,
2014). This might involve aiming to increase positive emotions, such as scheduling a spa day
after a difficult exam, or decrease negative emotions, such as putting off a tax appointment.
Situation modification refers to altering aspects of the situation in order to adjust the associated
emotional impact (Gross, 2014). For example, if an individual is unable to avoid attending a
dinner party at their in-laws, bringing a bottle of wine could help to alleviate distress. This can be
contrasted with situation selection, which would involve declining the invitation to attend in the
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first place. Attentional deployment refers to directing attention toward or away from an emotional
stimulus in order to alter the emotional experience. Gross (2014) describes a specific strategy
within attentional deployment, referred to as distraction, that involves replacing the emotional
stimulus with a different stimulus (Gross, 2014). This could be distraction from an external
stimulus (e.g., focusing on eating candy during a particularly frightening part of a movie) or an
internal stimulus (e.g., watching television if nervous about an upcoming job interview).
Cognitive change refers to altering thought patterns connected to an emotional
experience. A specific ER strategy within this family, referred to as reappraisal, has become one
of the most well-studied ER strategies (e.g., Diedrich et al., 2016; Milyavsky et al., 2019).
Reappraisal can involve rethinking an aspect of the situation itself, such as reframing a stressful
exam as a ‘learning opportunity,’ or rethinking the interpretation of the situation, such as
changing the thought, “If I do poorly on the exam, I must be stupid,” into “If I do poorly on the
exam, it is not a reflection of me as a person,” (Gross, 2014). Another specific strategy in this
family is rumination, or repetitive focus on thoughts, feelings, and behaviors related to
internalizing distress (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Although the distress is cognitively focused
on during rumination, active strategies regarding how to address the emotion or problem itself
are not generated or enacted. This leaves individuals in a prolonged state of negative affect and is
not considered an adaptive ER strategy (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012).
The final ER strategy family is response modulation, which includes strategies that are
engaged during the latest stages of the emotional experience, after a response tendency has been
triggered (Gross, 2014). Response modulation refers to changing something about the response
itself; this can occur across behavioral, cognitive, or physiological domains. This ER strategy
activates the process of inhibition. Emotional response inhibition overlaps with another
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commonly studied ER strategy, referred to as suppression (e.g., Ehring et al., 2010; Goldin et al.,
2008). Whereas inhibition refers more generally to inhibiting a prepotent response, suppression
specifically involves inhibiting responses associated with emotional behaviors, which could
include facial expressions, vocalizations, gestures, or body posture (Goldin et al., 2008). All five
ER strategy families are frequently used both on their own and in combination with each other
throughout daily life (Gross, 2014).
Gross’s (2015) Extended Process Model of ER. While the original (1998) process
model focuses on the importance of ER strategies, the extended model includes the critical role
of valuation, that is, the worth or level of meaning assigned to a situation based on the
individual’s goals (Gross, 2015). Gross’s proposed (2015) model includes a series of interrelated
levels of valuation that interact to influence the process of ER. Although this was a necessary
and beneficial addition to the original model, it is grounded in cybernetic/control systems theory
and is beyond the scope of the current discussion. Nevertheless, the idea of evaluating an
emotion or behavior in the context of one’s goals is an integral component of domain-general SR
and underscores the overlap between SR and ER (Nigg, 2017). Gross’s (2015) extended process
model adds another useful element in considering the overlap between ER and SR, such that the
process of ER is divided into three stages that overlap with several aspects of SR. The stages are
specified as follows:
1. Identification: concerned with when to regulate an emotion;
2. Selection: concerned with what strategy to use to regulate an emotion;
3. Implementation: concerned with implementing a particular tactic suited to the present
situation (Gross, 2015, pp. 14-15)
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Identification Stage. In the identification stage, the emotional experience is perceived,
evaluated as positive or negative affect, and gauged in intensity to determine whether ER
abilities should be activated (Gross, 2015). For example, an individual might recognize that a
feeling of sadness is distracting them from their work and thus needs to be addressed. The
identification stage corresponds to the self-observation stage of Bandura’s (1991) model of SR in
that it requires emotional awareness, understanding of antecedents and consequences, and
motivation to attend to emotional behaviors. Like self-observation in SR, identification of
emotions is impacted by an individual’s cognitive schemas, goal sets, and social priorities, as
these factors influence which emotions are given more conscious awareness or direct attention
(Bandura, 1991). This functions to provide the information necessary for the remainder of the
SR/ER process.
Selection Stage. In the selection stage, possible ER strategies are perceived and brought
to awareness, evaluated based on their match to the current emotional experience, and decided
upon (Gross, 2015). For example, an individual might prefer to use the strategy of distraction
when sad and decide to use this strategy in the current situation. The selection stage corresponds
to the judgement stage of Bandura’s (1991) model of SR in that it requires knowledge of possible
adjustments and a decision-making process regarding which adjustments would lead to desired
outcomes. Selecting an effective strategy depends on how the individual evaluates the
importance of the activity in relation to their goals and whether they feel able to address the issue
themselves (i.e., considerations of self-efficacy and locus of control; Bandura, 1991).
Implementation Stage. Finally, the implementation stage involves placing the chosen ER
strategy in the current context, evaluating whether any other specialized adjustments need to be
made, and enacting the strategy (Gross, 2015). For example, the individual might consider the
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use of distraction to alleviate sadness, recognize that they still need to get work done, and
determine that a brief distraction strategy (e.g., a 10-minute walk), would be best suited to the
current context. The implementation stage corresponds to the self-reaction stage of Bandura’s
(1991) model of SR in that it involves the enaction of behavioral adjustment in order to meet
individual goals. This stage draws on the individual’s motivation to adjust behavior and ability to
do so. The ideas of implementation (Gross, 2015) and self-reaction (Bandura, 1991) map on to
Barkley’s (1997a) idea of motor control/syntax/fluency (e.g., goal-directed behavior).
Given the overlap between the processes of SR and ER, it is no surprise that just as
Gross’s (1998, 2015) model corresponds to elements of Bandura’s (1991) model of SR, it also
corresponds to Barkley’s (1997a) model. Importantly, consideration of ER in the context of
Barkley’s (1997a) model allows for a connection to be drawn between ER and EF. This
connection will be discussed next.
ER in the Context of Barkley’s (1997a) Model of SR. Barkley’s (1997a) model of SR
directly specifies that ER processes fit into the model under the affect/motivation/arousal
component. Three important aspects of this model will be highlighted: the relationship between
response inhibition and ER, the relationship between ER and EF, and the relationship between
ER and the outcome component of motor control/fluency/syntax.
As previously mentioned, the idea of emotional response inhibition maps on to the
domain-general response inhibition EF component of Barkley’s (1997a) model. Similar to SR,
Barkley (2015) conceptualizes emotional response inhibition as being the first step in the process
of ER. Inhibiting the initial response tendency provides a delay period that allows for effortful
ER strategies (e.g., Table 3) to be employed. If the individual has already expressed the
prepotent emotion, then they will not be able to exert control and act intentionally or flexibly
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across situations (Barkley, 2015). Having a delay between the stimulus and the emotional
response can help the individual to consider the greater social context and respond in a socially
adaptive way (Barkley & Fischer, 2010). ER abilities therefore depend on the EF of response
inhibition. Indeed, empirical evidence has supported this connection (e.g., Hinshaw, 2003; Kühn
et al., 2014; Tang & Schmeichel, 2014).
Despite the conflicting terminology use, part of the ‘affect’ regulation component of
Barkley’s (1997a) model can be conceptualized as being synonymous with effortful ER. After
the prepotent response is inhibited, effortful ER strategies can be employed in service of goal
attainment, whether that be regarding emotional or non-emotional goals (Barkley, 2015; Tamir,
2016). Once the initial emotional response is inhibited, ER is able to work in conjunction with
the other EFs in Barkley’s model (i.e., working memory, internalization of speech, and
reconstitution) to adaptively adjust behavior (Barkley, 1997a). Empirical findings support
relationships between ER and working memory (e.g., Schmeichel et al., 2008), verbal fluency
(Gyurak et al., 2012), task-switching (Whitmer & Banich, 2007), and problem-solving
(Blanchard-Fields, 2007). Overall, these studies have demonstrated that individual differences in
EF are directly connected to differential success in regulating emotions (Hofmann et al., 2012;
Schmeichel & Tang, 2015).
As stated, the implementation stage of Gross’s (2015) model in which an ER strategy is
enacted overlaps with the motor control/syntax/fluency component of Barkley’s (1997a) model
in the form of organized, goal-directed behavior. From this perspective, ER and SR utilize the
same underlying mechanisms and have the same functional outcomes; the key differentiation is
that with ER processes, the target of regulation is the emotional experience (Gross, 2014).
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Development
The ability to regulate emotions emerges early on in development and follows a parallel
trajectory to SR development (Rothbart et al., 2011). In light of the inherent overlap between
these constructs, the same developmental features discussed in relation to SR also apply to ER.
Further, like SR, ER should be considered as a process that develops alongside other, related
processes (Sroufe, 2007). However, ER is unique in that it is intricately connected to the
development of emotion itself (Thompson, 2011). As new emotions and corresponding dynamics
emerge over the lifespan, regulation abilities must adapt (Davidson, 1998). Although the
connection between ER and emotional development is understandably strong, ER also shares
reciprocal relationships with neurological, cognitive, and social domains of development. These
relationships will be described next in the context of emerging adulthood. Then, gender
differences in ER will be highlighted.
ER in Emerging Adulthood
Perhaps the most relevant aspect of neurological development to the process of ER is the
maturation of connections between the frontal lobe and the limbic system (Taber-Thomas &
Pérez-Edgar, 2015). During emerging adulthood, white matter continues to increase, and the
processes of myelination and synaptogenesis are ongoing, all of which help to increase the
efficiency of the fronto-limbic pathway. This allows the frontal and prefrontal cortices, which are
critical for higher-order EFs, to gain more control over the limbic system, which is a key
component of emotion processing (Ahmed et al., 2015; Taber-Thomas & Pérez-Edgar, 2015).
Maturation of these brain regions corresponds to increasing emotional functioning and goaldirected behavior (Taber-Thomas & Pérez-Edgar, 2015).
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Cognitive elements are also closely related to ER development in emerging adulthood.
Similar to the influence of postformal thought on the evaluative component of SR, decisions of
‘right’ versus ‘wrong’ play a role in the valuation and strategy selection components of ER
(Gross, 2015). Postformal thought can influence cognitive appraisal and reappraisal strategies,
such that both logic and subjectivity are required to adaptively interpret emotional events
(Despotović, 2014). For instance, if an individual is late for an exam and gets a speeding ticket,
an effective reappraisal might include flexibility in the interpretation of ‘right’ (i.e., not
speeding) and ‘wrong’ (i.e., speeding) by keeping in mind the motivation behind the situation
(i.e., to get to the exam on time). This reappraisal might serve to better regulate the resulting
negative emotions. Cognitive reappraisal abilities have been found to increase linearly into
emerging adulthood (McRae et al., 2012).
An interesting overlap between ER and cognitive development is the notion of risktaking. Risk-taking, particularly in the context of sensation seeking, or the desire to increase
stimulation, has been identified as an ER strategy. For example, extreme sports (Woodman et al.,
2008), prolonged exposure high-risk sports (Woodman et al., 2010), and even substance use can
all be considered strategies to modify the emotional experience (Gross, 2015). It is possible that
the decline in risk-taking observed in late adolescence and emerging adulthood may correspond
with an increase in adaptive ER and a broader range of ER strategies to choose from. This
possibility is supported by evidence suggesting that ER strategies shift across the lifespan (e.g.,
Charles & Carstensen, 2014).
As mentioned, ER and emotional development go hand in hand. ER abilities are
particularly important during late adolescence and emerging adulthood when emotional
insecurity is high (Zimmermann & Iwanski, 2014). For individuals in this developmental period,
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the emotional experience might fluctuate quickly and follow varying courses (Crone & Dahl,
2012). Perhaps expectedly, higher levels of emotional reactivity, or individual variation in the
course of an emotion, have been shown to require higher levels of ER (Hare et al., 2008). In
addition, emotions tend to be more complex and more negative during late adolescence and
emerging adulthood than other developmental periods (Galambos et al., 2006; Hay & Diehl,
2011). Thus, the ongoing development of emotion necessitates a corresponding development of
ER abilities (Thompson, 2011).
Late adolescence and emerging adulthood represent the peak of reward sensitivity,
showing a decline into the early twenties (Urošević et al., 2012). Reward sensitivity is
particularly relevant to the valuation system involved in ER, such that sensitivity toward riskier
rewards can outweigh the value of prosocial rewards (Gross, 2015). As the fronto-limbic system
continues to mature, emerging adults become better at integrating emotional and social
information regarding rewards, helping them to evaluate rewards based on the greater social
context rather than being biased toward riskier rewards. Socially, theory of mind and empathy
skills are also maturing through this period, allowing for better integration of the social context
into individual emotional experiences and subsequent ER processes (Smits et al., 2011; Stietz et
al., 2019). Overall, these transitions reflect an underlying maturation of emotional processes that
is reflected in the maturation of ER abilities (Zimmerman & Iwanski, 2014). Parallel to the
rationale behind examining SR abilities during emerging adulthood, the present sample also
represented a dynamic period for the examination of ER.
Gender Differences in ER
Unlike the inconsistent gender differences observed in SR, gender differences in ER are
well-documented (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Although it is a commonly held belief that females
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are more emotional than males, empirical evidence regarding this difference is not clear (Barrett
& Bliss-Moreau, 2009). What is clear is that women report using a wider variety of ER strategies
and using them more often than males (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Interestingly, Nolen-Hoeksema
(2012) connects these patterns to the observed gender differences in developmental studies of
effortful control. Females appear to have slightly higher effortful control and delay of
gratification abilities than males (Raffaelli et al., 2005; Silverman, 2003).
While this adaptive advantage of SR and ER abilities should perhaps lead to reduced
prevalence of related disorders for females, this is not the case (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). It is
possible this is due to different implications of the ER strategies most frequently used by females
versus males (e.g., McRae et al., 2008). Specifically, several studies have demonstrated that
females are more likely to engage in rumination and seeking social support, whereas males are
more likely to engage in suppression or avoidance to regulate emotions (Johnson & Whisman,
2013; Flynn et al., 2010; Tamres et al., 2002). Gender differences in strategy use persist even
after emotional intensity is controlled (Zimmermann & Iwanski, 2014).
Unlike SR, there is clear evidence of gender differences in ER. Those differences,
however, appear to be more related to magnitude or frequency rather than the underlying
structure of ER. That is, although females appear to use a wider variety of strategies and use
them more frequently than males, the actual strategies implemented are common to both males
and females (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Overall, evidence does not seem to suggest that the
underlying structure of ER might differ between males and females.
Psychopathology
Considering that emotions are an integral part of human functioning, it makes sense that
deficits in ER abilities can impact several domains of functioning. Davidson (1998) notes that
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most, if not all, forms of psychopathology involve an emotional component. ER deficits have
been associated with impairment in academic (e.g., Seibert et al., 2017), occupational (e.g.,
Totterdell et al., 2012), and social (e.g., Lopes et al., 2005) functioning. ER is considered a
transdiagnostic construct (Sloan et al., 2017) and has been consistently connected to both
internalizing and externalizing forms of psychopathology (Aldao et al., 2016). These can include
mood disorders (e.g., Joormann & Siemer, 2014), anxiety disorders (e.g., Campbell-Sills et al.,
2014), and substance use disorders (e.g., Kober, 2014). The present study focused on a
widespread form of psychopathology with a well-established connection to ER deficits,
depression.
ER & Depression
It has been suggested that individuals with depression do not necessarily experience
higher levels of negative emotions than other people, but that they are less able to regulate those
emotions (Joorman & Stanton, 2016). Sheppes, Suri, and Gross (2015) identified specific points
of the ER process that, when dysregulated, could lead to depressive symptoms. First, during the
identification stage, when an emotional experience has been identified that reaches the threshold
of requiring ER abilities, the individual must actively engage ER abilities (Gross, 2015). If an
individual fails to follow through on this step, it could be related to learned helplessness or low
self-efficacy (Bandura et al., 2003; Sheppes et al., 2015). When ER abilities are not activated in
this step, the original emotion persists; if the emotion was negative, this could lead to a
prolonged period of negative affect for the individual.
Next, in the selection stage, a depressed individual may consider only maladaptive ER
strategies, such as rumination, suppression, or other forms of response modulation that could
lead to over-eating, over-sleeping, self-harm, or suicidal ideation (Sheppes et al., 2015).
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Evidence from a recent meta-analysis indicated that individuals with depression use more
maladaptive strategies and less adaptive strategies than their non-depressed counterparts (Visted
et al., 2018). In particular, the ER strategy of rumination has been consistently connected to
depression (Zhou et al., 2020). Although intended by individuals who use this strategy as a way
to regulate emotions, rumination has been found to exacerbate depressive symptoms (NolenHoeksema et al., 2008). ER deficits at this stage can be particularly impairing if the individual
believes the ER strategy they are implementing is beneficial when, in fact, it is detrimental.
Finally, in the implementation stage, an individual may fail to effectively implement an
ER strategy (Sheppes et al., 2015). Failure at this step could be related to a decreased ability to
implement effective ER strategies, such as difficulty with cognitive reappraisal (Joorman &
Stanton, 2016). It could also be related to learned helplessness or low self-efficacy, similar to the
identification stage (Bandura et al., 2003). Sheppes and colleagues noted that deficits at any
stage of the ER process can serve to initiate or maintain depressive episodes (2015).
ER, Gender, & Depression
The relationships among ER, gender, and depression have received significant empirical
attention in the last several years. Studies have indicated that adaptive strategies (e.g.,
reappraisal, acceptance) do not have the same level of influence on reducing depressive
symptoms that maladaptive strategies (e.g., rumination, suppression, avoidance) have on
exacerbating depressive symptoms (Aldao et al., 2010). While females tend to use more ER
strategies overall than males, theorists have suggested that the use of adaptive strategies may be
helpful only in some contexts, whereas the use of maladaptive strategies is detrimental in all
contexts (Nolen-Hoeksema & Aldao, 2011). For example, reappraisal or acceptance may not be
helpful if the situation is in fact harmful or dangerous.
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In particular, the connection between the maladaptive strategy of rumination and
depressive symptoms appears to be strong, as evidenced by large effect sizes across samples
(Aldao et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2020). This has highlighted the connection between the use of
rumination as an ER strategy and the higher prevalence rates of depression for females (Johnson
& Whisman, 2013). Nolen-Hoeksema (2012) suggested that, based on evidence that females
have heightened emotional awareness and have likely been socialized differently regarding
emotional expression than males, it is possible that sometimes the heightened awareness and
reflective focus becomes maladaptive and leads to rumination. Indeed, ER strategies have been
found to mediate the relationship between emotional awareness and depressive symptoms
(Eastabrook et al., 2014). Overall, past research suggests the impact of ER on depressive
symptoms may be stronger for females than for males.
Measurement
Though substantial work has been done to differentiate the process of ER from related
processes, issues with the path from theory to measurement of ER remain. This likely reflects the
complexity of ER as a construct, including its pervasiveness across modalities, variety of
possible strategies, and range of functional outcomes (Gross, 2014). A lack of clarity in the
operationalization and measurement of ER has prompted calls for the examination of its
construct validity (Bridges et al., 2004; Weems & Pina, 2010). Similar to the challenges noted
with SR measurement, this lack of clarity seems to stem from the wide variability in both the
methods and content of ER measurement (Adrian et al., 2011).
Common approaches to ER measurement include behavioral assessment of EFs and selfreport measures (Fernandez et al., 2016). Methods such as affective/emotion/mood induction
techniques (e.g., CO2 challenge, Trier Social Stress Test, watching video/film clips) and
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biological or physiological indicators (e.g., skin conductance, heart rate variability, facial
electromyography [EMG], or electroencephalogram [EEG]) have also been used to assess ER
(Adrian et al., 2011; Britton et al., 2012; Fernandez et al., 2016; Latham et al., 2017). While
these approaches are instrumental in assessing aspects of ER not captured in EF tasks or selfreports, they are much more specific to the study of emotion than to domain-general SR or SPS.
Thus, the following review will focus on the use of behavioral EF tasks and self-report measures
of ER. Then, measures to be utilized in the present study will be specified.
Behavioral EF Tasks
Given that the same underlying mechanisms associated with SR are also thought to
contribute to ER (e.g., response inhibition, working memory, set-shifting), some of the
behavioral EF tasks used in SR research have been adapted for investigations of ER. Typically,
tasks are adapted to include emotional content, such as pictures of emotional facial expressions,
emotion-related words, or other elements intended to induce emotion during the task (e.g., Aker,
2019). Examples of emotionally adapted EF tasks utilized in ER research include, but are not
limited to the following:
1. Inhibition
a. Emotional Go/No-Go Task (Murphy et al., 1999)
b. Emotional Stop Signal Task (Pawliczek et al., 2013)
c. Emotional Stroop Task (McKenna, 1986)
2. Working Memory
a. Affective n-back Task (Schweizer et al., 2011)
3. Set-Shifting
a. Emotional Picture Sorting Task (Aker & Landrø, 2014)
b. Attentional Control Capacity for Emotion (Johnson, 2009)
These tasks have been used in varied investigations of ER (e.g., Aker et al., 2014; Hare et al.,
2008; Kappes & Bermeitinger, 2016). As with the use of EF tasks in the investigation of SR,
concerns have been raised regarding the reliability (e.g., Eide et al., 2002) and predictive utility
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(e.g., Wright et al., 2014) of some of these tasks. Regarding validity, it is unclear whether these
tasks indeed assess ER, if the intended measurement of the original EF is preserved, or if they
actually assess facets of domain-general SR in the context of emotional stimuli (e.g., Algom et
al., 2004; De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994; Schulz et al., 2007). In addition, concerns related to the
use of behavioral EF tasks to assess SR also apply to the assessment of ER.
Self-Report Measures of ER
In light of the complexity of ER as a construct, the focus of self-report measures varies
based on differences in the underlying theory used in developing the measure. Some measures
focus on overall ER ability, some focus on specific modalities of ER (e.g., cognitive, behavioral),
and some focus on strategy implementation (Bridges et al., 2004). These approaches to ER
assessment via self-report are summarized next.
Perhaps the most widely used measure in clinical investigations of ER is the Difficulties
in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The DERS contains six subscales,
including: (1) nonacceptance of emotional responses, (2) difficulty engaging in goal-directed
behavior, (3) impulse control difficulties, (4) lack of emotional awareness, (5) limited access to
emotion regulation strategies, and (6) lack of emotional clarity. These subscales highlight the
aim of the DERS to capture a broad picture of ER abilities (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The DERS
has been used in a variety of clinical contexts to assess overall ER (e.g., Lafrance et al., 2014;
Shorey et al., 2011; Tull et al., 2007). Further, this measure has demonstrated good psychometric
properties and has been validated across genders, racial identities, and within undergraduate
populations (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Ritschel et al., 2015). The DERS was developed to measure
only negative emotions (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Given that positive emotions are also regulated,
a second measure was developed in order to remedy this imbalance, titled the DERS-Positive
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(Weiss et al., 2015). Despite the benefit of capturing positive emotions, the DERS-Positive is not
frequently utilized in clinical investigations, likely due to a reduced connection between positive
emotions and psychopathology.
Recently, a measure was developed that aims to assess the overall ability to regulate
emotions as theorized by Gross’s (2015) extended process model. The Perth Emotion Regulation
Competency Inventory (PERCI) was designed to assess the regulation of both positive and
negative emotions simultaneously (Preece et al., 2018). The PERCI includes eight subscales,
four of which map on to negative emotions while the other four map on to positive emotions as
follows: (1) negative-controlling experience, (2) negative-inhibiting behavior, (3) negative
activating behavior, (4) negative-tolerating emotions, (5) positive-controlling experience, (6)
positive-inhibiting behavior, (7) positive-activating behavior, and (8) positive-tolerating
emotions (Preece et al., 2018). The original validation study demonstrated good psychometric
properties and included undergraduate students (Preece et al., 2018). Though this measure fills
an important gap in the literature through its foundation in Gross’s updated (2015) model, it has
yet to gain widespread use in the field.
Another measure designed to assess overall ER ability is the Regulatory Emotional SelfEfficacy Scale (r-RESE; Zou et al., 2019). The r-RESE is comprised of four subscales, including:
(1) the up-regulation of positive emotions, (2) the down-regulation of positive emotions, (3) the
down-regulation of despondency or distress, and (4) the down-regulation of anger. Like the
PERCI, this measure was designed to assess the regulation of positive and negative emotions;
however, the r-RESE is not able to be combined into a total score that reflects both domains (Zou
et al., 2019). Further, the specificity of the items and resulting subscales do not appear to capture
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the full construct of ER as described in Gross’s (1998, 2015) models. The r-RESE demonstrated
good psychometric properties but has not yet gained widespread use in the field.
In contrast to measures designed to assess the overall ability to regulate emotions, some
measures focus on specific modalities of ER. Two complimentary examples that use this
approach are the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski et al., 2002)
and the Behavioral Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (BERQ; Kraaij & Garnefski, 2019). The
CERQ was designed to assess nine ER strategies that utilize cognition, including: (1) self-blame,
(2) other-blame, (3) rumination or focus on thought, (4) catastrophizing, (5) putting into
perspective, (6) positive refocusing, (7) positive reappraisal, (8) acceptance, and (9) refocus on
planning (Garnefski et al., 2002). The BERQ was designed to assess two facets of behavioral
ER, including style of responding and common strategies used in response to stress (Kraaij &
Garnefski, 2019). The five subscales of the BERQ include: (1) seeking distraction, (2)
withdrawal, (3) actively approaching, (4) seeking social support, and (5) ignoring (Kraaij &
Garnefski, 2019). Though these scales provide the ability to focus on individual modalities of
ER, they do not represent the complete construct of ER, which encompasses skills across
multiple modalities.
Yet another approach to the assessment of ER via self-report is through measurement of
specific ER strategies. Some measures aim to assess a range of ER strategies, such as the
Regulation of Emotion Systems Survey (RESS; De France & Hollenstein, 2017). The RESS
assesses the strategies of distraction, rumination, reappraisal, suppression, engagement, and
arousal control. Other measures assess a subset of the most frequently used ER strategies, for
example the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), which focuses on
the strategies of reappraisal and suppression. Finally, some measures focus on individual ER
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strategies, such the Ruminative Responses Scale (a subscale of the Response Style
Questionnaire), which is commonly used to assess rumination (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
1993).
Though measures that assess specific ER strategies do not capture the whole construct of
ER, one measure’s ubiquitous use in the field warrants consideration. The ERQ developed by
Gross and John (2003) is considered a widely-used measure of ER despite its focus on ER
strategies (Preece et al., 2018). A likely reason for this is that it accurately reflects Gross’s
(1998) process model of ER before it was extended in 2015. This measure has been used in
varied clinical investigations of ER (e.g., Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Meyer et al., 2014). The
ERQ has demonstrated good psychometric properties and has been validated in undergraduate
populations (Melka et al., 2011).
Present Study Measures of ER
In correspondence with the rationale provided for the use of self-report measures to
assess SR, the present study utilized self-report measures to assess ER. The ER measures
included were the DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004), the PERCI (Preece et al., 2018), and the ERQ
(Gross & John, 2003). The DERS and the PERCI were selected based on their aim to capture the
overall construct of ER. The PERCI and the ERQ were chosen based on their theoretical
foundation in Gross’s (2015) and (1998) models of ER, respectively. Finally, the DERS and the
ERQ were selected as they are arguably the two most commonly used measures in clinical
investigations of ER. All three measures have demonstrated good psychometric properties and
have been utilized in undergraduate populations. They will each be described in more detail in
Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL PROBLEM-SOLVING
Problems inevitably arise in the course of everyday life. The social environment can
generate a variety of problems, ranging from smaller issues such as dealing with an irritable coworker to larger issues such as losing a job. The failure to solve a problem can lead to an array of
negative consequences or the inability to attain a goal (Nezu, 2004). Given this potential for
adverse outcomes, the ability to identify effective solutions to problems is considered a crucial
aspect of adaptive functioning. The process by which individuals understand, appraise, and adapt
to problems in daily living is referred to as social problem-solving (SPS; D’Zurilla & Nezu,
1990). The present chapter provides an overview of the process of SPS and highlights its overlap
with SR and ER. First, the definition, mechanisms, and functions of SPS are described. Next, a
theoretical model of SPS is presented and connected to Bandura’s (1991) and Barkley’s (1997a)
models of SR as well as Gross’s (2015) extended process model of ER. In the final section, key
aspects of development, psychopathology, and measurement specific to the process of SPS are
reviewed. Gender differences are highlighted throughout.
Definition & Theory
Defining SPS
The concept of problem-solving has been studied in a multitude of forms across the field
of psychology. In a general sense, problem-solving is conceptualized as a process of identifying
and implementing the steps necessary to move from an initial state to a goal state (Sweller,
1988). This is often measured using tasks outlining specific problems that have a limited number
of optimal solutions, such as mathematical calculations, mazes, or puzzles (Heppner & Peterson,
1982). However, problems that individuals encounter in daily life do not always fit into clear
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categories or have optimal solutions. Thus, practitioners in the field identified a need to
distinguish problems in daily living from prototypical problems assessed in laboratory
experiments (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971).
Common terms used to identify this type of problem-solving include interpersonal
problem-solving (e.g., Shure & Spivack, 1980), personal problem-solving (e.g., Heppner &
Peterson, 1982), or social problem-solving (e.g., D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). This type of
problem-solving has been studied across educational (e.g., Arslan, 2016), personality (e.g.,
D’Zurilla et al., 2011), developmental (Mayeux & Cillessen, 2003), counseling (Heppner et al.,
2004), and clinical (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010) perspectives, among others. Social problemsolving (SPS) is arguably the most commonly used term within the clinical literature (e.g.,
Hasegawa et al., 2018; Romano et al., 2019); therefore, it was used in describing the present
study.
Before defining SPS more specifically, each portion of the phrase warrants clarification.
First, the inclusion of the term social does not restrict the construct to interpersonal issues, but
rather is intended to place the individual and the process within a social context (Nezu, 2004).
The term social was included to underscore the idea that problem-solving in daily life involves
social skills and learning, both from the environment and from other people (D’Zurilla & Nezu,
1990). For instance, a caregiver who has double-booked a work meeting and their child’s piano
recital for the same time needs to employ more than prototypical problem-solving skills to
resolve the issue. Possible solutions, such as having to reschedule the meeting or provide an
explanation to the child, hold different social consequences. In daily living, SPS could be
engaged for intrapersonal, interpersonal, or broad social problems that may or may not have an
explicit social aspect (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
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Next, the term problem is intended to reflect a situational issue or obstacle in an
individual’s life that is preventing them from functioning adaptively and for which no solution is
readily apparent (Nezu, 2004). This could be a current or anticipated situation that requires
action on the part of the individual in order to resolve a conflict or achieve a goal (D’Zurilla &
Nezu, 2010). Problems could stem from the environment, such as being evicted (i.e., barrier to a
goal), interpersonal relationships, such as getting divorced (i.e., conflict between goals), or
intrapersonal factors, such as difficulty losing weight (i.e., failure to attain a personal goal; Nezu,
2004). In this sense, problems can be conceptualized as a discrepancy between a current state
and a goal state (Nezu, 1987). Finally, the process of solving the problem reflects an individual’s
ability to identify possible responses to the problem and select the response most likely to be
effective; the effective response would be considered the solution (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
The notion of SPS in the clinical literature has largely been centered on a model first
proposed by D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971) and later expanded (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
Based on the prominence of this model in the field, D’Zurilla and Nezu’s (1990) definition of
SPS was adopted for the present study. They define SPS as a process through which individuals
identify adaptive solutions to everyday problems. More specifically, the model presents SPS as
follows:
“Social problem solving is thus conceived as a conscious, rational, effortful, and
purposeful activity aimed at improving a problematic situation, reducing or modifying the
negative emotions generated by the situation, or both of these outcomes. Hence, it is best
viewed as the metaprocess of understanding, appraising, and adapting to stressful life
events, rather than simply a singular coping strategy or activity” (D’Zurilla & Nezu,
2010, p. 199).
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Several aspects of this definition illustrate the overlap among SR, ER, and SPS. First,
SPS is characterized as an effortful, intentional process. This maps on to the idea of top-down SR
and ER and aligns with the placement of the reconstitution element of Barkley’s (1997a) model
of SR; this will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Second, the definition highlights
the components of ‘understanding,’ ‘appraising,’ and ‘adapting,’ which can be likened to the
elements of monitoring, evaluating, and adjusting discussed in the context of SR and ER
(Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). Finally, the function of SPS is identified as
modifying the outcome of a situation, which could include the modulation of emotions (Nezu,
2004). One feature of SPS that this definition does not capture, but is specified directly in
Heppner and colleagues’ definition, is the notion that SPS includes behavioral, cognitive, and
emotional components (Heppner et al., 2004). Each of these aspects will be described in more
detail in the following sections.
Bottom-up vs. Top-down SPS. In contrast to SR and ER, SPS primarily involves what
would be considered top-down processes (Nezu, 2004). Bottom-up regulatory processes involve
innate, reflexive, and habituated behaviors that represent immediate or reactive responses to
stimuli (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). SPS, on the other hand, is employed when there is no
immediate or preferred response to a stimulus, such that a solution to the problem is not readily
apparent (Nezu, 2004). In other words, SPS is employed when the reactive action or solution will
not be effective or may produce negative consequences (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). That
being said, elements of SPS do include bottom-up processes. In particular, the identification of
problems can be reactive, following either an environmental stimulus (e.g., unexpected road
construction on the way to an important presentation) or an internal stimulus (e.g., an unexpected
emotion during a conversation with a colleague; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). Additionally,
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gathering information about the problem, generating possible solutions, and evaluating
consequences can involve detecting social cues or interpreting other information from the
environment via bottom-up processes (Nezu, 2004). While bottom-up processes involved in SPS
are not able to fully solve the problem (in comparison to bottom-up processes in SR and ER,
which are able to regulate behavior, cognitions, and emotions), SPS is still comprised of both
types of processes.
Modalities of SPS. SPS is conceptualized as a goal-directed process that involves
behavioral, cognitive, and emotional components (Heppner et al., 2004). This is because
problems in daily living often involve elements that cut across domains of functioning. When a
problem arises, it typically affects an individual’s actions, thoughts, and feelings, rather than one
modality in isolation. For solutions to be effective, they must mirror the elements of the problem
(D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). That is, similar to how problems generate actions, thoughts, and
feelings about a situation, effective solutions serve to remedy or modify those actions, thoughts,
and feelings (Nezu, 2004). For instance, an individual having an argument with their partner (i.e.,
the problem) might involve leaving to take a walk (behavioral), thoughts of concern for the
relationship (cognitive), and feelings of frustration or sadness (emotional). Likewise, the solution
might involve returning to initiate a conversation (behavioral), thinking through ways to frame a
resolution (cognitive), and expressing feelings of remorse (emotional). In this way, SPS is
similar to SR and ER in its pervasiveness across modalities of functioning.
Functions of SPS. The ultimate goal of SPS is to find an adaptive, effective solution to a
problem. This can be contrasted with the actual implementation of a solution, which depends on
different skills than the process of solving the problem (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). Whereas the
abilities associated with SPS are considered generalized, the abilities needed to implement a
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solution in any given situation are specific to the conditions and environment of that problem.
SPS encompasses the process of identifying a problem, generating solutions, selecting the most
effective solution, and monitoring the effectiveness of the chosen solution (Nezu, 2004). The
original phrasing of D’Zurilla and Nezu’s (2010) conceptualization of an ‘effective’ solution
illustrates the overlap among SR, ER, and SPS; the definition is specified as follows:
“An ‘effective’ solution is one that achieves the problem-solving goal (e.g., changing the
situation for the better, reducing negative emotions, increasing positive emotions), while
it also maximizes other positive consequences and minimizes negative consequences.
These consequences include long-term, as well as short-term, personal and social
outcomes.” (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010, p. 199)
This definition emphasizes several important points of overlap among SR, ER, and SPS. First, it
highlights the connection between solving a problem and achieving a goal, such that SPS is
employed to remove a barrier or obstacle on the path to goal attainment, broadly speaking (Nezu,
2004). For instance, if an individual wants to apply for a job but does not have appropriate
experience, adjusting behavior to obtain the experience could be viewed as solving a problem on
the path to goal attainment. Second, it acknowledges that both problems and goals could involve
a desire to adjust the experience of emotion (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). For instance, if an
individual has a fight with a family member and becomes upset, resolving the issue might
include the goals of mending the relationship, decreasing negative emotions, and increasing
positive emotions. Finally, it speaks to the function of maximizing the balance of consequences
across the short- and long-term, an integral element discussed in the context of SR (e.g., Barkley,
1997a). Consequences of different solutions can impact the outcome of SPS, the emotional
experience associated with the problem, the individual’s self-efficacy or self-perception, or other
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features of the greater social context (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). The ways through which SPS
operates to accomplish these functions is described next in the context of D’Zurilla and
Goldfried’s (1971) model.
Models of SPS
As mentioned, D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model is a particularly prominent model
of SPS. The foundational model of SPS was first posited by D’Zurilla and Goldfried in 1971 and
later refined through operationalization and factor analytic studies (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1982,
1990; D’Zurilla et al., 2002; Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1995, 1996). The progression of this
model will be described below and connected to Bandura’s (1991) model of SR and Gross’s
(2015) extended process model of ER. Then, SPS will be placed in the context of Barkley’s
(1997a) model of SR and connected to EF.
D’Zurilla & Goldfried’s (1971) Model of SPS. D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model
of SPS originated within a behavioral modification context with the goal of using problemsolving as a basis for therapeutic intervention. The model conceptualized the goals of behavior
modification and problem-solving to overlap, such that they both involved adjusting behavior in
order to produce desired consequences. In this sense, SPS was viewed as a form of ‘self-control
training’ that would allow individuals to better adapt to dynamic and often stressful
environments (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). Approaching treatment from this perspective was
considered by many to be one of the first ‘cognitive behavior therapies’ (D’Zurilla & Nezu,
2010). Behavior related to psychopathology was viewed as ‘ineffective’ and was thought to
create undesired consequences for the individual, which made subsequent attempts at adaptive
behavior more challenging. The posited theory of SPS was essentially a collection of
propositions outlining how an individual would engage in ‘effective’ behavior and find solutions
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to obstacles (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). This included a problem orientation and four stages
of problem-solving as follows:
(1) Problem definition and formulation
(2) Generation of alternatives
(3) Decision-making
(4) Solution implementation and verification (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971).
These stages were theorized to represent skill clusters (i.e., a certain set of skills would be
involved with problem definition and formulation, different skills would be associated with
generating alternatives, and so on) which would lead the individual to an effective solution
(D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). Each of these will be summarized next and connected to Bandura’s
(1991) model of SR and Gross’s (2015) models of ER.
Stage 1: Problem Definition and Formulation. The first stage of problem-solving involves
identifying and defining the features of a problem (Nezu, 2004). As with SR and ER, the
problematic stimulus that activates SPS can be driven by the environment, such as running low
on finances, or driven by intrapersonal factors, such as feeling guilty about missing a friend’s
birthday. One of the key identifiable features of a problem is the individual’s affective reaction to
a situation; in other words, emotions can serve as cues that a problem needs to be addressed
(D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). A second element of this stage after the problem has been
identified is to gather details and define aspects of the problematic situation to help inform the
subsequent stages of problem-solving (Nezu, 2004). For example, if an individual receives a
warning from their employer that they have been missing too many days of work, they may feel
negative emotions including nervousness or sadness. After identifying that this problem needs to
be addressed, the individual might read the warning carefully and determine they need to meet
with their supervisor to develop an attendance plan.
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This stage closely parallels the self-observation stage of Bandura’s (1991) model of SR
and the identification stage of Gross’s (2015) model of ER in that it involves awareness of
situational features, understanding of antecedents and consequences, and motivation to attend to
problem behaviors. Identifying and defining the problem can be impacted by the individual’s
biases, interpersonal tendencies, and greater social context (Bandura, 1991; D’Zurilla & Nezu,
2010). For example, whether a warning from an employer is considered a significant problem
might depend on the individual’s financial standing, valuation of the position, and personal
career goals. Like the first stages of SR and ER, this stage of SPS provides the information
necessary for the remaining stages of the process.
Stage 2: Generation of Alternatives. After the problem has been identified and defined,
the second step is to think of many possible solutions that could be implemented (Nezu, 2004).
The authors of the model likened this stage to the process of ‘brainstorming’ and noted that the
important feature is quantity, not quality, because the quality will be evaluated in the next stage
(D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). The goal of this stage is for the individual to generate enough
solutions so that one of them is likely to be effective and produce the desired consequences. In
considering the above example of receiving a warning, the individual might generate possible
solutions including obtaining a letter from their primary care physician to give to their
supervisor, requesting weekly work-from-home days, or seeking alternative employment.
Stage 3: Decision-making. Once enough possible solutions to the problem have been
generated, the next step is to evaluate each solution and determine the most effective option
(Nezu, 2004). This stage includes a cost-benefit analysis of each solution in terms of both its
likelihood of solving the problem as well as an evaluation of the probable consequences if it is
implemented (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). In the above example, the individual might
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determine that seeking alternative employment is not a viable option and that providing a letter
from their doctor may not help to justify future sick leave; they might determine that requesting
work-from-home days will not only allow them to rest but also continue with employment.
The generation of alternatives and decision-making stages of SPS correspond to the
judgement stage of Bandura’s (1991) model of SR and the selection stage of Gross’s (2015)
model of ER. These stages all involve a valuation process, as well as an analysis of possible
adjustments to behavior, cognitions, or emotions to determine which actions will lead to the
desired consequences. This requires utilizing prior knowledge of possible responses and their
associated consequences, as well as incorporating information gained in the identification stage
(Nezu, 2004). In addition, this stage of SPS involves first selecting a general strategy and then
adapting it to the specific situation, similar to the process outlined in the selection stage of
Gross’s (2015) model of ER. Selecting an effective solution depends on how the individual
evaluates possible responses in the context of their goals, as well as their self-efficacy in solving
the problem (Bandura, 1991; D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971).
Stage 4: Solution Implementation and Verification. The final stage of SPS involves
monitoring and evaluating the solution after it has been implemented (Nezu, 2004). This is an
important step, particularly in situations in which the solution does not produce the desired
outcomes. If that is the case, the individual needs to return to the problem-solving process and
implement a different solution (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). The verification stage not only helps to
identify that a new solution is needed, but also can provide information necessary regarding what
stage of the process needs to be returned to. That is, another solution already generated could be
effective or perhaps more information about the problematic situation needs to be gathered. In
the example above, the individual’s supervisor might state that work-from-home days are not
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possible for the individual’s position, but they could solve the problem by finding a substitute.
Then, the individual could revisit the process to determine if they are able to implement the
solution of finding a substitute and if that would produce the desired consequences.
The solution implementation and verification stage of SPS corresponds to the selfreaction stage of Bandura’s (1991) model of SR and the implementation stage of Gross’s (2015)
model of ER in that all stages involve the adjustment of behavior, cognition, or emotion in order
to meet individual goals. This additionally involves an evaluation of the effectiveness of the
chosen adjustment as well as its associated consequences. Importantly, this stage also includes
the ability and motivation to implement a solution (although, the actual skills involved in
implementing a solution are not considered part of SPS as they are situation specific; Nezu,
2004). The idea of implementation maps on to Barkley’s (1997a) idea of motor
control/syntax/fluency (e.g., goal-directed behavior) and will be revisited later in this chapter.
D'Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model created the foundation for the construct
understood today as SPS. The model was operationalized by D’Zurilla and Nezu in 1990 with
the construction of the Social Problem-Solving Inventory (SPSI). The item content of the SPSI
was developed to reflect the process of SPS as a general orientation and set of four specific skill
clusters (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). A series of factor analytic investigations revealed that the
underlying factor structure of the SPSI differed from the hypothesized structure of the original
model (Maydue-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1995, 1996). The results revealed two problem orientation
factors and three factors referred to as problem-solving styles, rather than skill sets.
This signified a conceptual shift in the overall model, such that the general orientation
component was separated into adaptive and maladaptive dimensions and the specific skill sets
were separated into one cluster of adaptive responding and two separate clusters of maladaptive
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responding (Maydue-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1995, 1996). The two orientation dimensions were
termed positive problem orientation and negative problem orientation, while the three problemsolving styles were termed rational problem-solving style, impulsive/carelessness problemsolving style, and avoidance problem-solving style (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). The five
components are thought to comprise SPS. Each of these will be summarized next.
Problem Orientation. An individual’s problem orientation represents their typical attitude,
set, or schema that is activated in response to problems. Problem orientation includes cognitive
(e.g., attributions, appraisals, or expectancies regarding problems) and affective (e.g., emotional
states aroused by the problem) components (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). Problem orientation was
separated into two dimensions identified as a positive and negative. An important aspect of these
factors is that they do not reflect opposites falling along a single dimension, but instead represent
independent (but overlapping) dimensions (Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1995). A positive
problem orientation (PPO) reflects an adaptive set in which an individual tends to:
•

Appraise a problem as a challenge

•

Believe that problems are solvable

•

Believe in one’s own personal ability to solve problems successfully

•

Believe that successful problem-solving takes time, effort, and persistence

•

Commit oneself to solving problems with dispatch rather than avoiding them
(Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1996, p. 128).

In contrast, a negative problem orientation (NPO) reflects a maladaptive set in which an
individual tends to:
•

Appraise a problem as a significant threat to well-being

•

Believe that problems are unsolvable

•

Doubt one’s own personal ability to solve problems successfully

•

Become frustrated and upset when confronted with problems in living
(Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1996, p. 128).
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Similar to SR and ER, self-efficacy is an influential element and is incorporated into an
individual’s problem orientation in terms of the belief in one’s ability to solve a problem
(D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). Further, problem orientation is connected to emotional processing
in that PPO is associated with positive affect and approach motivation, whereas NPO is
connected to negative affect and avoidance motivation (Nezu, 2004). These differential
connections can serve to either facilitate or inhibit the subsequent stages of SPS.
Problem-Solving Styles. The three remaining components of SPS represent typical
response tendencies involved in identifying and implementing an effective solution (D’Zurilla &
Nezu, 2010). In contrast to the problem orientation component thought to include cognitive and
affective components, styles are thought to include primarily cognitive (e.g., monitoring,
identifying, and evaluating aspects of the problem) and behavioral (e.g., typical problem-solving
response tendencies) components (Nezu, 2004). The specific skill sets hypothesized in the
original model were maintained in the updated conceptualization, such that adaptive versions of
the skills were distinguished from maladaptive versions of the skills and clustered into ‘styles’
(Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1995, 1996). More specifically, the response styles reflect how
and individual typically gathers information, generates solutions, decides on the most effective
solution, and monitors the consequences of the chosen solution (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
Rational problem-solving style (RPS) is conceptualized as an adaptive problem-solving
style and involves a methodical approach to the stages of problem-solving (Nezu, 2004). The
authors characterized this style as ‘rational,’ ‘deliberate,’ and ‘systematic’ (D’Zurilla & Nezu,
2010). Regarding the stages of problem-solving, RPS includes an effortful process of identifying
problems when they arise, a logical approach to gathering information about the problem,
generation of a comprehensive set of possible solutions, a thorough evaluation process to
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determine the most effective solution, and subsequent monitoring of consequences of the
implemented solution (Nezu, 2004).
Impulsivity/carelessness style (ICS) is conceptualized as a maladaptive problem-solving
style that involves a rushed approach to the stages of problem-solving, such that effective
solutions are not given much thought (Nezu, 2004). The authors characterized this style as
‘hurried,’ ‘narrow,’ and ‘incomplete’ (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). The first stage of problemsolving is perhaps the most impacted by this style, such that very little information is gathered
regarding the problem prior to generating possible solutions. The solutions that are generated are
often limited and not evaluated in a systematic way. The solution is then implemented quickly
without much consideration of possible consequences (Nezu, 2004). In considering SPS as a topdown, effortful process, ICS is arguably the least effortful and most reactive form of problemsolving, which aligns with its conceptualization as a maladaptive style. ICS can be damaging in
that the individual believes they are working toward solving the problem by implementing a
variety of solutions, yet these solutions are likely to be ineffective (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
Avoidance style (AS) is also conceptualized as a maladaptive problem-solving style
which involves neglecting problems and pushing them off on to other people (Nezu, 2004). The
authors described this style as being characterized by ‘procrastination,’ ‘passivity,’ and
‘dependency’ (Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1996, p. 128). AS involves avoiding engaging in
the stages of problem-solving altogether and instead hoping that either the problem will dissipate
or that someone else will step in to solve the problem. This style can be particularly detrimental
when considering the potential for an accumulation of problems and associated negative
consequences. AS can also create prolonged negative affect for the individual if they recognize a
problem but then do not address it for a long period of time (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
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In summary, PPO and RPS are considered adaptive (or constructive) problem-solving
dimensions, whereas NPO, ICS, and AS are considered maladaptive (or dysfunctional) problemsolving dimensions (Nezu, 2004). While the two components of orientation and style are often
investigated and discussed separately, the combination of these elements is thought to represent
an individual’s overall ability to identify effective solutions to problems in living (D’Zurilla &
Nezu, 2010). Just as with SR and ER, the underlying mechanisms involved in the overall ability
to solve everyday problems can be tied to EF; this connection will be discussed next in the
context of Barkley’s (1997a) model of SR.
SPS in the Context of Barkley’s (1997a) Model of SR. SPS aligns with the
reconstitution element of Barkley’s (1997a) model of SR. Three important aspects of this model
will be highlighted: the relationship between response inhibition and SPS, the relationship
between SPS and EF, and the relationship between SPS and the outcome component of motor
control/fluency/syntax.
As discussed in the context of SR and ER, effortful processes require the immediate or
prepotent response to a situation to first be inhibited. For SPS, without this inhibition, the most
effective solution to the problem cannot be identified because the individual has already acted
(Nezu, 2004). The original model of SPS describes the reliance of SPS on response inhibition,
noting that inhibitory processes help the individual to not react inappropriately, implement an
ineffective solution, or avoid the problem entirely. The authors describe this as the need to ‘stop
and think’ (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971, p. 113). This notion directly corresponds to discussions
in the context of SR and ER that underscore the importance of a delay period between the
stimulus and the response in order for the individual to engage in intentional processes. For SPS,
this is particularly important in terms of taking time to evaluate possible consequences and
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consider the greater social context prior to implementing a solution. Empirical evidence speaks
to a connection between SPS and response inhibition (e.g., Ciairano et al., 2007; Walker &
Henderson, 2012).
As noted, SPS aligns with Barkley’s (1997a) element of reconstitution, or the ability to
analyze and synthesize behavioral responses. More specifically, reconstitution (conceptualized as
an EF) is likely an underlying mechanism of SPS. Problem-solving often requires behavioral
sequences that were unsuccessful to be broken down so that each component can be evaluated
and reconstructed in a way that is more likely to be successful. This corresponds to what
D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971) referred to as ‘combination and improvement’ of solutions,
which involves brainstorming different variations of solutions in order to increase effectiveness.
Once the immediate action is inhibited, reconstitution (and other effortful SPS mechanisms)
would then work in conjunction with the other EFs in Barkley’s (1997a) model to adjust
behavior and solve problems. Empirical evidence suggests connections between SPS and
working memory (e.g., Brown et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2014), internal speech (e.g., Diaz et al.,
2014; Goudena, 1987), ER (e.g., de Castro et al., 2003), and general EF (Muscara et al., 2008;
Riggs et al., 2006; Thoma et al., 2015).
The solution implementation stage of D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model aligns with
the motor control/syntax/fluency component of Barkley’s (1997a) model in the form of an
effective solution. Similar to SR and ER, this component reflects the outcome of SPS in that
behavior is adjusted so as to achieve desired consequences and avoid undesired consequences
related to the problem (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). The actual implementation of a solution is not
considered to be part of SPS due to the specificity of skills needed for particular situations; this is
parallel to SR and ER in that the actual behavioral adjustment (i.e., goal-directed behavior) is not
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considered part of the process, but rather the outcome of the process (Barkley, 1997a). For
instance, if an individual is working to regulate the behavior of procrastination to work toward
the goal of increasing productivity on homework, the actual engagement in homework requires a
unique set of skills specific to that situation. Similarly, with SPS, if the individual encounters a
problem of missing a lecture, the skills involved in obtaining lecture notes from a classmate are
specific to that situation. In all cases, the skills involved in the processes of SR, ER, and SPS are
considered generalized while the outcomes of these processes are reflected in goal-directed
behavior that is tailored to the situation.
Considering the connections amongst these models, SR, ER, and SPS appear to overlap
in several ways, including shared underlying mechanisms, pervasiveness across modalities, and
similarities in functional outcome; this overlap will be revisited in Chapter V.
Development
Similar to the trajectories of SR and ER, SPS emerges early in development and
continuously improves through adulthood (Mayeux & Cillessen, 2003). In fact, SPS abilities are
thought to increase through young adulthood and into middle adulthood, then decline in older
adulthood (D’Zurilla et al., 1998). As a process that develops alongside other processes, many of
the same influences discussed in the context of SR and ER development also impact the SPS
development. Aspects of neurological, cognitive, emotional, and social domains of development
during emerging adulthood that are connected to SPS will be described in the following sections.
Then, gender differences in SPS will be highlighted.
SPS in Emerging Adulthood
Brain areas associated with social cognition continue developing into the mid-twenties
via both structural and functional changes (Kilford et al., 2016). In particular, continued
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maturation of frontal cortices, as well as increased efficiency in fronto-limbic connections, have
been found to impact social, goal-directed behavior (Taber-Thomas & Pérez-Edgar, 2015).
During emerging adulthood, these neurological changes are associated with increased integration
of social and reward information, improved theory of mind and empathy skills, and enhanced
problem-solving (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006). In addition, environmental influences, such
as social and cultural factors, are thought to impact the processes of synaptic pruning and
changes in functional connectivity (Taylor et al., 2015). In terms of SPS, this reflects a process of
building social competence and learning from the environment, which help to improve skills
specific to solving social problems (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
In terms of cognitive development, the notion of postformal thought is particularly
relevant to the development of SPS. This is because evaluating effective solutions to complex
social problems requires both logic and subjectivity, as problems may have multiple ‘correct’
solutions, but the consequences of each will differ based on social and cultural norms (D’Zurilla
& Nezu, 2010). Throughout emerging adulthood, individuals are learning to integrate
intrapersonal, interpersonal, and socio-cultural information, which is a key aspect of navigating
the ambiguous problems that might arise as life becomes more complex (Despotović, 2014). This
process of integration can also be impacted by theory of mind, empathy, and reward sensitivity.
As these processes continue to shift in emerging adulthood, the valuation, cost-benefit analysis,
and generation of solutions elements of SPS are likely to shift in a similar manner.
Aspects of social development are closely connected to the development of SPS through
emerging adulthood. As noted, theory of mind and empathy skills, which are important
components of social cognition, are continuing to improve throughout this period (Dumontheil et
al., 2010; Smits et al., 2011). Emerging adulthood is characterized by an increasing complexity
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in social environments and a transition from an individualized perspective toward a societal
perspective (Lapsley & Woodbury, 2016). Because problems that require SPS occur within the
individual’s social context, improvement in perspective-taking abilities and overall social
cognition can help to facilitate improvements in SPS abilities (Shure, 1982). In addition, several
features of emerging adulthood, including high rates of moving, role transitions, and ambiguous
expectations, likely increase the number of problems individuals experience daily, thereby
requiring stronger SPS skills (Arnett, 2015).
Gender Differences in SPS
Findings regarding gender differences in SPS have been mixed. Early investigations of
gender and SPS relied on performance-based measures that did not address generalized problemsolving ability and did not identify any differences between males and females (D’Zurilla et al.,
1998). Following the operationalization of D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model and
validation of the SPSI-Revised, gender differences could be examined along theorized
dimensions of problem-solving ability, including problem orientation and problem-solving style
(Nezu, 2004). One of the first investigations of gender using the SPSI-R indicated differences on
the dimensions of NPO and PPO, such that females were found to have higher NPO and lower
PPO than males (D’Zurilla et al., 1998). Since then, this finding has been replicated in additional
samples (Bell & D’Zurilla, 2009; Belzer et al., 2002; D’Zurilla et al., 1998; Robichaud et al.,
2003; Roy et al., 2019). Regarding problem-solving styles, some studies have found that males
are higher in ICS than females (Belzer et al., 2002; D’Zurilla et al., 1998), while another study
revealed no difference in ICS and instead found that females were lower in RPS than males (Bell
& D’Zurilla, 2009). Conversely, another study found females were higher in RPS than males
(Roy et al., 2019).

100

In contrast to these results, several investigations using the SPSI-R have not found gender
differences on any SPS dimensions (e.g., Anderson et al., 2009; Haugh, 2006; McCabe et al.,
1999; Reinecke et al., 2001). Additionally, investigations using other measures of SPS have not
found evidence for differences between males and females (Dixon et al.,1993; Robichaud &
Dugas, 2005a). Overall, these studies provide mixed evidence for gender differences, with
perhaps the clearest pattern being higher NPO for females as compared to males. Relevant to the
present study, this difference appears to be more so related to strength (i.e., gender differences in
levels of NPO), rather than a difference in the underlying structure of overall SPS.
Psychopathology
With the potential for negative consequences to accumulate following failure to solve a
problem, deficits in SPS can have an impact on psychological health and well-being. Deficits in
SPS have been connected to impairment in academic (e.g., D’Zurilla & Sheedy, 1992),
occupational (e.g., Elliot et al., 1996), and social functioning (e.g., Muscara et al., 2008; Sibley et
al., 2010). SPS is considered a transdiagnostic construct and has been associated with both
internalizing and externalizing forms of psychopathology (Bell & D’Zurilla, 2009; Jaffee &
D’Zurilla, 2003, Siu & Shek, 2010). These can include mood disorders (Anderson et al., 2009,
2011), anxiety disorders (Belzer et al., 2002), and substance use (Jaffee & D’Zurilla, 2009). The
present study focused on depression, a widespread form of psychopathology with a wellestablished connection to SPS deficits.
SPS & Depression
Based on D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model of SPS, Nezu (1987) proposed a
problem-solving model of depression. The model is based on the premise that stressful events in
life often lead to problems. If those problems are not solved effectively, negative consequences
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could result. These negative consequences could influence functioning in several ways. First,
negative consequences resulting from the unsolved problem could worsen the problem itself
(Nezu, 1987). For example, if an individual receives a wrongful parking citation, avoiding the
problem instead of paying or appealing the ticket could lead to additional citations being issued.
Second, novel consequences could be generated (Nezu, 1987). Not addressing the citations could
lead to the individual arguing with their partner over financial concerns. Third, negative
consequences could serve to decrease personal or social reinforcement (Nezu, 1987). For
instance, the individual may not be able to engage in social activities with their partner due to
conflict or financial concerns. Finally, negative consequences could serve to dampen motivation
to engage in SPS in the future (Nezu, 1987). If the individual had attempted to appeal the
original ticket and was unsuccessful, they may be less likely to implement another solution due
to lowered self-efficacy or an increased likelihood of perceiving the problem as a threat.
In addition to outlining this general structure, Nezu’s (1987) model describes connections
between each component of SPS and depressive symptoms. The component most consistently
associated with depression has been NPO (e.g., D’Zurilla et al., 1998; Kant et al., 1997; Wilson
et al., 2011). Several aspects of NPO align with symptoms of depression, including a bias toward
negative appraisals, low self-efficacy, and irrational beliefs regarding problems (Nezu, 1987).
Importantly, the model specifies that it is not the presence versus absence of NPO that likely
predicts depressive symptoms, but rather it is the impact of NPO on the subsequent stages of
problem-solving (Nezu, 1987). That is, high NPO serves to inhibit the remaining stages of SPS.
Failure to solve the problem could then reinforce the individual’s negative orientation, creating a
cyclical relationship that can initiate or maintain depressive symptoms (Nezu, 1987).
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Regarding the four stages of problem-solving, Nezu (1987) posits that skill deficits in any
stage can disrupt SPS and create a negative cycle. Deficits could involve information gathering
and realistic goal setting, generating too few solutions, or an inability to identify solutions that
will be effective. Some evidence suggests that individuals with depression generate fewer and
less effective solutions than their non-depressed counterparts (Marx et al.,1992; Nezu & Ronan,
1985). Overall, NPO, deficits in the four stages of problem-solving, and the accumulating
negative impact of unsolved problems, could make an individual vulnerable to initial or recurrent
depressive episodes. Indeed, negative consequences and ongoing problems have been shown to
elicit and exacerbate depressive symptoms (Anderson et al, 2009, 2011; Fergus et al., 2015;
Haugh, 2006).
SPS, Gender, & Depression
Perhaps due to the mixed evidence for gender differences in the context of SPS abilities,
relatively few studies have investigated gender differences in the context of the relationship
between SPS and depressive symptoms. The clearest pattern of gender differences has emerged
regarding the dimension of NPO, which has also been the dimension most consistently
associated with depressive symptoms. One study found that females were more likely to report
higher NPO and higher depressive symptoms than males, but the results did not indicate an
interaction between these factors (D’Zurilla et al., 1998). In contrast, other studies investigating
depressive symptoms have not found evidence for gender differences, even on the dimension of
NPO (e.g., Anderson et al., 2009; Haugh, 2006; McCabe et al., 1999; Reinecke et al., 2001).
While it is possible that higher levels of NPO might impact the relationship between SPS and
depressive symptoms, past research is not suggestive of a clear association among gender, NPO,
and depression, let alone overall SPS.
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Measurement
In comparison to the assessment of SR and ER, the assessment of SPS has been confined
to a smaller number of approaches and operationalizations. Typically, measures of SPS are
considered either process measures or outcome measures. Process measures assess general SPS
ability including behavioral, cognitive, and emotional features, that contribute to the process of
finding an effective solution (D’Zurilla, Nezu, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2004). In contrast, outcome
measures assess the effectiveness or quality of solutions in specific situations. In other words,
process measures are thought to assess an individual’s strengths or deficits in SPS, whereas
outcome measures assess their performance in problem-solving (D’Zurilla et al., 2004). Some
tasks of EF are intended to measure problem-solving ability, such as the Tower of London Task
(Shallice, 1982) or the Porteus Maze Task (Porteus, 1942). However, these are considered
measures of general problem-solving, not problem-solving that occurs in a social context
(Heppner & Peterson, 1982). The following discussion will focus on process and outcome
measures of SPS. Then, the measures utilized in the present study will be specified.
Process Measures of SPS
Arguably the most widely used measure of SPS is the SPSI-R (D’Zurilla et al., 2002). As
mentioned, the item pool of the original measure (the SPSI) was designed to reflect the general
orientation and set of four specific skill clusters detailed in D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971)
model. Then, a series of factor analytic investigations revealed that the underlying factor
structure of the SPSI differed from the hypothesized structure (Maydue-Olivares & D’Zurilla,
1995, 1996). The revised measure, the SPSI-R, assesses overall SPS ability through items
addressing two problem orientation dimensions and three problem-solving styles. These five
subscales include: (1) PPO, (2) NPO, (3) RPS, (4) ICS, and (5) AS. The original four skill
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clusters are represented in the problem-solving styles measured in the SPSI-R, such that adaptive
skills align with the RPS subscale, and maladaptive skills align with the ICS and AS subscales
(Nezu, 2004). These subscales can be combined into a total score that reflects an individual’s
overall ability to identify solutions to problems in daily life (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). This
measure has been used in several investigations of SPS (e.g., Anderson et al., 2009; Bell &
D’Zurilla, 2009; Haugh, 2006; Romano et al., 2019). Further, the SPSI-R has demonstrated good
psychometric properties and has been utilized in samples of undergraduate students (Bell
&D’Zurilla, 2009; Chang & D’Zurilla, 1996; D’Zurilla & Chang, 1995; D’Zurilla et al., 2002;
D’Zurilla & Sheedy, 1992).
Perhaps the second most commonly used measure of SPS is the Problem-Solving
Inventory (PSI; Heppner & Peterson, 1982). The PSI was originally developed based on the
stages of problem-solving, including problem orientation, definition, generation of solutions,
decision-making, and evaluation. Similar to the development of the SPSI-R, an item pool was
generated based on D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model of SPS; however, following factor
analytic investigation, a different underlying structure emerged (Heppner & Peterson, 1982).
Specific problem-solving skills assessing SPS appraisal loaded on to three factors, which are
now the subscales of the PSI.
The three subscales of the PSI are labeled as: (1) problem-solving confidence (PSC), (2)
approach-avoidant style (AAS), and (3) personal control (PC; Heppner & Peterson, 1982). The
subscales reflect an individual’s belief in their ability to solve problems, problem-solving
response tendencies, and perception of control over behaviors related to the problem,
respectively (Heppner et al., 2004). The PSI has been used in several investigations of SPS
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(Heppner et al., 2004). The PSI has demonstrated good psychometric properties and has been
utilized in samples of undergraduate students (Dixon et al., 1993; Julal, 2016).
Another process measure that is specific to one dimension of SPS is the Negative
Problem Orientation Questionnaire (NPOQ; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). This measure was
designed based on the NPO component of SPS and was developed in order to isolate NPO given
its consistent connection to psychopathology in studies using the SPSI-R. More specifically, the
developers of this measure identified a need for the behavioral, cognitive, and emotional
components of NPO to be adequately assessed, as the SPSI-R captures only the cognitive and
emotional aspects (Nezu, 2004; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). The NPOQ has been used in
investigations of NPO as a dimension of SPS (Barahmand, 2008; Fergus et al., 2015; Humphrey,
2016). Further, the NPOQ has demonstrated good psychometric properties and has been utilized
in samples of undergraduate students (Kertz et al., 2015; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a, 2005b).
Outcome Measures of SPS
Prior to the operationalization of D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model, the leading
tool used to assess SPS was the Means-End Problem-Solving Procedure (MEPS; Platt & Spivak,
1975). The MEPS assesses an individual’s ability to generate an effective solution to problems in
daily life. This includes identifying necessary problem-solving steps, anticipating problems, and
understanding of problem situations (D’Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995). This procedure
includes 10 hypothetical situations that describe real-life problems; it can be completed via
interview or self-report format. The situations are presented as having a beginning and an ending,
and participants are instructed to generate an effective solution that would connect the beginning
of the story (initial state) to the end of the story (goal state). Scores are based on the number of
solutions, number of obstacles identified, and amount of time taken (D’Zurilla & Maydeu-
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Olivares, 1995). In this way, the MEPS is considered an outcome measure, as the indicator of
problem-solving ability is the actual quality of solutions, rather than the process of SPS itself.
Concerns with the MEPS have been raised. The MEPS is often adapted based on the
study, making psychometric analysis more challenging (House & Scott, 1996). The presentation
of hypothetical situations (some of which have questionable content, such as getting revenge) is
thought to make it difficult for the individual to imagine how they would personally respond
(D’Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995). Some studies have tried to combat this by adapting the
MEPS to instruct participants to recall their own problem situations, yet this procedure relies
heavily on memory, particularly the expectation that participants recall the specific solutions
they had previously generated in response to the problem (Anderson et al., 2009). Despite
concerns with the reliability and external validity of this measure, the MEPS has been used in
varied clinical investigations of SPS (e.g., Davey, 1994; Goddard et al., 1996; Marx et al., 1992).
A second outcome measure of SPS is the Problem-Solving Self-Monitoring task (PSSM;
D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1999). This task was designed to better assess the effectiveness of solutions
generated in daily life. In the PSSM task, participants are provided instructions and definitions of
what to monitor (e.g., problem, solution, problem-solving) and are asked to record problems as
they arise across a period of time (D’Zurilla et al., 2004). Then, the real-life solutions are rated
based on effectiveness, and a total score is used as an indicator of SPS ability. Rating dimensions
of the recorded problems and solutions include wellbeing, threat, challenge, control, confidence,
effort, emotion, situation change, emotion change, and satisfaction. Although this task helps to
address concerns with the external validity of other SPS measures, it has not gained widespread
use in clinical investigations (e.g., Anderson et al., 2009, 2011).
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Summary of SPS Measurement
Concerns have been raised as to whether process measures (e.g., capturing appraisal,
orientation, style) and outcome measures (e.g., evaluating solution generation and
implementation) are assessing the same components of SPS (Anderson et al., 2009, 2011). In
addition, the question of whether either process or outcome measures are connected to objective
problem-solving performance is unclear (Shewchuk et al., 2000). In considering process versus
outcome measures in the context of the present study, it was determined that process measures
better overlap with the selected measures of SR and ER. This is because self-report measures of
SR and ER ability also assess the overall ability of individuals to engage in these processes,
rather than the outcome of these processes. In other words, the actual regulation of behavior,
cognition, emotions in specific situations would be parallel to the implementation of effective
solutions as assessed by outcome measures.
Present Study Measures of SPS
The present study utilized self-report measures to assess SPS. The SPS measures
included were the SPSI-R (D’Zurilla et al., 2002), the PSI (Heppner & Peterson, 1982), and the
NPOQ (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). The SPSI-R and the PSI were selected based on their aim
to capture the overall construct of SPS. All three measures were chosen due to their theoretical
foundation in D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971) model of SPS. In addition, all three measures are
commonly used in clinical investigations of SPS. These measures have demonstrated good
psychometric properties and have been utilized in undergraduate populations. They will each be
described in more detail in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER V
THE PRESENT STUDY
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the literature and frame the theoretical and
empirical bases of the present study. The present study had three interrelated goals: to assess the
construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS, examine the convergent and discriminant validity of
measures of these constructs, and characterize the relationship between these constructs and
depressive symptoms. A major strength of the present study was in the complexity of the
analyses. To investigate the construct, convergent, and discriminant validity of measures of the
constructs of interest, a CFA was conducted, and four rival models were tested against each
other. Then, in order to assess the constructs’ relationship with depressive symptoms, latent
variable SEM was conducted using the best-fitting CFA model. The CFA and latent variable
models also included a multigroup analysis to examine possible gender differences. In the
following sections, empirical support and rationale for study aims and design will be outlined. In
addition, hypotheses and proposed models will be presented.
Study Aims
Construct Validity of SR, ER, and SPS
SR, ER, and SPS each represent complex, high-order constructs that are difficult to
operationalize and measure. Given the range of components comprising each construct,
developing a fully representative measure is an understandably significant challenge. As such,
several of the measures included in the present study have been subject to factor analytic
investigations in isolation to help characterize their underlying structure (e.g., D’Zurilla &
Maydeu-Olivares, 1995; Melka et al., 2011; Moilanen, 2007). This often occurs at the item level;
that is, all items in the measure are examined to determine how items load on to different factors
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within the measure (Byrne, 2016). Another use of factor analysis is to examine constructs at the
measure level, such that multiple measures are loaded on to one factor to determine how much
variance in the measures is generated by the underlying construct (Keith, 2019). This approach
speaks to construct validity across multiple measures that are intended to capture that construct.
Despite concerns having been raised regarding the construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS (e.g.,
Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Weems & Pina, 2010), commonly used measures of these constructs
have yet to be investigated from a measure-level CFA perspective.
Pertinent to the present discussion is how closely the selected measures of SR, ER, and
SPS are related to each other within each construct (e.g., how related are the three measures of
SR). Correlational evidence between the measures of interest is limited. When measures are
developed, they are often intended to meet a need and thus are the first of their kind. As such,
original validation studies may not include other measures of the exact construct (e.g., Carey et
al., 2004; Gross & John, 2003). To add, when subsequent studies intend to investigate a
construct, they often include only one measure of that construct; for example, investigations of
SPS might include only the SPSI-R (e.g., Chang, 2017; Durand-Bush et al., 2015). The
relationships between measures of the same construct are important to examine because how
closely the measures are related provides evidence for construct validity. That is, measures
intended to capture the same construct should be strongly correlated, which would demonstrate
convergent validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). The available evidence
for the selected measures of each construct will be summarized next.
Self-Regulation. The three selected SR measures included the SSRQ (Brown et al.,
1999; Carey et al., 2004), the ASRI (Moilanen, 2007), and the BSCS (Tangney et al., 2004). On
all three measures, higher scores represent higher levels of SR ability. The SSRQ is positively
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correlated with the BSCS (r = .77, p < .05; Gonzalez et al., 2019). The ASRI does not appear to
have been included in investigations with either the SSRQ or the BSCS. In a pilot study
conducted by the thesis author intended to inform the present study, the ASRI was found to be
positively correlated with the original, 63-item SRQ (r = .75, p < .05; Buffie & Nangle, 2018).
The SSRQ and SRQ are highly correlated (r = .96, p < .05; Carey et al., 2004), which suggests a
relationship between the SSRQ and ASRI is likely. Overall, these relationships provide evidence
for the convergent validity of these selected measures of SR.
These three measures represent a subset of the varied approaches to SR measurement.
Though the correlations among these three measures provide evidence for validity, calls for
clarification of the overall scope of SR measurement have been numerous (e.g., Duckworth &
Kern, 2011; Eisenberg et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2012). Part of the lack of clarity may be because
most measures aim to capture a portion of SR (i.e., EF or effortful control) rather than the overall
construct (Eisenberg et al., 2011). The SSRQ and ASRI appear to be the only measures that
attempt to capture the broad construct of SR in a self-report format. In contrast, the BSCS was
designed to primarily capture top-down SR (Tangney et al., 2004), yet the high correlation
between the BSCS and SSRQ suggest they may be capturing similar aspects of the construct. As
noted, the extent to which self-report measures differ from behavioral tasks in the assessment of
SR has been a long-standing debate (e.g., Allom et al., 2016; Friedman & Banich, 2019);
however, the extent to which self-report measures of varied components of SR are capturing the
intended construct remains unclear (Duckworth & Kern, 2011).
Emotion Regulation. The three selected ER measures included the DERS (Gratz &
Roemer, 2004), the PERCI (Preece et al., 2018), and the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003). On the
DERS and the PERCI, higher scores represent higher levels of ER difficulty; higher scores on
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the ERQ subscales indicate higher levels of use for that particular strategy. The DERS has
demonstrated relationships with the ERQ reappraisal (r = -.24, p < .05) and suppression (r = .27,
p < .05) subscales (Salsman & Linehan, 2012). Similarly, the PERCI has demonstrated
relationships with the ERQ reappraisal (r = -.25, p < .05) and suppression (r = .23, p < .05)
subscales (Preece et al., 2018). The DERS and PERCI do not appear to have been included
together in investigations of ER. The low correlations among these measures do not provide
strong evidence for convergent validity.
While the DERS and the ERQ are described as the two most well-validated measures of
ER (e.g., Ireland et al., 2017; Preece et al., 2018), the lower correlations between them suggest
that they may be capturing different aspects of ER. Although both measures have specific
emphases (i.e., the DERS focuses on the regulation of negative emotions and the ERQ focuses
on the use of two specific strategies), both measures are frequently utilized in overall
investigations of ER (e.g., Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Lafrance et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2014).
Calls for clarification in the measurement of ER have identified this issue and have posited that,
due to the complexity of this construct, ER is likely best accounted for by multiple measures
(Weems & Pina, 2010). How well current measures of ER are able to capture the overall
construct has yet to be examined.
Social Problem-Solving. The three selected measures of SPS included the SPSI-R
(D’Zurilla et al., 2002), the PSI (Heppner & Peterson, 1982), and the NPOQ (Robichaud &
Dugas, 2005a). Higher scores on the SPSI-R overall score indicate higher SPS ability, whereas
higher scores on the PSI indicate lower SPS ability. Higher scores on each subscale of the SPSIR and PSI represent higher levels of that component of SPS. Similarly, higher scores on the
NPOQ indicate higher levels of NPO. The maladaptive subscales of the SPSI-R (i.e., NPO, ICS,
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and AS) have demonstrated positive relationships with the subscales of the PSI (r’s ranged from
.37 to .74, p < .05). In contrast, the adaptive subscales of the SPSI-R (i.e., PPO and RPS) have
demonstrated negative relationships with the subscales of the PSI (r’s ranged from -.38 to -.62, p
< .05; Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1997). Other investigations of these two measures have
found similar ranges in correlations (e.g., Dreer et al., 2004; Shewchuk et al., 2000).
The total score of the PSI and the total score of a shortened version of the SPSI-R, the
SPSI-R:S, were found to be highly correlated (r = -.82, p < .05; Hawkins et al., 2009). Of note,
the SPSI-R and SPSI-R:S capture the same components of SPS (D’Zurilla et al., 2002; Li et al.,
2016). The NPOQ has also been examined alongside the SPSI-R:S and found to be correlated
with the NPO subscale (r = .83, p < .05) and the PPO subscale (r = -.39, p < .05; Robichaud &
Dugas, 2005a). The NPOQ is correlated with the two maladaptive problem-solving dimensions
of the SPSI-R, namely ICS (r = .41, p < .05) and AS (r = .54, p < .05; Pawluk et al., 2017). The
NPOQ and PSI do not appear to have been included together in investigations of SPS. Overall,
these relationships provide some evidence for convergent validity; however, some elements that
comprise SPS appear to be more related than others (e.g., the range of correlations between the
SPSI-R and PSI subscales).
The SPSI-R and the PSI are two of the most commonly used measures of SPS (e.g.,
Anderson et al., 2009; Shewchuk et al., 2000). However, investigations attempting to
characterize the underlying construct captured in these measures and the extent to which they
overlap have often yielded conflicting results (D’Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995, 1996;
Heppner et al., 2004; Maydeu-Olivares, & D’Zurilla, 1997). Overall, the SPSI-R seems to have
emerged as the front-runner in describing the construct understood today as SPS, whereas the
PSI has been characterized more so as a measure of ‘problem-solving appraisal,’ or an
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individual’s assessment and understanding of their own SPS abilities (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010;
Heppner et al., 2004). Despite these differing conceptualizations and the varied relations between
subscales, both measures purport to measure the construct of SPS.
In addition, the component of NPO has been identified as accounting for a significant
amount of the variance in relationships between psychological well-being and SPS, and thus is
often used as the primary indicator in investigations of SPS (e.g., Bell & D’Zurilla, 2009; Chang,
2017; Kant et al., 1997). In contrast, RPS, the component of SPS that is intended to capture the
adaptive versions of SPS skills, is rarely a key factor in connections to psychopathology (e.g.,
Haugh, 2006; Reinecke et al., 2001). Several investigators have recognized issues with these
measures of SPS in that they seem to capture varied components of the construct (Anderson et
al., 2009, 2011; D’Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995; Heppner et al., 2004; Robichaud & Dugas,
2005a). How well all three measures capture the construct of SPS when considered in the context
of each other has not yet been investigated.
Gender Differences in the Constructs of SR, ER, and SPS. As reviewed, past
theoretical and empirical work on the constructs of interest does not appear to indicate that the
constructs’ structures would differ based on gender. Regarding SR, factor analytic investigations
of SR measures mirror empirical findings in that no notable gender differences have been
identified (Carey et al., 2004; Moilanen et al., 2007). Though gender differences in ER and some
facets of SPS exist, investigations of underlying measure structures do not indicate a clear
pattern of differences (D’Zurilla et al., 2002; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gross & John, 2003;
Heppner & Peterson, 1982; Preece et al., 2018; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). While evidence for
structural gender differences among these constructs is lacking, possible differences were
examined in the measurement stage in order to better inform the latent variable model.
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Convergent & Discriminant Validity of SR, ER, and SPS
Although theorists within each construct area mostly agree on their construct’s
composition, there seems to be very little “cross-construct” communication or consensus as to
the common and distinct features of each construct. As described, the majority of work in
differentiating these constructs has been at the theoretical level (e.g., D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010;
Gross, 2014; Nigg, 2017; see Table 1 and Table 2). In particular, Chapter IV integrates
theoretical models of the three constructs and highlights points of overlap. To some extent,
empirical work has been done to differentiate pairs of the constructs (e.g., SR versus ER), yet no
study was identified that investigated the common versus distinct aspects of all three constructs
in the context of one another. The present study aimed to address this gap in the literature
through evaluating four possible ways measures of these constructs might relate to each other,
which will be described later in this chapter. To help provide a framework for the proposed
models, the convergent and discriminant evidence available for pairs of the constructs will be
summarized next. Of note, all measures used to assess the constructs of interest are self-report
measures, which introduces an element of shared method variance (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
Thus, the present investigation of convergent and discriminant validity was considered within the
framework of a shared method.
SR & ER. As described in Chapters II and III, ER can be conceptualized as a form of SR
in which the target of regulation is emotion (Gross, 2014; Nigg, 2017). While these constructs
share a significant amount of overlap, both in underlying mechanisms and functional outcomes,
they do appear to be distinct in that the dysregulation of emotions can impair domain-general SR
(Diamond & Aspinwall, 2003; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000). This has been shown to occur through
two pathways: first, negative affect, mood, or emotions can serve to disrupt or inhibit adaptive
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SR (Bridgett et al., 2013; Moberly & Watkins, 2010); second, putting energy and effort toward
regulating emotions can subtract resources from domain-general SR (Muraven & Baumeister,
2000). ER has been demonstrated to impact SR through mis-regulation (i.e., focus on emotional
over non-emotional goals) or under-regulation (i.e., not enough resources are left over after
addressing negative affect; Baumeister et al., 1998; Tice et al., 2001). While SR and ER likely
share common features, these findings indicate that they can interact with each other, which also
suggests the presence of distinct features.
Some investigations have reported correlations between the measures of SR and ER
selected for the present study. The SSRQ was found to be positively related to the ERQ
reappraisal subscale (r = .20, p < .05) and negatively related to the suppression subscale (r = .14, p < .05; Lazuras et al., 2019). The BSCS and the DERS have demonstrated a negative
relationship (r = -.46, p < .05; Aka et al., 2020). The ASRI does not appear to have been
examined with any of the selected ER measures; similarly, the PERCI does not appear to have
been investigated with any of the selected SR measures. In the pilot study conducted prior to the
present proposal, negative relationships were found between the SRQ and the DERS (r = -.61),
as well as the ASRI and the DERS (r = -.62, p < .05; Buffie & Nangle, 2018).
Overall, the theories of these constructs suggest that while some convergence is expected
between SR and ER, they should also function as distinct constructs. There seems to be minimal
evidence for discriminant validity of these constructs. More specifically, the relationship
between two measures of ER should be stronger than the relationship between a measure of ER
and a measure of SR; yet, this pattern does not always hold up (e.g., the relationship between the
SRQ and DERS was r = .61, p < .05, while the relationship between the DERS and the ERQ
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reappraisal subscale was r = -.24, p < .05). This suggests a substantial amount of convergence
between measures of SR and measures of ER.
SR & SPS. As described in Chapter IV, SR and SPS appear to share a significant amount
of theoretical overlap, both in underlying mechanisms and functional outcomes. However, no
empirical studies were identified that investigated SR and SPS in the context of each other. The
majority of studies that examined these constructs either focused on emotion as the target of
regulation (more relevant to the relationship between ER and SPS) or general problem-solving,
rather than SPS. Some investigations have recognized the overlap between SPS and self-control
(e.g., Antonowicz & Ross, 2005; Rohde et al., 1990), while others have utilized measures of EF
and delay of gratification to explore the relationship (e.g., Ganesalingam et al., 2007). However,
these studies do not provide analyses of the relationships between these constructs (they instead
focused on a third variable outcome) and therefore do not provide much indication of the overlap
versus uniqueness between SR and SPS.
In the pilot study conducted prior to the present proposal, positive relationships were
found between the SRQ and SPSI-R (r = .75, p < .05), as well as the ASRI and the SPSI-R (r =
.68, p < .05; Buffie & Nangle, 2018). This supports a fair degree of possible overlap between the
constructs yet based on their theoretical distinctions and lack of empirical connection, they
should also function as distinct constructs. The same concern regarding discriminant validity
noted between SR and ER is relevant here, such that the strong relationship between measures of
SR and SPS indicate low divergence. In particular, some subscales of the SPSI-R and PSI were
correlated at magnitudes as low as r = .37, while the SRQ and SPSI-R were correlated at a
magnitude of r = .75. This suggests a substantial amount of convergence between measures of
SR and measures of SPS.
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ER & SPS. As described in Chapter IV, ER and SPS appear to share a significant amount
of theoretical overlap, both in underlying mechanisms and functional outcomes. Empirical
investigations of ER and SPS have tended to focus on two connections between these constructs:
the impact of emotion on SPS and the interaction between the ER strategy of rumination and
SPS. In particular, positive affect has been connected to PPO, whereas negative affect has been
connected to NPO (Chang & D’Zurilla, 1996). Importantly, these aspects can function to enable
or disrupt subsequent SPS (Nezu, 2004). Indeed, evidence suggests that positive affect facilitates
SPS (Nelson & Sim, 2014), and negative affect inhibits SPS (Chang, 2017). In addition, high
levels of rumination have been linked to maladaptive SPS (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). This has
been primarily investigated in the context of depressive symptoms and will be discussed in more
detail in the next section. Other studies have found that depending on the problem, ER strategies
can be employed in service of SPS (Hoppmann et al., 2008). While ER and SPS likely share
common features, these findings indicate that they can interact with each other, which also
suggests the presence of distinct features.
Some investigations have reported correlations between the measures of ER and SPS
selected for the present study. The SPSI-R was found to be negatively correlated with the DERS
(r = -.50, p < .05), positively correlated with the ERQ reappraisal subscale (r = .37, p < .05), and
not significantly related to the ERQ suppression subscale (Turner et al., 2012). In another study,
the adaptive subscales of the SPSI-R demonstrated negative relationships with all of the DERS
subscales (r’s ranged from -.16 to -.22, p < .05) except for DERS Awareness, which did not
correlate with either PPO or RPS (Kuzucu, 2016). The maladaptive subscales of the SPSI-R
demonstrated positive relationships with the subscales of the DERS (r’s ranged from .17 to .40, p
< .05; Kuzucu, 2016). Similarly, the NPOQ demonstrated positive relationships with all of the

118

DERS subscales (r’s ranged from .37 to .61, p < .05), except for the DERS Awareness subscale
(Kertz et al., 2015). In the pilot study conducted prior to the present proposal, a negative
relationship was found between the DERS and the SPSI-R (r = -.64, p < .05; Buffie & Nangle,
2018).
Overall, the theories of these constructs suggest that while some convergence is expected
between ER and SPS, they should also function as distinct constructs. The same concern
regarding discriminant validity noted between the other construct combinations is relevant here,
such that the strong relationship between measures of ER and SPS indicate low divergence. In
particular, some subscales of the SPSI-R and PSI were correlated at magnitudes as low as r =
.37, p < .05, while the DERS and SPSI-R were correlated at a magnitude of r = -.64, p < .05.
This suggests a substantial amount of convergence between measures of ER and SPS.
Common vs. Distinct Pathways to Depressive Symptoms
As discussed in Chapters II-IV, each of the constructs has been identified as a significant
contributor to depressive symptoms (Anderson et al., 2009; Joormann & Stanton, 2016;
Strauman, 2017), yet the combined influence of these constructs on depression has not been
assessed. Given that no studies were identified that investigated SR and SPS in the context of
each other, the combined influence of these constructs on depressive symptoms is the least clear.
The majority of research examining the combined influence of either SR and ER or ER and SPS
on depressive symptoms has focused on one aspect of ER, rumination (e.g., Hasegawa et al.,
2018; Noreen et al., 2015; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). The common theme in these
conceptualizations is that something stressful occurs in an individual’s life, for instance an
unsolved problem or an unattained goal. The individual then experiences a high level of negative
affect and attempts to regulate through the strategy of rumination. As discussed in Chapter III,
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rumination is a particularly detrimental ER strategy because, while the individual believes it to
be helpful, it does not help to down-regulate negative emotions (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008;
Zhou et al., 2020). Failure to solve the problem, attain the goal, and regulate emotions can
function to initiate or maintain depressive symptoms over time (Hasegawa et al., 2018;
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987).
These patterns suggest that SR, ER, and SPS may interact to exacerbate depressive
symptoms. However, what remains unknown is whether SR, ER, and SPS share common
features. More specifically, are the measures currently being used to assess SR, ER, and SPS
capturing each construct as a unique, distinct entity, or is a substantial amount of shared variance
present across measures of these constructs? If the three constructs share common features,
might deficits in the common features themselves better explain observed depressive symptoms?
Conversely, if each construct holds a unique connection to depressive symptoms, can the unique
aspects be better characterized (and targeted more directly) by isolating and removing the
common components among the constructs? Until these questions are examined more closely,
interpretations of the relationships among SR, ER, SPS, and depression may be flawed. That is,
understanding the relationships among the measures used to assess these constructs will help to
better inform the subsequent observed relationships. The present study aimed to address this gap
in the literature.
Gender Differences in Predicting Depressive Symptoms. A question of interest in the
present study was whether the relationship between the constructs of interest and depressive
symptoms is impacted by gender. As noted in Chapter II, past research is not suggestive of a
significant impact of gender on the relationship between domain-general SR and depressive
symptoms. In contrast, notable gender differences in ER have been identified (Nolen-Hoeksema,
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2012). Relevant to the present study, evidence suggests the relationship between ER and
depressive symptoms is significantly impacted by gender (e.g., Aldao et al., 2010). While
evidence for differences in components of SPS exists, such as higher levels of NPO observed in
females as compared to males (e.g., D’Zurilla et al., 1998), the present study focused on overall
SPS ability, which does not appear to differ based on gender.
Study Rationale
Participants
As noted in Chapter I, there are several important reasons to investigate the research
questions of interest in a population of emerging adults. During emerging adulthood,
development across neurological, cognitive, emotional, and social domains occurs, which
substantially influences the maturation of SR, ER, and SPS. The solidification of these processes
during this inherently instable period creates an opportunity for things to go awry. Indeed,
evidence has suggested that the age of onset for many forms of psychopathology occurs in the
teens and twenties (Kessler et al., 2007). In particular, major depressive disorder is a significant
concern, with high prevalence rates found in both emerging adult and undergraduate populations
(Auerbach et al., 2018; Hasin et al., 2018). These factors support the examination of SR, ER,
SPS, and depressive symptoms during this developmental period.
Design
Undergraduate students aged 18-29 completed three self-report measures each of the
constructs interest (3 SR, 3 ER, and 3 SPS), as well as a measure of depressive symptoms. The
analyses progressed in two stages: the measurement model stage and the structural model stage.
In the measurement model stage, a CFA was conducted. Four rival CFA models, including (1) a
first-order model, (2) a higher-order model, (3) a bifactor model, and (4) a one-factor model,
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were tested against each other. In the structural model stage, the best fitting CFA model was used
in latent variable SEM. The CFA and latent variable models included a multigroup analysis to
examine possible gender differences. These steps will be discussed in the following sections.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. The first goal of the present study was to assess the
construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS by conducting a CFA based on three measures of each
construct. Factor analysis can be used to assess how much variance in measures is generated by
underlying constructs (Byrne, 2016). Three measures of each construct were selected to have
enough data points for multiple operationalization (Crano et al., 2014). This refers to the notion
that multiple assessments are better able to capture a wider portion of a construct’s nomological
net as compared to single assessments of the construct. For each construct, the three measures
were partitioned into shared variance among measures (the latent construct) and the remaining
variance of each measure (Crano et al., 2014). This created a ‘pure’ latent construct that is free of
measurement error. The factor loadings between the latent construct and each measure indicated
the extent to which variance in the measure is generated by the underlying construct (Byrne,
2016). This was accomplished using a first-order CFA model (Figure 1). This type of model is
used to test the factorial validity of a latent construct and can be conceptualized as a basic CFA
model as discussed in Chapter I (Byrne, 2016).
Rival CFA Models. The second goal of the present study was to examine convergent and
discriminant validity of the constructs by testing a series of CFA models that reflect different
possibilities for the underlying structure of the observed variables. The first model tested was the
first-order CFA model described in the previous section (Figure 1).
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Figure 1
Proposed First-Order CFA Model
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This model proposed that each measure loads on to its theorized construct, and that the three
theorized constructs are related to one another. In particular, this model suggests that each latent
construct functions as a distinct entity and does not share features with the other constructs.
The second model was a higher-order CFA model (Figure 2), which is a type of
hierarchical CFA model. Hierarchical models can be used to help explain observed correlations
between first-order factors or their measured variables (Brunner et al., 2012). This model
included the relationships as depicted in the first model, but also added the influence of a higherorder factor thought to impact each of the first-order factors. Similar to the manner in which the
first-order factors represent the shared variance in each group of measures, the higher-order
factor represented the shared variance among the three first-order factors. The three first-order
factors were partitioned into the common variance (the latent higher-order construct) and the
remaining variance in each construct (the unique factor variance; Keith, 2019). Higher-order
models can be conceptualized as a factor analysis of the first-order constructs (Keith, 2019). This
model suggests that the degree to which the three constructs are related is due to them all being
manifestations of a larger, over-arching construct.
The third model tested was another type of hierarchical CFA model, referred to as a
bifactor model (Figure 3). This model differs from the higher-order model in that, instead of the
common factor influencing the measures through the first-order constructs, the variance is shared
among all nine measures (Keith, 2019).
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Figure 2
Proposed Higher-Order CFA Model
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Figure 3
Proposed Bifactor CFA Model
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In other words, the common factor in the bifactor model represents shared features of all nine
measures that is separate from the shared features of the three sets of measures representing each
first-order construct. This model suggests that each latent construct functions as a distinct entity,
and that the nine measures share common features separate from the three constructs of interest.
The fourth and final model tested was a one-factor model (Figure 4). In this model, the
three constructs of interest were not represented as distinct entities and were instead collapsed
into one (Brunner et al., 2012). This model suggested that the three constructs are overlapping to
the point that they function better as one, common construct. This would suggest maximum
convergence of the constructs and indicate that the nine selected measures are in fact all
generated by one underlying construct. The four models discussed to this point represent the
measurement model stage of the analyses. How the models were tested against each other will be
described in more detail in the Analysis Plan section of Chapter IV. The best-fitting model was
used in the structural model stage, which will be discussed next.
Latent Variable SEM. The third goal of the present study was to use the best-fitting
CFA model to assess how the common and/or distinct features of SR, ER, and SPS relate to
depressive symptoms (possible options represented in Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8).
This portion represents the structural stage of the analyses. In the measurement stage, the
measured variables were factor-analyzed, such that the resulting latent constructs were
considered ‘free’ of error (Crano et al., 2014). The relationships that were tested in the
subsequent structural model represent more than correlations or regression coefficients in that
error has been removed. This allowed for an examination of how well either the common
features, distinct features, or both relate to depressive symptoms, depending on the best-fitting
CFA model.
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Figure 4
Proposed One-Factor CFA Model
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Figure 5
Proposed First-Order CFA Model; Latent Variable SEM Predicting Depressive Symptoms
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Figure 6
Proposed Higher-Order CFA Model; Latent Variable SEM Predicting Depressive Symptoms
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Figure 7
Proposed Bifactor CFA Model; Latent Variable SEM Predicting Depressive Symptoms
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Figure 8
Proposed One-Factor CFA Model; Latent Variable SEM Predicting Depressive Symptoms
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Multigroup Analysis (Gender). Based on the evidence reviewed in Chapters I-IV, there
was reason to predict some of the relationships of interest may differ based on gender.
Examining these differences in CFA/SEM involved consideration of invariance, or whether the
models are invariant across groups (Byrne, 2016). This was tested through multigroup analysis,
which involves systematically allowing paths to either vary or be constrained to equivalent
values and then comparing the differences in model fit (Keith, 2019). This analysis can answer
the two interrelated questions of (1) are the constructs equivalent across groups as measured and
(2) are certain structural paths among variables equivalent across groups? The first question
addresses whether the constructs SR, ER, and SPS are being measured the same across groups
(invariance), while the second question addresses whether gender interacts with the constructs to
impact the outcome (Byrne, 2016; Keith, 2019). Invariance testing does not require the model to
be tested as two distinct groups (i.e., model tested once for females and once for males) and thus
does not require a substantially larger sample size than single-group SEM (Prindle & McArdle,
2012).
Summary
Overall, there are several advantages to using a CFA/SEM approach. First, these
approaches were able to account for both predictive error (i.e., variance remaining after a
predictor explains an outcome) and measurement error (Crano et al., 2014). Second, fit indices
allowed for the overall fit of the hypothesized model in comparison to the underlying data to be
assessed. Third, it was possible to statistically test rival or competing models to provide
additional support for the best-fitting model (Keith, 2019). Finally, multigroup analyses allowed
for the comparison between two categorical groups without significantly impacting sample size.
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Hypotheses
Bivariate Correlations
Because several of the measures selected for the present study have yet to be included in
investigations together, bivariate correlations between all predictor measures and the outcome
measure of depression were examined first. Of note, bivariate relationships were tested across all
measures of each construct to assess for pattern differences. However, hypotheses will be
presented as general rather than specific relationships.
First, given the overlap in theoretical foundations discussed between SR and ER (Gross,
2014; Nigg, 2017), as well as empirical evidence of their interaction (e.g., Tice & Bratslavsky,
2000), it was hypothesized that adaptive SR would be positively related to adaptive ER
(Hypothesis 1). Second, despite a lack of empirical evidence linking SR to SPS, overlap in
underlying mechanisms and functional outcomes suggests these constructs are likely related
(Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). As such, it was predicted that adaptive SR would be
positively related to adaptive SPS (Hypothesis 2). Third, in addition to the theoretical overlap
discussed, the constructs of ER and SPS have been investigated empirically and found to interact
with each other, particularly in the context of depressive symptoms (e.g., Hasegawa et al., 2018;
Hoppmann et al., 2008). It was hypothesized that adaptive ER would be positively related to
adaptive SPS (Hypothesis 3). Finally, previous investigations have identified deficits in SR, ER,
and SPS as being significant contributors to depressive symptoms (e.g., Anderson et al., 2009;
Joormann & Stanton, 2016; Strauman, 2017). It was therefore predicted that adaptive SR, ER,
and SPS would be related to lower depressive symptoms (Hypothesis 4-6).
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Mean-Level Differences (Gender)
As discussed in Chapters I-IV, some differences may exist in the relationships of interest
based on gender. To investigate this possibility, mean-level differences between males and
females on the constructs of interest were examined first, prior to multigroup examinations of the
CFA/SEM models. Similar to the approach for correlational analyses, these differences were
tested across all measures of each construct to assess for pattern differences; however, the
hypotheses will be presented as general rather than specific relationships. Based on prior
research indicating gender differences in ER (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012), it was predicted that
females would report higher difficulties in ER than males (Hypothesis 7). Regarding SPS, some
evidence indicates a possible gender difference between females and males on levels of NPO
(e.g., Bell & D’Zurilla, 2009). Thus, it was predicted that females would report higher levels of
NPO than males (Hypothesis 8). Finally, consistent evidence across multiple samples has
indicated a gender difference in depressive symptoms (e.g., Salk et al., 2017). It was therefore
predicted that females would report higher levels of depressive symptoms than males
(Hypothesis 9).
First-Order CFA Model
The next set of hypotheses will refer to the first-order model CFA (Figure 1). As
discussed in Chapters II-IV, all selected measures were chosen based on their (1) aim to capture
the overall construct, (2) connection to theory, and (3) frequency of use in the field. They were
each predicted to load on to their theorized constructs as follows.
The three measures selected to assess SR have been found to be related to each other and
to other constructs as would be expected based on SR theory (e.g., Brown et al., 1999; Carey et
al., 2004; Moilanen, 2007; Tangney et al., 2004). As such, it was hypothesized that the three
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measures selected to assess SR would load on to a latent factor thought to represent the
underlying construct of SR (Hypothesis 10). Regarding ER, the three measures included what are
considered the most well-validated measures of ER, which have been found to be related to each
other (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gross & John, 2003; Ireland et al., 2017; Preece et al., 2018). It
was predicted that the three measures selected to assess ER (with the ERQ split into an ERQ-S
suppression score and ERQ-R reappraisal score) would load on to a latent factor thought to
represent the underlying construct of ER (Hypothesis 11). Finally, although the three measures
of SPS have been subject to investigations to determine whether they assess similar components,
they all purport to capture elements of the underlying construct of SPS (e.g., D’Zurilla et al.,
2002; Heppner & Peterson, 1982; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). In addition, they have been
found to be related to each other in previous empirical studies (e.g., Maydeu-Olivares &
D’Zurilla, 1997; Pawluk et al., 2017). It was hypothesized that the three measures selected to
assess SPS would load on to a latent factor thought to represent the underlying construct of SPS
(Hypothesis 12).
In this model (Figure 1), it was also predicted that all three latent factors would be
correlated with each other (Hypotheses 13-15). This was based on the same evidence highlighted
in predicting correlational relationships between these three constructs discussed above (e.g.,
Hasegawa et al., 2018; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000), as well as the areas of theoretical overlap
presented in Chapters II-IV.
Rival CFA Models
The four proposed models were tested against one another to determine which model fits
the underlying data best. While this process was somewhat exploratory in nature, evidence
presented in Chapters II-IV suggested that the higher-order model (Figure 2) may result in the
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best fit (Hypothesis 16). There were several reasons underlying this hypothesis. First, the firstorder model (Figure 1) proposed that the constructs of interest are related but does not include
shared features after measurement error has been removed. This would indicate that the
constructs function entirely as distinct entities and that the measures do not share any variance;
in other words, it is not that the constructs are unrelated, but rather that the degree to which they
are related is not a reflection of shared variance with an overarching construct. Theoretical
evidence discussed in Chapters II-IV suggests that the constructs likely share several features,
including underlying mechanisms and functional outcomes (e.g., Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla &
Nezu, 2010; Gross, 2014). On the other end of the spectrum, the one-factor model (Figure 4)
suggests that the constructs converge to the extent that they should not be considered distinct
constructs and instead function better as one common factor. Though a certain amount of
convergence among constructs is expected, substantial theoretical work has been done that
suggests these three constructs are worth differentiating (e.g., Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla & Nezu,
2010; Gross, 2014). Further, empirical work suggests that the constructs can interact with each
other, which indicates that some distinct features are likely also present (e.g., Hasegawa et al.,
2018; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000).
The theoretical difference between the higher-order model (Figure 2) and the bifactor
model (Figure 3) is less apparent. Specifically, the higher-order model suggests that a common
factor (i.e., shared variance among the three latent constructs) is present and indirectly impacts
the observed measures through the first-order factors. In contrast, the bifactor model suggests
that a common factor that is separate from the first-order factors explains a portion of the shared
variance amongst all nine measures of the constructs. The common factor represented in the
higher-order model (Figure 2) could represent the shared features of SR, ER, and SPS

137

highlighted throughout Chapters II-IV, including underlying mechanisms (i.e., top-down and
bottom-up processes; skills specific to cognitive, emotional, or behavioral modalities; EFs) or
functional outcomes (i.e., features related to monitoring, evaluating, and adjusting behavior
across modalities to achieve a goal or solve a problem; Barkley 1997a; Gross, 2014; D’Zurilla &
Nezu, 2010). However, the common factor represented in the bifactor model (Figure 3) would
represent shared features that impact all of the observed measures but that are separate from the
three latent constructs of interest. Possible features of this separate common factor could include
constructs like self-efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 1991), baseline affect (e.g., Chang, 2017), or stress
(e.g., D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). Thus, while all four models represent some of the possible
structures underlying these constructs, based on the noted theoretical overlap, it was
hypothesized that the higher-order model (Figure 2) would fit best (Hypothesis 16).
Latent Variable SEM
Due to the approach of the present study in using a measurement model (CFA) to inform
the structural model (latent variable SEM), it was challenging to hypothesize the final outcome
of the analyses in terms of how the common and/or distinct features of SR, ER, and SPS might
be related to depressive symptoms. Possible latent variable SEM models are presented in Figures
5 through 8. Generally speaking, it was predicted that either the common features (higher-order
model or one-factor model; Figure 6 and Figure 8, respectively), distinct features (first-order
model; Figure 5), or a combination of both (bifactor model; Figure 7) would predict depressive
symptoms (Hypothesis 17). This was based on the same evidence highlighted for the predictions
that the constructs would be independently related to depressive symptoms (e.g., Anderson et al.,
2009; Joormann & Stanton, 2016; Strauman, 2017), as well as evidence suggesting that SR, ER,
and SPS share common features (e.g., Barkley, 1997a; Gross, 2014; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
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Multigroup Analysis (Gender)
Multigroup analysis can help to answer the following two questions: (1) are the
constructs equivalent across groups as measured and (2) are certain structural paths among
variables equivalent across groups? Regarding the first question, prior evidence does not indicate
that the constructs of SR, ER, and SPS should differ significantly based on gender. Regarding the
second question, there was not enough evidence to suggest that the relationship between SR and
depressive symptoms would be impacted by gender. While differences in components of SPS
(e.g., NPO) have been identified between males and females, the proposed models focused on
overall SPS ability rather than NPO specifically. As such, the relationship between SPS and
depressive symptoms was not predicted to be impacted by gender. The key gender difference
investigated was within the context of ER.
Notable gender differences in ER have been identified. However, those differences
appear to be more quantitative than qualitative. That is, although females appear to use a wider
variety of strategies and use them more frequently than males, the actual strategies implemented
are common to both males and females (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Evidence suggests the
relationship between ER and depressive symptoms is impacted by gender (e.g., Aldao et al.,
2010). It was therefore predicted that the relationship between ER and depressive symptoms
would be stronger for females than for males (Hypothesis 18). This hypothesis would have been
tested only if either the first-order model (Figure 1; Figure 5) or the bifactor model (Figure 3;
Figure 7) were found to be the best fitting model.
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CHAPTER VI
METHOD
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students (N = 592), aged 18 to 29 years old, from a rural
New England university. Regarding power, previous investigations using CFA/SEM have
suggested the guideline of 10 participants per parameter to be estimated (e.g., Melka et al., 2011;
Schreiber et al., 2006); the sample size was well within this range for all models. Participants
were recruited for the study through the Psychology Department Sona subject pool, a web-based
research scheduling program. Two research (Sona) credits were awarded for participating in the
study (see Appendix A for Sona recruitment posting).
Measures
Measures of SR
Short Form Self-Regulation Questionnaire (SSRQ). The Short Form Self-Regulation
Questionnaire (SSRQ) is a 31-item, self-report measure designed to assess the ability to regulate
behavior to be in line with goals (Brown et al., 1999; Carey et al., 2004; Appendix D). Items are
answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Example
items include, “I easily get distracted from my plans,” and “I am able to accomplish goals I set
for myself.” Items are summed to compute a total score; higher scores reflect higher SR abilities.
The SSRQ has demonstrated good psychometric properties (Carey et al., 2004; Neal & Carey,
2005). The internal consistency was found to be high in multiple samples (Cronbach’s α = .92;
Carey et al., 2004; Durand-Bush et al., 2015). Regarding validity, the SSRQ has demonstrated
relationships with other measures as expected based on SR theory (e.g., Chowdhury & Pychyl,
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2018; Lazuras et al., 2019). The SSRQ has been used in several investigations with
undergraduate samples (e.g., Brown et al., 2015; Durand-Bush et al., 2015; Hong, 2013).
Adolescent Self-Regulatory Inventory (ASRI). The Adolescent Self-Regulatory
Inventory (ASRI) is a 36-item, self-report measure designed to assess the ability to regulate
behavior, cognitions, and emotions (Moilanen, 2007; Appendix E). Items are answered on a
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not true at all for me) to 5 (really true for me). Example items
include, “If I really want something, I have to have it right away,” and “When I have a big
project, I can keep working on it.” Items are summed to compute a total score; higher scores
reflect higher SR abilities. The scale can also be divided into short-term (24 items) and long-term
(28 items) subscales; these subscales are highly correlated (r = .79; Moilanen, 2007, 2015). The
ASRI has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties, including high internal consistency
(Cronbach’s α = .94) and good test-retest reliability (r = .80; Moilanen, 2007, 2015; Moilanen &
Manual, 2017). Regarding validity, the ASRI has demonstrated relationships with other measures
as expected based on SR theory (Moilanen, 2007, 2015). The ASRI has been used in
investigations with undergraduate samples (e.g., Moilanen & Manuel, 2017; Ramli et al., 2018).
Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS). The Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS) is a 13-item,
self-report measure designed to assess top-down SR or self-control (Tangney et al., 2004;
Appendix F). Items are answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
Example items include, “I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals,” and “I often act
without thinking through all the alternatives.” Items are summed to compute a total score; higher
scores reflect higher self-control abilities. The scale can also be divided into five subscales as
follows: self-discipline (5 items), deliberate/nonimpulsive action (3 items), healthy habits (2
items), work ethic (2 items), and reliability (1 item); however, the subscales are not frequently
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used (e.g., Linder et al., 2015). The BSCS has demonstrated good psychometric properties
(Manapat et al., 2019; Tangney et al., 2004). Internal consistency is good (Cronbach’s α = .89)
and the measure is related to other measures as would be expected based on SR theory, providing
evidence for its validity (Tangney et al., 2004). The BSCS has been used in several
investigations with undergraduate samples (e.g., Denovan & Macaskill, 2017; Wasylkiw et al.,
2020).
Measures of ER
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). The Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale (DERS) is a 36-item, self-report measure designed to assess clinically relevant
difficulties with regulating negative emotions (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Appendix G). The items
are answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). Example
items include, “I am clear about my feelings,” and “When I’m upset, I acknowledge my
emotions.” Items are summed to compute a total score; higher scores reflect higher difficulties in
ER. The DERS can also be examined as six subscales, including: (1) nonacceptance of emotional
responses (6 items), (2) difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior (5 items), (3) impulse
control difficulties (6 items), (4) lack of emotional awareness (6 items), (5) limited access to
emotion regulation strategies (8 items), and (6) lack of emotional clarity (5 items). The DERS
has demonstrated good psychometric properties, including high internal consistency (Cronbach’s
α = .93) and good test-retest reliability (r = .88; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Regarding validity, the
DERS has demonstrated relationships with other measures as expected based on ER theory (e.g.,
Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Ritschel et al., 2015). The DERS has been used in several investigations
with undergraduate samples (e.g., Lafrance et al., 2014; Shorey et al., 2011; Tull et al., 2007).
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Perth Emotion Regulation Competency Inventory (PERCI). The Perth Emotion
Regulation Competency Inventory (PERCI) is a 32-item, self-report measure designed to assess
the overall ability to regulate both negative and positive emotions (Preece et al., 2018; Appendix
H). Items are answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). Example items include, “When I’m feeling bad, I have no control over the strength and
duration of that feeling,” and “I don’t know what to do to create pleasant feelings in myself.”
Items are summed to compute a total score; higher scores reflect higher difficulties with ER. The
PERCI can be examined as eight subscales (4 items each), including: (1) negative-controlling
experience, (2) negative-inhibiting behavior, (3) negative activating behavior, (4) negativetolerating emotions, (5) positive-controlling experience, (6) positive-inhibiting behavior, (7)
positive-activating behavior, (8) positive-tolerating emotions. The PERCI demonstrated good
psychometric properties in the original validation study, including a high internal consistency
(Cronbach’s α = .94) and demonstrated relationships with other measures as would be expected
based on ER theory, providing evidence for its validity (Preece et al., 2018). The original
validation study included samples of undergraduate students (Preece et al., 2018).
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire
(ERQ) is a 10-item, self-report measure designed to assess two strategies of ER, suppression and
reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003; Appendix I). Items are answered on a Likert scale ranging from
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Example items include, “When I want to feel less
negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation,” and “I control my
emotions by not expressing them.” As noted, the ERQ is divided into two subscales, suppression
(4 items) and reappraisal (6 items). Items within these subscales are summed to create two total
scores; higher scores on the subscales reflect higher levels of that specific ER strategy. The ERQ
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has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties (Gross & John, 2003; Melka et al., 2011).
Averaged across four samples, the internal consistency of each subscale was found to be
adequate (suppression Cronbach’s α = .73; reappraisal Cronbach’s α = .79) and test-retest
reliability for both subscales was good (r = .69; Gross & John, 2003). Regarding validity, the
ERQ has demonstrated relationships with other measures as would be expected based on ER
theory (e.g., Preece et al., 2019). The ERQ has been used in several investigations with
undergraduate samples (e.g., Thomas & Zolkoski, 2020; Wasylkiw et al., 2020).
Measures of SPS
Social Problem-Solving Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R). The Social Problem-Solving
Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R) is a 52-item, self-report measure designed to assess the ability to
identify solutions to problems in everyday living (D’Zurilla et al., 2002; Appendix J). Items are
answered on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (not true at all for me) to 4 (extremely true of me).
Example items include, “When I am trying to solve a problem, I keep in mind what my goal is at
all times,” and “Whenever I have a problem, I believe that it can be solved.” Items can be
summed to compute a total score; higher scores reflect higher SPS abilities. The SPSI-R is
broken into five subscales, including: Positive Problem Orientation (20 items), Negative Problem
Orientation (10 items), Rational Problem-Solving (20 items), Impulsive/Careless Style (10
items), and Avoidance Style (7 items). The SPSI-R has demonstrated good psychometric
properties (D’Zurilla et al., 2002). Internal consistency has been found to be adequate across
subscales (Cronbach’s α ranged from .72 to .92) and test-retest reliability was good (r’s ranged
from .74 to .97; D’Zurilla et al., 2002). Regarding validity, the SPSI-R has demonstrated
relationships with other measures as would be expected (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010) and has been
used in several investigations with undergraduate samples (e.g., Dreer et al., 2004; Haugh, 2006).
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Problem-Solving Inventory (PSI). The Problem-Solving Inventory (PSI) is a 35-item,
self-report measure designed to assess problem-solving appraisal (Heppner & Peterson, 1982;
Appendix K). Items are answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly
disagree). Example items include, “I trust my ability to solve new and difficult problems,” and “I
generally go with the first good idea that comes to my mind.” Items can be summed to compute a
total score; lower scores reflect better SPS abilities. The PSI can also be examined as three
subscales, including: problem-solving confidence (11 items), approach-avoidant style (16 items),
and personal control (5 items). The PSI has demonstrated good psychometric properties
(Heppner & Peterson, 1982). Internal consistency was found to be adequate across subscales
(Cronbach’s α ranged from .72 to .90) and test-retest reliability was good (r’s ranged from .83 to
.89; Heppner, 1988). Regarding validity, the PSI has demonstrated relationships with other
measures as would be expected based on SPS theory (e.g., Heppner et al., 2004). The PSI has
been used in several investigations with undergraduate samples (e.g., Dixon et al., 1993;
Heppner et al., 2004; Julal, 2016).
Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire (NPOQ). The Negative Problem
Orientation Questionnaire (NPOQ) is a 12-item, self-report scale designed to assess an
individual’s approach to solving problems in everyday life (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a;
Appendix L). Items are answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all true of me) to 5
(extremely true of me). Example items include, “I see problems as a threat to my well-being,”
and “Even if I have looked at a problem from all possible angles, I still wonder if the solution I
decided on will be effective.” Items are summed to compute a total score; higher scores reflect
higher levels of NPO. The NPOQ has demonstrated good psychometric properties, including
high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .92) and test-retest reliability (r = .80) (Robichaud &
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Dugas, 2005a, 2005b). Regarding validity, the NPOQ demonstrated relationships with other
measures as would be expected based on theory (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a, 2005b). The
NPOQ has been used in investigations with undergraduate samples (e.g., Bottesi et al., 2016;
Kertz et al., 2015).
Descriptive & Outcome Measures
Participants responded to questions about basic demographic information (Appendix C).
The demographic information was used to describe the sample and explore group differences.
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). The Center for
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) is a 20-item, self-report measure designed to
assess the symptoms of depression according to DSM-IV (APA, 2013; Radloff, 1977; Appendix
M). Items are answered on a Likert scale and range from 1 (rarely or none of the time; less than
1 day) to 5 (most or all of the time; 5-7 days). Example items include, “I was bothered by things
that didn’t usually bother me,” and “I felt sad.” Items are summed to compute a total score;
higher scores reflect higher levels of depressive symptoms. The CES-D has demonstrated good
psychometric properties, including high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .90) and
relationships with other measures as would be expected (Carleton et al., 2013; Radloff, 1977;
1991; Siddaway et al., 2017). The CES-D has been used in several investigations with
undergraduate populations (e.g., Patten et al., 2020; Pirbaglou et al., 2013).
Coronavirus Anxiety Scale (CAS). The Coronavirus Anxiety Scale (CAS) is a 5-item,
self-report measure designed to screen for dysfunctional anxiety related to the COVID-19
pandemic (Lee, 2020; Appendix N). Items are rated on a Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 4
(nearly every day for the last two weeks). Example items include, “I felt dizzy, lightheaded, or
faint, when I read or listened to news about the coronavirus,” and “I had trouble falling or
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staying asleep because I was thinking about the coronavirus.” Items are summed to compute a
total score; higher scores reflect higher levels of COVID-related anxiety. The CAS demonstrated
adequate psychometric properties, including high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .93) and
correlations with other measures as expected (Lee, 2020). The CAS has been examined in
participants aged 18-29 (e.g., Lee et al., 2020).
Procedure
The present study was approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects. Participants were provided a link to the survey via the Sona
system after signing up for a timeslot. The study was administered anonymously via Qualtrics, a
secure survey-based website used to facilitate data collection. Prior to starting the study,
informed consent was obtained (see Appendix B for Informed Consent). All participants were
informed that they would be asked to answer questions about their self-regulation, emotion
regulation, problem-solving abilities, and psychological functioning. Participants were also
informed that their identity and responses would remain anonymous, that they could withdraw
from the study at any time, and that they could choose to skip questions that they felt
uncomfortable answering. The battery of questionnaires was completed via Qualtrics
(Appendices D-N). All predictor variable questionnaires (SR, ER, and SPS) were presented in
randomized order across participants, followed by the CES-D, CAS, and demographic questions.
All questionnaires took approximately 90 minutes to complete. Upon study completion,
participants were thanked for their participation and given a resource list for counseling services
should any participants have felt distressed and wished to seek such services (see Appendix O
for resource list). Finally, participants were awarded two research (Sona) credits, which could be
applied toward introductory psychology courses.
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Analysis Plan
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses were performed using SPSS 26/27 prior to conducting the
hypothesis-driven analyses. Descriptive data were assessed for the demographic variables of age,
gender, and race. Internal consistencies (Cronbach’s α), total and/or subscale scores, means, and
standard deviations were computed for all measures. Distributions were assessed for normality
via histograms, and pairs of variables were assessed for linear relationships via scatterplots. Data
were examined for skewness, kurtosis, and outliers. Relevant assumptions were evaluated prior
to conducting each statistical analysis (e.g., Keith, 2019; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Correlational Analyses
Bivariate correlations among all variables of interest were conducted. The three sets of
measures for the predictor variables (i.e., SR, ER, and SPS) were compared to examine pattern
differences. Bivariate relationships between all predictor variables and the outcome variable
(CES-D) were assessed. These analyses tested Hypotheses 1-6 regarding correlational
relationships among the constructs of interest.
Mean-Level Differences (Gender)
Mean-level differences on the variables of interest between males and females were
examined using independent t tests. Similar to the approach for bivariate correlations, the three
sets of measures for the predictor variables (i.e., SR, ER, and SPS) were compared to investigate
pattern differences. These analyses tested Hypotheses 8-9 regarding gender differences on the
constructs of interest.
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Measurement Models: CFA
The CFA measurement models depicted in Figures 2-5 were tested using SPSS AMOS
26/28. Prior to estimating the models, the identification status for each model (i.e., the balance of
measured to estimated parameters) was checked (Byrne, 2016; Keith, 2019). Then, each model
was estimated and evaluated for fit based on a variety of model fit indices. Some examples
include, but are not limited to the following (guidelines outlined by Keith, 2019):
•
•
•
•
•

χ2 value; non-significance supports the model and lower values indicate better fit when
comparing models
RMSEA; <.05 = good fit, < .08 = adequate fit, <.10 = poor fit
CFI; > .95 = good fit, >.90 = adequate fit
AIC; smaller values indicate better fit (used for comparing non-nested models)
BIC; smaller values indicate better fit, reward for parsimony (used for comparing nonnested models)

The overall fit of each model, in addition to their comparison to each other, was used to
determine the best-fitting CFA model. The first-order factors depicted in Figure 1 examined
Hypotheses 10-15 regarding the construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS. The comparison of
model fit across competing CFA models tested Hypothesis 16 regarding convergent versus
discriminant validity of the constructs.
Structural Model: SEM
The best-fitting measurement model was used to test one of the four possible models
depicted in Figures 5 through 8 connecting SR, ER, and SPS to depressive symptoms. Prior to
estimating the model, the identification status was checked (Byrne, 2016; Keith, 2019). Then, the
model was estimated and evaluated for fit based on a variety of model fit indices. The model was
evaluated as a stand-alone model rather than compared to competing models (Keith, 2019). This
analysis tested Hypothesis 17 regarding the relationships among common and/or distinct features
of SR, ER, and SPS and their connection to depressive symptoms.
149

Multigroup Analysis (Gender)
Multigroup analyses were conducted for both the measurement model and the structural
model portions to examine possible differences between males and females. This analysis
involves systematically allowing paths to either vary or be constrained to equivalent values and
then comparing the differences in model fit (Keith, 2019). Differences in model fit were assessed
using a similar collection of fit indices as described above. This analysis tested Hypothesis 18
regarding possible gender differences in ER.
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CHAPTER VII
RESULTS
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the analysis plan. First, preliminary analyses
were conducted, which included assessment of missing data, sample demographics, and scale
descriptives. Relevant assumptions were evaluated prior to conducting each statistical analysis
(e.g., Keith, 2019; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Next, bivariate correlations were computed, and
mean-level gender differences were examined using independent t tests. In the measurement
model stage, each of the four CFA models was estimated and evaluated. The overall fit of each
model, in addition to their comparison to each other, was used to determine the best-fitting CFA
model. In the structural model stage, the best-fitting measurement model was used to examine
the connections among SR, ER, SPS, and depressive symptoms in a latent variable SEM model.
Lastly, multigroup analyses were conducted for both the measurement and structural model
portions to examine possible gender differences.
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses were performed using SPSS 26/27. Six hundred and thirty-four
participants were recruited; however, 25 of these participants either declined consent or opted out
prior to study completion, resulting in an N of 609. Total scores on all measures were computed
using summed totals which require no missing data to be considered an accurate estimate.
Approximately .02% of the overall data was missing, and according to Little’s MCAR test, total
scores across variables were missing completely at random, χ2 (122) = 120.51, p = .52. Given the
nature of the measures used and the assumptions of SEM (e.g., Keith, 2019), only participants
that responded to all items on the measures of interest were included in analyses (i.e., listwise
deletion). This yielded a final N of 592.
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The sample was comprised of participants who identified as 51.9% female, 46.6% male,
1.0% non-binary, .3% female to male transgender, .2% not sure, and 0% male to female
transgender. Of note, when examining gender differences (mean-level and multigroup analyses),
data for non-binary, transgender, and unsure participants were excluded due to small sample size
for those subgroups and a corresponding lack of power (Cohen, 1992; Glick et al., 2018). The
race/ethnicity of the sample was as follows: 89.9% White, 3.5% Asian, 2.9% Multiple Racial
Identities, 1.5% Black, 1.5% Latinx, and .3% American Indian/Native American or Alaska
Native. Age of participants ranged from 18 to 29 (M = 19.02, SD = 1.50).
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics for each observed variable. Internal consistencies
across measures ranged from acceptable to excellent (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Analysis of the
CAS revealed a significantly skewed and kurtotic distribution (Range = 0-20, M = 1.34, SD =
2.79, Mode = 0). Thus, the CAS was excluded from subsequent analyses.
Table 5 displays mean comparisons to past samples for each observed variable, including
published studies with undergraduate students and two pilot study samples collected by the thesis
author (Buffie et al., 2020; Buffie & Nangle, 2018). Overall, the variable means of the data
collected were in correspondence with past samples; no observed means were more than one
standard deviation above or below past samples. The mean of the CES-D appeared to be slightly
higher than samples collected prior to 2020 (current dataset M = 19.77, published data M =
16.38, spring 2018 pilot data M = 15.95; Buffie & Nangle, 2018). A recent meta-analytic study
demonstrated higher prevalence rates of depressive symptoms in undergraduate student
populations following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Deng et al., 2021), which could
account for the increase in depressive symptoms observed in the present dataset.
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Table 4
Scale Descriptives
Possible
Range

Observed
Range

Mean

Standard
Deviation

SSRQ

31-155

48-155

106.23

17.82

.02

-.06

.93

ASRI

36-180

66-159

114.49

14.70

.08

.18

.83

BSCS

13-65

16-63

38.51

9.14

.05

-.15

.86

DERS

36-180

36-165

90.81

25.39

.32

-.28

.95

PERCI

32-224

32-190

97.83

30.01

.09

-.35

.94

ERQ_C

6-42

7-42

27.62

6.41

-.21

.23

.85

ERQ_S

4-28

4-28

16.31

4.81

-.20

-.34

.74

SPSI

0-20

1.99-18.80

10.55

3.08

-.01

-.30

.87

PSI

32-192

66-185

126.07

20.11

.48

.32

.91

NPOQ

12-60

12-60

28.87

10.60

.46

-.29

.94

CESD

0-60

0-55

19.77

12.02

.52

-.45

.92

CAS

0-20

0-18

1.33

2.79

2.81

8.85

.89

Skewness Kurtosis

Cronbach’s
α

Note. N = 592.
Statistical Assumptions
Applicable assumptions were evaluated prior to conducting each analysis (e.g., Keith,
2019; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The independence of observations assumption was
considered met based on the administration procedures utilized (see Chapter VI). Univariate
outliers were assessed using the z-score method (+/-3.29); outliers falling three standard
deviations above or below the mean were winsorized. Multivariate outliers were assessed by
examining a studentized deleted residual by leverage scatterplot (SDRESID = +/- 2.00; leverage
= [2k + 2]/n) and DFBeta values falling above or below the threshold of 2/sqrt(n).
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Table 5
Variable Mean Comparisons to Past Samples
Observed Mean &
Published Data
S18 Pilot Data
S20 Pilot Data
Standard Deviation with College Students
(N = 350)
(N = 315)
M = 106.23
M = 112.741
SSRQ
SD = 17.82
SD = 14.36
M = 114.49
M = 119.442
M = 118.03
ASRI
SD = 14.70
SD = 15.84
SD = 14.67
M = 38.51
M = 39.223
BSCS
SD = 9.14
SD = 8.58
M = 90.81
M = 89.954
M = 85.29
M = 90.86
DERS
SD = 25.39
SD = 23.44
SD = 25.39
SD = 22.98
5
M = 97.83
M = 93.40
PERCI
SD = 30.01
SD = 32.21
M = 27.62
M = 27.606
ERQ_C
SD = 6.41
SD = 5.64
M = 16.31
M = 13.566
ERQ_S
SD = 4.81
SD = 4.44
M = 10.55
M = 12.557
M = 11.24
M = 10.74
SPSI
SD = 3.08
SD = 2.48
SD = 2.78
SD = 2.64
8
M = 97.93
M = 87.09
PSI
SD = 20.11
SD = 21.91
M = 28.87
M = 25.039
NPOQ
SD = 10.60
SD = 7.80
M = 19.77
M = 16.3810
M = 15.95
M = 19.00
CESD
SD = 12.02
SD = 9.88
SD = 13.98
SD = 14.46
Note. Means are displayed in bolded font. 1. Durand-Bush et al. (2015) N = 469; 2. Moilanen
(2015) N = 168; 3. Tangney et al. (2004) N = 351; 4. Finkelstein-Fox et al. (2018) N = 158; 5.
Preece et al. (2018) N = 231; 6. Gross & John (2003) N = 791; 7. Bell & D’Zurilla (2009) N =
259; 8. Tümkaya (2009) N =353; 9. Robichaud & Dugas (2005a) N = 201; 10. Nadorff et al.
(2011) N = 571. S18 = spring 2018 (Buffie & Nangle, 2018); S20 = spring 2020 (Buffie et al.,
2020).
Six multivariate outliers were identified and removed from relevant analyses. Normality was
assessed via histograms, skewness and kurtosis values (critical value of +/-1.96), and
standardized residual q-q plots. Linearity was assessed via scatterplots between predictor and
outcome variables and standardized residual p-p plots (SR, ER, and SPS regressed onto CES-D).
Homogeniety of variance in the context of mean-level gender difference analyses was assessed
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via Levene’s test and the Fmax ratio test. Homoscedasticity was assessed via standardized residual
by standardized predicted scatterplots. All assumptions related to regression were considered
met. Assumptions related to path analyses were also considered met, including (a) assumed
perfect reliability of measures, (b) all models were recursive, (c) no common causes were
missing from consideration, and (d) a state of equilibrium was reached (e.g., hypothesized causal
processes had sufficient time (Keith, 2019).
Correlational Analyses
All bivariate relationships were significant and in the expected directions (Table 6). As
predicted, adaptive SR was positively related to adaptive ER (Hypothesis 1); adaptive SR was
positively related to adaptive SPS (Hypothesis 2); adaptive ER was positively related to adaptive
SPS (Hypothesis 3); and adaptive SR, ER, and SPS were related to lower depressive symptoms
(Hypotheses 4-6). The within-construct correlations for SR ranged from r(590) = .70, p < .01 to
r(590) = .78 p < .01; ER ranged from r(590) = -.11, p < .01 to r(590) = .74, p < .01; and SPS
ranged from r(590) = -.56, p < .01 to r(590) = .84, p < .01. The between-construct correlations
for SR and ER ranged from r(590) = -.12, p < .01 to r(590) = -.68, p < .01; ER and SPS ranged
from r(590) = .11, p < .01 to r(590) = .69, p < .01; and SR and SPS ranged from r(590) = -.44, p
< .01 to r(590) = .82, p < .01.
Cohen (1988) established rules of thumb regarding interpretation of correlational
magnitude, such that correlation coefficients of around .10 are considered “small,” around .30
are considered “medium,” and above .50 are considered “large.” Across variables, most
correlations fell into the medium to large magnitude range (Cohen, 1988). The weakest
magnitudes were observed between the ERQ suppression subscale (ERQ_S) and all other
variables, which ranged from small to medium.
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Table 6
Bivariate Correlations
SSRQ ASRI BSCS DERS PERCI ERQC ERQS SPSI PSI

SSRQ

-

ASRI

.78

-

BSCS

.71

.70

-

DERS

-.68

-.57

-.49

-

PERCI

-.63

-.61

-.58

.74

-

ERQ_C

.49

.45

.32

-.48

-.40

-

ERQ_S

-.20

-.13

-.12

.34

.25

-.11

-

SPSI

.82

.72

.62

-.67

-.60

.52

-.17

-

PSI

.77

.69

.56

-.60

-.57

.52

-.19

.84

-

NPOQ

-.60

-.51

-.44

.69

.61

-.41

.11

-.67

-.56

NPOQ CESD

-

CESD
-.55
-.47 -.42
.76
.62
-.43
.22
-.52 -.45
.63
Note. N = 592; all correlations significant at p < .01.
Light shaded regions represent within-construct correlations for SR, ER, and SPS.
Medium-Light shaded regions represent between-construct correlations for SR and ER.
Medium-Dark shaded regions represent between-construct correlations for ER and SPS.
Dark shaded regions represent between construct-correlations for SR and SPS.

-

Mean-Level Differences (Gender)
Results of the independent t tests examining mean-level gender differences between
males and females for all variables are displayed in Table 7. As predicted, females reported
significantly higher levels of NPO (Hypothesis 8) and higher levels of depressive symptoms
(Hypothesis 9) than males. Results for gender differences in ER (Hypothesis 7) were mixed, such
that females reported higher levels of emotional dysregulation (DERS) than males, whereas
males reported higher use of suppression as an ER strategy (ERQ_S) than females. Males and
females did not differ in their overall ability to regulate emotions (PERCI) or the use of cognitive
reappraisal as an ER strategy (ERQ_C).
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Contrary to prediction, females reported lower levels of SR than males (SSRQ). Gender
differences additionally emerged for overall problem-solving ability, such that females reported
lower levels of SPS than males (SPSI-R and PSI).
Table 7
Mean-Level Gender Differences
Cohen’s d
Mean
SD
Independent t
d = -.20
104.79
18.71
t(581) = -2.41
SSRQ
p = .016*
95% CI: -.36, -.04
108.33
16.40
d = -.09
113.93
15.91
t(581) = -1.13
ASRI
p = .257
95% CI: -.26, .07
115.32
13.16
d = .02
38.66
9.26
t(581) = .28
BSCS
p = .783
95% CI: -.14, .19
38.45
8.98
d = .40
95.02
27.30
t(581) = 4.85
DERS
p < .001*
95% CI: .24, .57
85.09
21.22
d = .15
99.54
31.43
t(581) = 1.77
PERCI
p = .077
95% CI: -.02, .31
95.13
28.21
d = -.06
27.53
6.55
t(581) = -.76
ERQ_C
p = .447
95% CI: -.23, .10
27.93
6.09
d = -.39
15.45
5.04
t(581) = -4.55
ERQ_S
p = < .001*
95% CI: -.54, -.21
17.24
4.34
d = -.32
10.12
3.31
t(581) = -3.91
SPSI
p < .001*
95% CI: -.49, -.16
11.10
2.70
d = -.17
124.75
20.44
t(581) = -2.03
PSI
p = .043*
95% CI: -.33, -.01
128.12
19.57
d = .37
30.44
11.22
t(581) = 4.51
NPOQ
p < .001*
95% CI: .21, .54
26.60
9.10
d = .50
22.20
12.30
t(581) = 6.03
CESD
p
<
.001*
95%
CI: .34, .67
16.45
10.55
Note. N = 583 (nfemale = 307; nmale = 276); Females means are displayed in bolded font. *
indicates significance at p < .05.
Measurement Models: CFA
The measurement and structural models were tested using SPSS AMOS 26/28. All
participants with missing data as well as six identified multivariate outliers were removed prior
to SEM analyses, yielding a total N of 586. For ease of interpretation, all variables were rescaled
prior to SEM analyses by dividing the total score by the number of scale items. The original
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computation method for the SPSI overall index reflects a weighted average based on the number
of items in each subscale (D’Zurilla et al., 2002). Because unmeasured variables have no
inherent scale, a scale must be set for each latent variable and error term using one of two
methods: unit variance identification (UVI) or unit loading identification (ULI). UVI involves
setting the latent factor variances to one, whereas ULI involves setting a factor loading to one for
each latent factor (Keith, 2019). UVI is commonly used for CFA model estimation (e.g., Ellis &
Fraser, 2019) and when evaluating competing models (e.g., Weiss et al., 2021). Thus, UVI was
used for all latent variable estimation, with the exception of the higher-order model due to the
requirement that unique factor variance has to be estimated in that particular type of model. All
models were evaluated based on the a priori fit index thresholds displayed in Table 8.
Table 8
Fit Index a priori Thresholds
Index

Threshold

Fit

χ2

Lower

Better Fit

AIC

Lower

Better Fit

BIC

Lower

Better Fit

TLI

>.90

Adequate Fit

CFI

>.90

Adequate Fit

RMSEA

<.08

Adequate Fit

SRMR

<.08

Good Fit

Note. Sourced from Keith, 2019, p. 327.
First-Order CFA Model
As discussed in Chapter I, factor analysis is used to assess the extent to which observed
variables are generated by latent constructs (Byrne, 2016). Factor loadings, which can be
interpreted as regression coefficients with measurement error removed, reflect the strength of the
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relationship between the observed variable and latent construct. CFA is used when theory helps
inform a proposed model thought to reflect the underlying factor structure of the observed
variables (Keith, 2019). Ultimately, the first-order model was utilized to examine the construct
validity of SR, ER, and SPS as commonly measured in practice, addressing the first goal of the
study.
Model Results. Prior to running the analysis, the model was determined to be
overidentified (i.e., more measured parameters than parameters needing to be estimated). The
results of the first-order CFA model estimation (standardized) are displayed in Figure 9. No
Heywood cases or standardized factor loadings greater than one were detected. All factor
loadings were significant, in the expected directions, and considered medium to large in
magnitude (Table 9). As predicted, the correlations among all three latent factors were
significant, in the expected directions, and considered large in magnitude (Table 9; Hypotheses
13-15). This finding supports the examination of a higher-order model (discussed in the next
section) which was proposed to help explain correlations among the first-order latent factors.
A modified model is displayed in Figure 10. Modifications were made in order of highest
parameter change (modification index [MI] change > 20; represents the impact the modification
would have on the χ2 value for the model) until the fit index threshold goals were reached (Table
10). Notable cross-loadings were evaluated first, followed by error terms. Four modifications
were required in order to reach the a priori fit index thresholds, including: 1) adding a path from
the ER latent variable to the NPOQ, 2) correlating the BSCS and PERCI error terms, 3)
correlating the ERQ_C error term with the ER latent variable, and 4) correlating the ERQ_S and
NPOQ error terms. All modifications were significant and in the expected directions (Table 11).
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Figure 9
First-Order CFA Model (Original)
χ2(32, N = 586) = 308.13, p < .001
TLI = .91
CFI = .94
RMSEA = .12 [.11, .13]
SRMR = .05
AIC = 354.13
BIC = 454.71
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Table 9
First-Order CFA (Original) – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances
Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

SR – SSRQ

.54

.94

.02

29.84*

SR – ASRI

.34

.84

.01

24.89*

SR – BSCS

.53

.76

.03

21.14*

ER – DERS

.62

.89

.02

26.25*

ER – PERCI

.78

.83

.03

23.43*

ER – ERQ_C

-.57

-.54

.04

-13.43*

ER – ERQ_S

.38

.31

.05

7.38*

SPS – SPSI

2.89

.95

.10

30.26*

SPS – PSI

.51

.88

.02

26.73*

SPS – NPOQ

-.61

-.70

.03

-18.99*

SR – ER

-.81

-.81

.02

-39.79*

ER – SPS

-.81

-.81

.02

-40.84*

SR – SPS

.91

.91

.01

76.38*

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001.
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Figure 10
First-Order CFA Model (Modified)
χ2(28, N = 586) = 119.13, p < .001
TLI = .97
CFI = .98
RMSEA = .08 [.06, .09]
SRMR = .03
AIC = 173.11
BIC = 291.19
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Table 10
First-Order CFA (Modified) – Change in Model Fit
Modification

χ2

df

TLI

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

AIC

BIC

Original

308.13

32

.908

.935

.121

.0549

354.13

454.71

ER – NPOQ

218.41

31

.936

.956

.102

.0478

266.41

371.37

E3 – E5

178.73

30

.947

.965

.092

.0464

228.73

338.06

E6 – ER

142.16

29

.958

.973

.082

.0358

194.16

307.87

E7 – E10

119.11

28

.965

.978

.075

.0329

173.11

291.19

Note. Modifications made in order of highest parameter change until goal fit index thresholds
reached; began with notable cross-loadings then error terms (MI change > 20; .10).
Table 11
First-Order CFA (Modified) – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances
Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

ER – NPOQ

.49

.57

.05

10.20*

E3 – E5

-.08

-.30

.01

-6.09*

E6 – ER

.21

.23

.04

5.37*

E7 – E10

-.14

-.21

.03

-4.76*

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001.
The modifications and corresponding redistribution of variance primarily impacted the
ER latent variable to ERQ_C factor loading (-.54 to -.70) and the SPS latent variable to NPOQ
factor loading (-.71 to .24).
Evaluation of Model Fit. With the exception of the RMSEA, fit indices indicated an
overall adequate fit of the original model. The χ2 value was significant as expected with sample
sizes over N = 400 (Keith, 2019). The TLI (.91) and CFI (.94) were considered adequate, and the
SRMR (.05) was considered good. However, the RMSEA (.12) was considered poor. The four
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modifications, while making the model less parsimonious (df decreased from 32 to 28),
substantially improved the fit of the model. Again, the χ2 value was significant as expected with
sample sizes over N = 400. The TLI (.97), CFI (.98), and SRMR (.03) were considered good. The
RMSEA (.08) was considered adequate. The AIC and BIC both significantly decreased,
indicating a better fit of the modified model compared to the original model.
Construct Validity
As discussed in Chapters II-IV, all selected measures were chosen based on their (1) aim
to capture the overall construct, (2) connection to theory, and (3) frequency of use in the field.
The prediction that each measure would load on to its theorized construct was mostly supported.
Self-Regulation. As predicted, the three measures selected to assess SR loaded on to the
latent factor thought to represent the underlying construct of SR (Hypothesis 10). All three factor
loadings were considered large in magnitude and did not substantially change between the
original and modified models. This suggests the measures appropriately captured the intended
construct of SR.
Emotion Regulation. Hypothesis 11 was partially supported in that two out of the three
measures selected to assess ER loaded on to the latent factor thought to represent the underlying
construct of ER. The factor loadings for the DERS and the PERCI were considered large in
magnitude and did not substantially change between the original and modified models,
suggesting these measures appropriately captured the intended construct. The factor loading for
the ERQ_S did not change between the original and modified models, but was considered
medium in magnitude, suggesting this measure is less representative of the underlying ER
construct than the other measures. One of the modifications involved correlating the ERQ_C
error term with the ER latent variable, suggesting that there is unique variance within that
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measure that is related to ER in a different manner than the remainder of the measure’s variance.
After accounting for this unique variance, the ERQ_C factor loading was strengthened (path
increased from -.54 in the original model to -.70 in the modified model).
Social Problem-Solving. Hypothesis 12 was partially supported in that two out of the
three measures selected to assess SPS loaded on to the latent factor thought to represent the
underlying construct of SPS. The factor loadings for the SPSI and the PSI were considered large
in magnitude and did not substantially change between the original and modified models,
suggesting these measures appropriately captured the intended construct. One of the
modifications involved adding a path from the ER latent variable to the NPOQ, suggesting a
portion of the variance in the NPOQ is more so reflective of the underlying construct of ER
(modified path = .57) than of SPS (modified path = -.24). The relationship between ER and the
NPOQ is additionally supported by the suggested modification of correlating the ERQ_S and
NPOQ error terms.
Overall, these findings support the construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS. However, two
measures, the ERQ and the NPOQ, appeared to include notable portions of variance unaccounted
for by the latent constructs of ER and SPS, respectively.
Higher-Order CFA Model
As discussed in Chapter I, CFA can also be utilized to examine convergent and
discriminant validity by testing rival models (Keith, 2019). Models that reflect convergence of
observed variables, divergence of observed variables, and possibilities in between were
presented in Chapter V. A comparison of the first-order, higher-order, bifactor, and one-factor
CFA models was utilized to examine the convergent and discriminant validity of SR, ER, and
SPS as commonly measured in practice, addressing the second goal of the study.
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The first-order model represented the highest level of divergence, such that all constructs
within the model are considered distinct entities and do not share underlying variance after
measurement error has been removed. It is not that the constructs were hypothesized to be
unrelated, but rather that the degree to which they are related is not a reflection of shared
variance with an overarching construct. In contrast, the higher-order model represented a level
“in between” convergence and divergence, such that it reflects the constructs as being distinct
entities with a common element of shared variance that underlies the three constructs.
Despite the theoretical difference between the first-order and higher-order models, the
two models are mathematically equivalent. As noted in Chapter V, higher-order models are used
to explain observed correlations between first-order factors (Brunner et al., 2012). The higherorder model can therefore be conceptualized as a factor analysis of the first-order factors.
Because correlations and standardized regression equations are utilized to compute and evaluate
both models, the mathematical outcomes of the models are identical. Thus, the primary
difference between the first-order and higher-order models is the shift from correlations among
latent constructs to error-free factor loading estimates for the first-order variables to a higherorder construct labeled the “Common Factor” (i.e., shared variance among the three latent
constructs). Specifically, the higher-order model suggests that the common factor indirectly
impacts the observed measures through the first-order factors. The common factor could
represent the shared features of SR, ER, and SPS highlighted throughout Chapters II-IV,
including underlying mechanisms (i.e., top-down and bottom-up processes; skills specific to
cognitive, emotional, or behavioral modalities; EFs) or functional outcomes (i.e., features related
to monitoring, evaluating, and adjusting behavior across modalities to achieve a goal or solve a
problem; Barkley 1997a; Gross, 2014; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
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Model Results. Prior to running the analysis, the model was determined to be
overidentified (i.e., more measured parameters than parameters needing to be estimated). The
results of the higher-order CFA model estimation (standardized) are displayed in Figure 11. As
previously discussed, ULI was utilized to set the scale of the unmeasured variables due to the
requirement of unique factor variance for the first-order factor loadings to be estimated; one
factor loading for each of the first-order latent variables was fixed to a value of one. No
Heywood cases or standardized factor loadings greater than one were detected. All first-order
factor loadings were significant, in the expected directions, and considered medium to large in
magnitude (Table 12). In addition, all higher-order factor loadings were significant, in the
expected directions, and considered large in magnitude (Table 12). These findings correspond to
the correlations observed in the first-order model and suggest a significant amount of shared
variance among SR, ER, and SPS after accounting for the unique variance of each factor.
The modified model is displayed in Figure 12. Modifications were made in order of
highest parameter change (MI change > 20) until the fit index threshold goals were reached
(Table 13). Notable cross-loadings were evaluated first, followed by error terms. Four
modifications were required in order to reach the a priori fit index thresholds, including: 1)
adding a path from the ER latent variable to the NPOQ, 2) correlating the BSCS and PERCI
error terms, 3) correlating the ERQ_C error term with the ER variable unique factor variance,
and 4) correlating the ERQ_S and NPOQ error terms. All modifications were significant and in
the expected directions (Table 14).
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The primary difference between the first-order and higher-order model modifications is the shift
from correlating the ERQ_C error term with the ER latent variable itself (first-order model)
versus the ER latent variable unique factor variance (higher-order model). This suggests that
variance separate from the ER latent variable is correlated with variance that is unique to the
ERQ_C measure.
Evaluation of Model Fit. With the exception of the RMSEA, fit indices indicated an
overall adequate fit of the original model. The χ2 value was significant as expected with sample
sizes over N = 400 (Keith, 2019). The TLI (.91) and CFI (.94) were considered adequate, and the
SRMR (.05) was considered good. However, the RMSEA (.12) was considered poor. The four
modifications, while making the model less parsimonious (df decreased from 32 to 28),
substantially improved the fit of the model. Again, the χ2 value was significant as expected with
sample sizes over N = 400. The TLI (.97), CFI (.98), and SRMR (.03) were considered good. The
RMSEA (.08) was considered adequate. The AIC and BIC both significantly decreased,
indicating a better fit of the modified model compared to the original model.
As previously noted, the higher-order model suggests that a common factor underlies the
three latent constructs of interest and indirectly impacts the observed measures through the firstorder factors. Overall, the higher-order model fit the data moderately well, which supports a
conceptualization of the constructs as being comprised of both common and shared features.
However, the number of modifications necessary to achieve a good fit indicated exploration of
additional models was warranted.
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Figure 11
Higher-Order CFA Model (Original)
χ2(32, N = 586) = 308.13, p < .001
TLI = .91
CFI = .94
RMSEA = .12 [.11, .13]
SRMR = .05
AIC = 354.13
BIC = 454.71
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Table 12
Higher-Order CFA (Original) – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances
Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

SR – SSRQ

1.00 (fixed)

.94

-

-

SR – ASRI

.64

.84

.02

30.57*

SR – BSCS

.99

.76

.04

24.35*

ER – DERS

1.00 (fixed)

.89

-

-

ER – PERCI

1.24

.83

.05

24.14*

ER – ERQ_C

-.92

-.54

.07

-13.65*

ER – ERQ_S

.60

.31

.08

7.41*

SPS – SPSI

1.00 (fixed)

.95

-

-

SPS – PSI

.18

.88

.01

34.79*

SPS – NPOQ

-.21

-.70

.01

-21.40*

SR – CF

.51

.95

.02

26.80*

ER – CF

-.53

-.85

.03

-21.17*

SPS – CF

2.76

.95

.10

27.19*

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001. CF = Common Factor. One loading for each firstorder latent variable fixed to a value of 1.00 as per ULI method.
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Figure 12
Higher-Order CFA Model (Modified)
χ2(28, N = 586) = 119.13, p < .001
TLI = .97
CFI = .98
RMSEA = .08 [.06, .09]
SRMR = .03
AIC = 173.11
BIC = 291.19
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Table 13
Higher-Order CFA (Modified) - Change in Model Fit
Modification

χ2

df

TLI

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

AIC

BIC

Original

308.13

32

.908

.935

.121

.0549

354.13

454.71

ER – NPOQ

218.41

31

.936

.956

.102

.0478

266.41

371.37

E3 – E5

178.73

30

.947

.965

.092

.0464

228.73

338.06

E6 – UF2

142.16

29

.958

.973

.082

.0358

194.16

307.87

E7 – E10

119.11

28

.965

.978

.075

.0329

173.11

291.19

Note. Modifications made in order of highest parameter change until goal fit index thresholds
reached; began with notable cross-loadings then error terms (MI change > .20; .10).
Table 14
Higher-Order CFA (Modified) – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances
Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

ER – NPOQ

.76

.57

.08

10.07*

E3 – E5

-.08

-.30

.01

-6.09*

E6 – UF2

.14

.38

.03

5.33*

E7 – E10

-.14

-.21

.03

-4.76*

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001.
Bifactor CFA Model
Similar to the higher-order model, the bifactor model represented a level “in between”
convergence and divergence, such that it reflects the constructs as being distinct entities with a
common element of shared variance. However, unlike the higher-order model, the bifactor model
suggests the common factor is separate from the first-order factors. More specifically, the
common factor reflected in the bifactor model represents shared features that impact all of the
observed measures but that are separate from the three latent constructs of interest.
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Model Results. The bifactor model as originally specified was not able to be estimated
because the factor loading of the SPSI emerged as a Heywood case and its standardized
regression weight exceeded 1.00. This resulted in the model being unidentified and the iteration
limit was reached. To address this issue, the variance of the SPSI was constrained to zero (Keith,
2019). Subsequently, the model was determined to be overidentified (i.e., more measured
parameters than parameters needing to be estimated). The results of the bifactor CFA model
estimation (standardized) are displayed in Figure 13. UVI was utilized to set the scale of the
unmeasured variables. All factor loadings were significant, in the expected directions, and
ranged from small to large in magnitude, with the exception of the ERQ_C and NPOQ factor
loadings which were nonsignificant (Table 15). In addition, all common factor loadings were
significant, in the expected directions, and considered medium to large in magnitude, with the
exception of the ERQ_S which was considered small (Table 15).
The modified model is displayed in Figure 14. Modifications were made in order of
highest parameter change (MI change > 20) until the fit index threshold goals were reached
(Table 16). Notable cross-loadings were evaluated first, followed by error terms. Two
modifications were required in order to reach the a priori fit index thresholds, including: 1)
adding a path from the ER latent variable to the NPOQ and 2) adding a path from the SR latent
variable to the PERCI. These changes impacted the significance of the SPS latent variable to
NPOQ path, such that the path became significant following the redistribution of variance. All
modifications were significant and in the expected directions (Table 17).
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Figure 13
Bifactor CFA Model (Original)
χ2(26, N = 586) = 208.43, p < .001
TLI = .93
CFI = .96
RMSEA = .11 [.10, .12]
SRMR = .04
AIC = 266.43
BIC = 393.26

*

*
* Indicates nonsignificance
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Table 15
Bifactor CFA (Original) – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances
Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

SR – SSRQ

.13

.22

.02

6.22*

SR – ASRI

.14

.35

.02

7.61*

SR – BSCS

.33

.46

.04

8.41*

ER – DERS

.44

.63

.05

8.12*

ER – PERCI

.32

.34

.05

6.71*

ER – ERQ_C

-.07

-.06

.04

-1.63

ER – ERQ_S

.36

.30

.07

5.31*

SPS – SPSI

-1.32

-.43

.07

-18.48*

SPS – PSI

-.11

-.19

.02

-5.34*

SPS – NPOQ

.06

.07

.04

1.54

SSRQ – CF

.51

.90

.02

26.97*

ASRI – CF

.32

.79

.02

22.00*

BSCS – CF

.48

.68

.03

17.69*

DERS – CF

-.53

-.76

.03

-21.02*

PERCI – CF

-.66

-.71

.04

-19.03*

ERQ_C – CF

.60

.56

.04

14.28*

ERQ_S – CF

-.23

-.19

.05

-4.52*

SPSI – CF

2.75

.90

.10

27.09*

PSI – CF

.49

.84

.02

24.31*

NPOQ – CF

-.62

-.71

.03

-18.81*

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001. Nonsignificant paths are displayed in bolded font.
CF = Common Factor.
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Figure 14
Bifactor CFA Model (Modified)
χ2(24, N = 586) = 69.64, p < .001
TLI = .98
CFI = .99
RMSEA = .06 [.04, .07]
SRMR = .02
AIC = 131.64
BIC = 267.21

*

* Indicates nonsignificance
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Table 16
Bifactor CFA (Modified) – Change in Model Fit
Modification

χ2

df

TLI

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

AIC

BIC

Original*

202.18

25

.924

.958

.110

.0361

262.18

393.38

Original

208.43

26

.925

.957

.110

.0361

266.43

393.26

ER – NPOQ

115.18

25

.962

.979

.079

.0282

175.18

306.38

SR – PERCI

69.64

24

.980

.989

.057

.0227

131.64

267.21

Note. Modifications made in order of highest parameter change until goal fit index thresholds
reached; began with notable cross-loadings then error terms (MI >20; .10).
*First model was unidentified due to the SPSI being a Heywood case; thus, the variance of the
SPSI was constrained to 0 (Keith, 2019).
Table 17
Bifactor CFA (Modified) – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances
Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

ER – NPOQ

.29

.34

.03

9.48*

SR – PERCI

-.24

-.25

.04

-6.41*

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001.
Evaluation of Model Fit. With the exception of the RMSEA, fit indices indicated an
overall adequate fit of the original model. The χ2 value was significant as expected with sample
sizes over N = 400 (Keith, 2019). The TLI (.93) was considered adequate, and the CFI (.96) and
SRMR (.04) were considered good. However, the RMSEA (.11) was considered poor. The two
modifications, while making the model less parsimonious (df decreased from 26 to 24),
substantially improved the fit of the model. Again, the χ2 value was significant as expected with
sample sizes over N = 400. The TLI (.98), CFI (.99), and SRMR (.02) were considered good. The
RMSEA (.06) was considered adequate but close to good (.05). The AIC and BIC both
significantly decreased, indicating a better fit of the modified model.
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As previously noted, the bifactor model suggests that a common factor separate from the
first-order factors directly impacts the observed measures. Overall, the bifactor model fit the data
well and required minimal modifications to achieve a good fit. This supports a conceptualization
of the constructs as being comprised of both common and distinct features, with common
features shared across all nine measures rather than underlying the three constructs.
One-Factor CFA Model
The one-factor model represented the highest level of convergence. In other words, this
model suggests that the constructs converge to the extent that they should not be considered
distinct constructs and instead function better as one common factor. This is reflected in all nine
measures loading on to one factor, labeled the “Common Factor.”
Model Results. Prior to running the analysis, the model was determined to be
overidentified (i.e., more measured parameters than parameters needing to be estimated). The
results of the one-factor CFA model estimation (standardized) are displayed in Figure 15. No
Heywood cases or standardized factor loadings greater than one were detected. All factor
loadings were significant, in the expected directions, and considered medium to large in
magnitude (Table 18), with the exception of the ERQ_S which was considered small in
magnitude. Of note, the standardized factor loadings for the common factor in this one-factor
model are essentially the same as the loadings for the common factor in the bifactor model.
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Figure 15
One-Factor CFA Model (Original)
χ2(35, N = 586) = 564.46, p < .001
TLI = .84
CFI = .88
RMSEA = .16 [.15, .17]
SRMR = .06
AIC = 604.46
BIC = 691.93
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Table 18
One-Factor CFA (Original) – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances
Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

SSRQ – CF

.52

.91

.02

28.28*

ASRI – CF

.33

.82

.01

23.96*

BSCS – CF

.51

.72

.03

19.94*

DERS – CF

-.53

-.76

.03

-21.53*

PERCI – CF

-.68

-.73

.03

-20.16*

ERQ_C – CF

.59

.56

.04

14.32*

ERQ_S – CF

-.26

-.22

.05

-5.19*

SPSI – CF

2.76

.90

.10

28.08*

PSI – CF

.49

.86

.02

25.63*

NPOQ – CF

-.61

-.70

.03

-19.12*

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001. CF = Common Factor.
A modified model is displayed in Figure 16. Modifications were made in order of highest
parameter change (MI change > 20) until the fit index threshold goals were reached (Table 19).
Notable cross-loadings were evaluated first, followed by error terms. Eight modifications were
required in order to reach the a priori fit index thresholds, including 1) correlating the DERS and
PERCI error terms, 2) correlating the SPSI and PSI error terms, 3) correlating the DERS and
NPOQ error terms, 4) correlating the DERS and ERQ_S error terms, 5) correlating the SPSI and
NPOQ error terms, 6) correlating the PERCI and NPOQ error terms, 7) correlating the BSCS and
PERCI error terms, and 8) correlating the ASRI and BSCS error terms. All modifications were
significant and in the expected directions (Table 20).
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Figure 16
One-Factor CFA Model (Modified)
χ2(27, N = 586) = 110.36, p < .001
TLI = .97
CFI = .98
RMSEA = .07 [.06, .09]
SRMR = .03
AIC = 166.36
BIC = 288.81
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Table 19
One-Factor CFA (Modified) – Change in Model Fit
Modification

χ2

df

TLI

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

AIC

BIC

Original

564.46

35

.839

.875

.161

.0578

604.46

691.93

E4 – E5

429.24

34

.876

.906

.141

.0532

471.24

563.08

E8 – E9

349.63

33

.898

.925

.128

.0516

393.63

489.84

E4 – E10

290.55

32

.914

.939

.118

.0468

336.55

437.14

E4 – E7

240.93

31

.928

.950

.108

.0401

288.93

393.89

E8 – E10

212.09

30

.935

.957

.102

.0395

262.09

371.43

E5 – E10

160.96

29

.952

.969

.088

.0339

212.96

326.67

E3 – E5

133.60

28

.960

.975

.080

.0331

187.60

305.68

E2 – E3

110.36

27

.967

.980

.073

.0294

166.36

288.81

Note. Modifications made in order of highest parameter change until goal fit index thresholds
reached; began with notable cross-loadings then error terms (MI >20; .10).
Table 20
One-Factor CFA (Modified) – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances
Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

E4 – E5

.15

.47

.02

9.95*

E8 – E9

.20

.42

.03

7.17*

E4 – E10

.13

.41

.01

9.13*

E4 – E7

.13

.23

.02

6.39*

E8 – E10

-.22

-.22

.04

-5.88*

E5 – E10

.14

.30

.02

6.91*

E3 – E5

-.06

-.18

.01

-4.79*

E2 – E3

.02

.22

.01

4.52*

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001.
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Evaluation of Model Fit. Fit indices indicated an overall poor fit of the original model.
The χ2 value was significant as expected with sample sizes over N = 400 (Keith, 2019). The TLI
(.84), CFI (.88), and RMSEA (.16) were considered poor, and the SRMR (.05) was considered
adequate. The eight modifications, while making the model less parsimonious (df decreased from
35 to 27), substantially improved the fit of the model. Again, the χ2 value was significant as
expected with sample sizes over N = 400. The TLI (.97), CFI (.98), and SRMR (.03) were
considered good. The RMSEA (.07) was considered adequate. The AIC and BIC both
significantly decreased, indicating a better fit of the modified model compared to the original
model.
As previously noted, the one-factor model suggests that the constructs converge to the
extent that they should not be considered distinct constructs and instead function better as one
common factor. Overall, the one-factor model did not fit the data well and required several
modifications to achieve an adequate fit. This does not support a conceptualization of the
constructs as being comprised of only shared features. As such, exploration of additional models
was warranted.
Convergent and Discriminant Validity
The four CFA models were compared against one another to determine which model fit
the underlying data best. Original model comparisons are displayed in Table 21, and modified
model comparisons are displayed in Table 22. Contrary to prediction, the bifactor model
emerged as the best-fitting model overall (Hypothesis 16). The bifactor model demonstrated
better original fit indices, fewer modifications to reach the a priori thresholds, and better
modified fit indices. Further, the AIC and BIC indices for the bifactor model were the lowest
across all models in both the original and modified versions.
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Table 21
Original Model Comparisons
χ2

df

TLI

CFI RMSEA SRMR

AIC

BIC

1st Order

308.13 32 .908 .935

.121

.0549

354.13 454.71

2nd Order

308.13 32 .908 .935

.121

.0549

354.13 454.71

Bifactor

208.43 26 .925 .957

.110

.0361

266.43 393.26

One-Factor 564.46 35 .839 .875

.161

.0578

604.46 691.93

Table 22
Modified Model Comparisons
χ2

df

TLI

CFI RMSEA SRMR

AIC

BIC

Modifications

1st Order

119.11 28 .965 .978

.075

.0329

173.11 291.19

4

2nd Order

119.11 28 .965 .978

.075

.0329

173.11 291.19

4

Bifactor

69.64

24 .980 .989

.057

.0227

131.64 267.21

2

One-Factor 110.36 27 .967 .980

.073

.0294

166.36 288.81

8

The one-factor model, which represented the highest level of convergence, demonstrated
the poorest fit across models. The factor loadings for the common factor in the one-factor model
were similar to the bifactor model, but the bifactor demonstrated a significantly better fit to the
underlying data. This suggests that unique variance for each latent construct needs to be
accounted for within the model. As previously discussed, the first-order and higher order models
are mathematically equivalent, so they are unable to be compared against one another.
Theoretically, the first-order model represents the highest level of divergence (i.e., no shared
variance among the latent constructs), while the higher-order model represents a level “in
between” convergence and divergence.
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As discussed in Chapter V, the theoretical difference between the higher-order model and
the bifactor model is nuanced. The higher-order model suggests that a common factor indirectly
impacts the observed measures through the first-order factors, whereas the bifactor model
suggests that a common factor separate from the first-order factors explains a portion of the
shared variance amongst all nine measures. Both the first-order and higher-order models did not
fit the data as well as the bifactor model.
Across all models, common patterns of variance emerged, including 1) a relationship
between the SR latent variable and the PERCI, 2) a unique relationship between the ER latent
variable and the ERQ_C, 3) low magnitudes of shared variance for the ERQ_S, and 4) a
relationship between the ER latent variable and the NPOQ. These relationships, along with the
identification of the bifactor model as the best fitting CFA model, suggests that while the
constructs of SR, ER, and SPS are worth differentiating, a substantial amount of overlapping
variance exists among them.
Structural Model
Latent Variable SEM
In the structural stage, the best-fitting measurement model—the bifactor model—was
examined as a latent variable SEM model in the context of depressive symptoms. This model
was tested as a stand-alone model, rather than compared to competing models. The latent
variable SEM model was utilized to assess the relationships among the common and distinct
features of SR, ER, and SPS and their connection to depressive symptoms, addressing the third
and final goal of the study.
Model Results. The results of the latent variable SEM model estimation (standardized)
are displayed in Figure 17. UVI was utilized to set the scale of the unmeasured variables.
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Figure 17
Latent Variable SEM
χ2(30, N = 586) = 96.00, p < .001
TLI = .98
CFI = .99
RMSEA = .06 [.05, .08]
SRMR = .02

*

*
*

* Indicates nonsignificance
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Because the SPSI emerged as a Heywood case within the bifactor model as part of the
measurement model stage, the variance of the SPSI was constrained to zero (Keith, 2019). No
additional Heywood cases or standardized factor loadings greater than one were detected.
Subsequently, the model was determined to be overidentified (i.e., more measured parameters
than parameters needing to be estimated). All factor loadings were significant, in the expected
directions, and ranged from small to large in magnitude, with the exception of the ERQ_C factor
loading, which was nonsignificant (Table 23). In addition, all common factor loadings were
significant, in the expected directions, and considered medium to large in magnitude, with the
exception of the ERQ_S which was considered small (Table 23). Notably, only the ER latent
variable and the common factor significantly predicted depressive symptoms; the SR and SPS
latent variables did not significantly predict depressive symptoms.
Evaluation of Model Fit. Fit indices indicated an overall good fit of the model. The χ2
value was significant as expected with sample sizes over N = 400 (Keith, 2019). The TLI (.98),
CFI (.99) and SRMR (.02) were considered good. The RMSEA (.06) was considered adequate
but close to good (.05).
Common vs. Distinct Pathways to Depressive Symptoms
In general, it was hypothesized that either the common and/or distinct features of SR, ER,
and SPS would predict depressive symptoms (Hypothesis 17). Somewhat contrary to this
prediction, only the common features and distinct features of ER emerged as significant
predictors of depressive symptoms. After accounting for the shared variance within the common
factor, SR and SPS did not significantly predict depressive symptoms. This pattern of results
should be considered within the context of the additional paths from the SR latent variable to the
PERCI (a measure of ER) and from the ER latent variable to the NPOQ (a measure of SPS).
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Table 23

Latent Variable SEM – Estimated Factor Loadings & Covariances

Path

Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
Estimate

Standard
Error

Critical
Ratio

SR – SSRQ

.10

.18

.02

5.10*

SR – ASRI

.12

.31

.02

7.30*

SR – BSCS

.39

.55

.04

10.04*

SR – PERCI

-.23

-.25

.04

-6.25*

ER – DERS

.42

.61

.02

21.17*

ER – PERCI

.41

.44

.03

13.64*

ER – ERQ_C

-.11

-.10

.04

-2.61

ER – ERQ_S

.32

.27

.05

5.87*

ER – NPOQ

.32

.37

.03

11.08*

SPS – SPSI

1.32

.43

.07

18.05*

SPS – PSI

.10

.17

.02

4.58*

SPS – NPOQ

-.17

-.19

.03

-5.40*

SSRQ – CF

.52

.91

.02

27.38*

ASRI – CF

.33

.80

.02

22.43*

BSCS – CF

.47

.67

.03

17.34*

DERS – CF

-.51

-.73

.03

-20.08*

PERCI – CF

-.62

-.66

.04

-17.17*

ERQ_C – CF

.59

.56

.04

14.24*

ERQ_S – CF

-.24

-.20

.05

-4.73*

SPSI – CF

2.75

.90

.10

27.04*

PSI – CF

.49

.85

.02

24.61*

NPOQ – CF

-.56

-.65

.03

-16.69*

CF – Dep Sx

-6.85

-.58

.48

-14.32*

SR – Dep Sx

-.60

-.05

.48

-1.25

ER – Dep Sx

6.80

.57

.42

16.20*

SPS – Dep Sx

.28

.02

.43

.65

Note. * indicates significance at p < .001. Nonsignificant paths are displayed in bolded font.
CF = Common Factor.
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Specifically, these added paths indicate that the SR latent variable included shared
variance with a measure of ER, and the ER latent variable included shared variance with a
measure of SPS. These findings suggest that, apart from the shared variance amongst all nine
measures, unique variance related to the construct of ER is the most predictive of depressive
symptoms.
Multigroup Analysis (Gender)
Multigroup analyses were conducted for both the measurement and structural model
portions to examine possible differences between females and males. As discussed in Chapter V,
examining these differences in CFA/SEM involves consideration of invariance, or whether the
models are invariant across groups (Byrne, 2016). This analysis involves systematically allowing
paths to either vary or be constrained to equivalent values and then comparing differences in
model fit (Keith, 2019). In the present study, multigroup analysis was utilized to address whether
the constructs SR, ER, and SPS are being measured the same between females and males, as well
as address whether any of the paths predicting depressive symptoms differ by gender.
Differences in model fit were assessed using the χ2 difference test for nested models as
well as the ΔCFI ≤ .01 criterion (Keith, 2019). Of note, the χ2 difference test is considered quite
sensitive, particularly for large sample sizes. Thus, many authors recommend focusing on the
ΔCFI as a more reasonable indicator of invariance (e.g., Chen, 2007). Additional supporting
criteria include ΔRMSEA ≤ .015 and ΔSRMR ≤ .010 (Putnick & Bornstein, 2016).
First-Order CFA
Configural Invariance. First, the data file was split into females (n = 303) and males (n
= 274), and the first-order CFA model was analyzed separately for each group in order to
establish baselines models. As per the recommendations of Keith (2019), the ULI method was
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utilized. The baseline model fit statistics are displayed separately in Table 24. The results suggest
the baseline structure is well-fitting across females and males and represents similarity between
groups.
Table 24
Measurement Invariance Testing – First-Order CFA
Model

χ2(df)

Δχ2(df)

CFI

ΔCFI

RMSEA

SRMR

AIC

1. Configural

331.94(64)*

-

.935

-

.120ǂ

.0530

423.94

1a. Females 189.44(32)*

-

.934

-

.128

.0530

235.44

1b. Males

142.50(32)*

-

.936

-

.112

.0706

188.50

2. Metric

341.23(71)*

9.29(7)

.935

.000

.115ǂ

.0513

419.23

3. Intercept

422.54(78)*

81.3(7)*

.917

.018

.124ǂ

.0506

526.54

385.29(77)*

44.08(6)*

.925

.010

.117ǂ

.0520

491.29

3a. Partial

Note. N = 577 (nfemale = 303; nmale = 274); * indicates significance at p < .05; ǂ indicates
RMSEA corrected for two groups (RMSEA x √2; Keith, 2019).
To assess configural invariance, a multigroup model without parameter constraints across
groups was analyzed, such that all paths were allowed to vary. The configural model fit statistics
are displayed separately in Table 24. The fit of the configural model was similar to the fit of the
baseline models, which indicates the same configuration of estimated parameters holds across
groups (Keith, 2019). More specifically, this demonstration of configural invariance means the
structure of what is being measured is the same across females and males. Standardized factor
loadings for the configural model are displayed separately for females (Figure 18) and males
(Figure 19). Importantly, while the magnitude of factor loadings differed across relationships,
none of the patterns or directions of the relationships differed between groups. Whether or not
the differences in factor loading magnitude between groups was statistically significant was
evaluated via the next step, metric invariance.
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Figure 18
First-Order CFA – Configural Model, Females
χ2(64, N = 577) = 331.94, p < .001
TLI = .91
CFI = .94
RMSEA = .09 [.08, .10]
SRMR = .05
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Figure 19
First-Order CFA – Configural Model, Males
χ2(64, N = 577) = 331.94, p < .001
TLI = .91
CFI = .94
RMSEA = .09 [.08, .10]
SRMR = .05
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Metric Invariance. To assess metric invariance, all factor loadings were constrained to
be equal between females and males. The metric model fit statistics are displayed in Table 24.
The increase in χ2 between the configural and metric models was not statistically significant,
Δχ2(7) = 9.29, p = .233. Further, when compared to the configural model, the ΔCFI was ≤ .01,
the ΔRMSEA was ≤ .015, and the ΔSRMR was ≤ .010. These findings suggest that the scales of
the latent variables are the same for both females and males, such that for every unit change in
the latent variable, scores on the measures change by the same amount for females and males
(Keith, 2019). In addition, given that the factor loadings were constrained to be equal across
groups without disrupting model fit, the differences in factor loading magnitude identified in the
configural model are therefore not statistically significant. This provides sufficient evidence to
assess intercept invariance and is a necessary requirement prior to comparing the effects of one
variable on another (i.e., SEM paths) across groups (Keith, 2019).
Intercept Invariance. To assess intercept invariance, all intercepts of measured variables
were constrained to be equal across females and males. The male latent factor means were
constrained to zero, whereas the female factor means were allowed to differ from the male factor
means (Keith, 2019). This is to facilitate the interpretation of mean differences, such that any
differences in intercepts/means on the measures are the result of true differences in means of the
latent variables. The intercept model fit statistics are displayed in Table 24. The increase in χ2
between the metric and configural models was statistically significant (Δχ2[7] = 81.30, p < .001)
and the ΔCFI was greater than .01 (ΔCFI = .018). These findings do not support complete
intercept invariance; however, this type of invariance is considerably harder to establish than
configural or metric invariance and is considered “strong” measurement invariance (e.g., Keith,
2019).
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Modification indices were examined in order to evaluate the possibility of partial
intercept invariance. The modification was to allow the ERQ_S intercept to vary. The partial
intercept invariance fit statistics with this modification are displayed in Table 24. Although the
Δχ2 remained significant for the modified model, the ΔCFI was ≤ .01, the ΔRMSEA was ≤ .015,
and the ΔSRMR was ≤ .010. These results support partial intercept invariance, which is a
necessary requirement prior to comparing composite means across groups. This indicates the
measures have the same “zero” or start point across groups. As such, any difference in means
between females and males on the majority of the measures stems from actual differences in the
latent variables rather than something specific to the measure (Keith, 2019). There may be
something specific about the ERQ_S that leads to differences between groups that is separate
from the underlying construct of ER.
Overall, the demonstrated configural, metric, and partial intercept invariance at the
measurement level indicates that 1) the structure of what is being measured is the same across
groups; 2) the scales of the latent variables are the same across groups; and 3) that the
differences in means of the measures stem from actual differences in SR, ER, and SPS, with the
exception of the ERQ_S measure. In other words, the latent variables as measured appear to
represent the same constructs for females and males.
Latent Variable SEM
Configural Invariance. First, the data file was split into females (n = 303) and males (n
= 274), and the latent variable SEM model was analyzed separately for each group to establish
baselines models. As per the recommendations of Keith (2019), the ULI method was utilized.
The baseline model fit statistics are displayed in Table 25. The results suggest the baseline
structure is well-fitting across females and males and represents similarity between groups.
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Table 25
Measurement Invariance Testing – Latent Variable SEM
Model

χ2(df)

Δχ2(df)

CFI

ΔCFI

RMSEA

SRMR

AIC

1. Configural

129.62(60)*

-

.985

-

.062ǂ

.0294

273.62

1a. Females

81.62(30)*

-

.981

-

.075

.0294

153.62

1b. Males

47.98(30)*

-

.991

-

.047

.0248

119.98

2. Metric

162.63(82)*

33.01(22)

.983

.002

.058ǂ

.0298

262.63

3. Intercept

230.10(89)*

67.47(89)*

.970

.013

.075ǂ

.0362

360.10

183.48(88)*

20.85(88)*

.979

.004

.061ǂ

.0302

315.48

3a. Partial

ǂ

Note. N = 577 (nfemale = 303; nmale = 274); * indicates significance at p < .05; indicates
RMSEA corrected for two groups (RMSEA x √2; Keith, 2019).
To assess configural invariance, a multigroup model without parameter constraints across
groups was analyzed, such that all paths were allowed to vary. The configural model fit statistics
are displayed separately in Table 25. The fit of the configural model was similar to the fit of the
baseline models, which indicates the same configuration of estimated parameters holds across
groups (Keith, 2019). More specifically, this demonstration of configural invariance means the
structure of what is being measured is the same across females and males. Standardized factor
loadings for the configural model are displayed separately for females (Figure 20) and males
(Figure 21).
Importantly, while the magnitude of factor loadings differed across relationships, none of
the patterns or directions of the relationships differed between groups. Whether or not the
differences in factor loading magnitude between groups was statistically significant was
evaluated via the next step, metric invariance.
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Figure 20
Latent Variable SEM – Configural Model, Females
χ2(60, N = 577) = 129.62, p < .001
TLI = .97
CFI = .99
RMSEA = .05 [.03, .06]
SRMR = .03

*

*

* Indicates nonsignificance
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Figure 21
Latent Variable SEM – Configural Model, Males
χ2(60, N = 577) = 129.62, p < .001
TLI = .97
CFI = .99
RMSEA = .05 [.03, .06]
SRMR = .03

*
*

*

*

*
*

* Indicates nonsignificance
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Metric Invariance. To assess metric invariance, all factor loadings were constrained to
be equal between females and males. The metric model fit statistics are displayed in Table 25.
The increase in χ2 between the configural and metric models was not statistically significant,
Δχ2(22) = 33.01, p = .062. Further, when compared to the configural model, the ΔCFI was ≤ .01,
the ΔRMSEA was ≤ .015, and the ΔSRMR was ≤ .010. These findings suggest that the scales of
the latent variables are the same for both females and males, such that for every unit change in
the latent variable, scores on the measures change by the same amount for females and males
(Keith, 2019). In addition, given that the factor loadings were constrained to be equal across
groups without disrupting model fit, the differences in factor loading magnitude identified in the
configural model are therefore not statistically significant. Contrary to prediction, the
relationship between ER and depressive symptoms was invariant across groups (Hypothesis 18).
This provides sufficient evidence to assess intercept invariance and is a necessary requirement
prior to comparing the effects of one variable on another (i.e., SEM paths) across groups (Keith,
2019).
Intercept Invariance. To assess intercept invariance, all intercepts of measured variables
were constrained to be equal across females and males. The male latent factor means were
constrained to zero, whereas the female factor means were allowed to differ from the male factor
means (Keith, 2019). The intercept model fit statistics are displayed in Table 25. The increase in
χ2 between the metric and configural models was statistically significant (Δχ2[7] = 67.47, p <
.001) and the ΔCFI was greater than .01 (ΔCFI = .013). These findings do not support complete
intercept invariance; however, as previously noted, this type of invariance is considerably harder
to establish than configural or metric invariance and is considered “strong” measurement
invariance (e.g., Keith, 2019).
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Modification indices were examined in order to evaluate the possibility of partial
intercept invariance. Parallel to the first-order CFA model, the modification was to allow the
ERQ_S intercept to vary. The partial intercept invariance fit statistics with this modification are
displayed in Table 25. Although the Δχ2 remained significant for the modified model, the ΔCFI
was ≤ .01, the ΔRMSEA was ≤ .015, and the ΔSRMR was ≤ .010. These results support partial
intercept invariance, which is a necessary requirement prior to comparing composite means
across groups. This indicates the measures have the same “zero” or start point across groups. As
such, any difference in means between females and males on the majority of the measures stems
from actual differences in the latent variables rather than something specific to the measure
(Keith, 2019). The correspondence between these findings and the first-order CFA model
provides additional support that there may be something specific about the ERQ_S that leads to
differences between groups that is separate from the underlying construct of ER.
Overall, the demonstrated configural, metric, and partial intercept invariance for the
latent variable SEM model align with the results of the higher-order CFA model invariance
testing. These findings provide strong evidence that the proposed models and corresponding
relationship patterns do not differ between females and males despite differences in factor
loading magnitude between groups.
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CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION
The present study examined the relationships among three psychological constructs: SR,
ER, and SPS, and their connection to depressive symptomology. Each construct has an
independent literature base comprised of varied theoretical models and empirical investigations
demonstrating links to psychopathology. Despite this independence in theory and measure
development, however, these constructs do appear to overlap in that each requires the ability to
monitor, evaluate, and adjust behavior to reach a goal or solve a problem (Barkley, 1997a;
D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Gross, 2015). These shared features suggest commonalities in both the
underlying mechanisms and functional outcomes of SR, ER, and SPS. Nonetheless, no studies to
date have empirically examined the measurement or predictive ability of these constructs in the
context of one another.
The present study aimed to bridge this gap in the literature by addressing three
interrelated research questions:
1. How well do commonly used measures capture the underlying constructs of SR, ER, and
SPS as intended?
2. Given the significant theoretical overlap and range of operational definitions among SR,
ER, and SPS, is their measurement more so reflective of (a) three distinct constructs, (b)
three constructs containing both distinct and common features, (c) three distinct
constructs with an external common influence, or (d) one common construct?
3. When considered in the context of one another, how do the common and/or distinct
features of SR, ER, and SPS relate to depressive symptomology?
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These questions relate to Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) notion of construct validity,
which refers to the process of determining whether variation in a measure reflects variation in a
latent construct. This type of validity is particularly important when a latent construct’s
nomological net is not universally agreed upon, as is the case for complex, higher-order
constructs like SR, ER, and SPS (e.g., Weems & Pina, 2010). There is no direct test of construct
validity, rather, it is an ongoing process that involves the accumulation of evidence from a
variety of sources. Information that speaks to construct validity includes overall measure content,
as well as within-construct, between-construct, and criterion-related relationships (Strauss &
Smith, 2009). Cronbach and Meehl (1955) emphasize that the evaluation of this information
cannot be an entirely quantitative process, such that the accumulated evidence needs to be
integrated and interpreted by the researcher. Over time, the process of evaluating construct
validity helps to sharpen measurement tools and, in some cases, can serve to reshape a
construct’s nomological net and underlying theory.
An important distinction to note is that validity is a property of measures, not constructs
(Foster & Cone, 1995). A construct is more than its operationalization or measurement; that is,
measures do not equal theory (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). This is, in part, because measures of
latent constructs depend on the process of operationalization, which can be subjective and prone
to error (Strauss & Smith, 2009). It is also because a construct is more than the total of its
collection of traits and behaviors (i.e., more than the sum of its parts; Clark & Watson, 2019).
For example, depression is comprised of symptoms such as low mood, sleep disturbance, and
feelings of worthlessness, but the concept of depression exceeds the totality of these symptoms
(e.g., Kessler & Bromet, 2013). Thus, in the present discussion, construct validity applies to
measurement in practice, which, in turn, speaks to the construct’s nomological net.
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A useful approach to organizing the accumulation of evidence relevant to construct
validity is through the lens of Foster and Cone’s (1995) two-phase evaluation of representational
validity followed by elaborative validity. Representational validity refers to how well a measure
captures an underlying construct and includes consideration of content, convergent, and
discriminant validity (Foster & Cone, 1995). Elaborative validity refers to a measure’s utility in
predicting or monitoring other constructs (Foster & Cone, 1995). These two phases can be useful
in framing the integration and interpretation of diverse information relevant to construct validity
gathered across within-construct, between-construct, and criterion-related sources.
The present study progressed in two stages, measurement and structural, which aptly
correspond to Foster and Cone’s (1995) phases of representational and elaborative validity. The
measurement stage involved an evaluation of the relationships among commonly used measures
of SR, ER, and SPS. This included consideration of convergent and discriminant validity via an
examination of a first-order CFA model and a comparison of rival CFA models. In the structural
stage, the identified pattern of relationships among these constructs was considered from a utility
perspective. Specifically, how well the common and distinct elements of SR, ER, and SPS were
able to predict depressive symptoms was assessed via a latent variable SEM model. Overall, the
conclusions drawn across these stages provided information relevant to the construct validity of
the SR, ER, and SPS measures.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss implications of the present findings in the
context of past theoretical and empirical work involving the constructs of SR, ER, and SPS.
First, a summary of the findings is provided, followed by an in-depth evaluation of implications.
Consistent with the above, the discussion is divided into two sections as per Foster and Cone
(1995): (1) the measurement stage and considerations of representational validity and (2) the
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structural stage and considerations of elaborative validity. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of limitations and future directions.
Summary of Findings
The data collected in the present study were considered representative of a typical
undergraduate population (e.g., Auerbach et al., 2018; NCES, 2019), sufficient in size (e.g.,
Melka et al., 2011; Schreiber et al., 2006), and comparable to past empirical work utilizing the
measures of interest (see Table 5). Preliminary analyses at the correlational level supported
predictions regarding relationships among the constructs, such that measures of adaptive SR, ER,
and SPS were positively related to one another and negatively related to depressive symptoms.
Findings from the first-order CFA model indicated that seven out of nine measures loaded on to
their intended factors as predicted. The exceptions were the ERQ (a measure of ER) and NPOQ
(a measure of SPS).
Contrary to prediction, the bifactor model was identified as the best-fitting CFA model.
This suggests that each construct is comprised of distinct variance, as well as common variance
separate from SR, ER, and SPS that is shared among all nine measures. Interestingly, only the
common factor variance and distinct variance of ER significantly predicted depressive
symptoms. Regarding gender differences, independent t tests indicated that females reported
significantly higher levels of NPO, emotional dysregulation, and depressive symptoms than
males. In addition, females reported lower levels of SR, use of suppression as an ER strategy,
and overall problem-solving ability than males. Despite these mean-level differences, multigroup
analyses at the measurement (first-order CFA) and structural levels (latent variable SEM model)
demonstrated configural, metric, and partial intercept invariance between females and males.
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Implications of Findings
Stage 1: Measurement & Representational Validity
The measurement stage included assessment of within-construct variance (i.e.,
relationships among measures of the same construct) and between-construct variance (i.e.,
relationships among measures of different constructs). First, within-construct variance was
evaluated via same-construct correlations and the first-order CFA model. Next, betweenconstruct variance was evaluated via cross-construct correlations and the comparison of rival
CFA models. Results of this stage are considered in the context of representational validity,
overall construct validity, and theoretical implications.
Within-Construct Variance. The first goal of the present study was to assess how well
commonly used measures capture the underlying constructs of SR, ER, and SPS as intended. All
three constructs are comprised of both bottom-up and top-down processes and include cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral components (Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Gross, 2015).
Given the complexity of these constructs, developing fully representative measures is a
challenge. A first-order CFA model can be used to examine the extent to which this is
accomplished. CFA models have been the method of choice in both item-level and measure-level
investigations of construct validity (DiStefano & Hess, 2005; Lance & Fan, 2016). This is
because CFA allows for an evaluation of how much variance in observed variables is generated
by latent constructs based on theoretical predictions (Byrne, 2016). At the measure level, CFA
demonstrates whether measures of the same construct indeed share variance with each other
(Keith, 2019). This is a necessary but not sufficient step in the process of evaluating construct
validity.
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A primary reason CFA is not sufficient as a stand-alone assessment of construct
validation is that the demonstration of shared variance does not provide information regarding
the composition of that variance (Keith, 2019). That is, whether the shared variance captured by
a latent construct is reflective of that construct’s nomological net remains unknown (Cronbach &
Meehl, 1955). From a methodological perspective, an individual’s inherent abilities related to the
constructs of interest are assumed to drive variation in item responses on self-report measures of
those constructs (Foster & Cone, 1995). However, variation in item responses can be impacted
by a multitude of factors, such as aspects of the measurement process (e.g., Campbell & Fiske,
1959), social desirability (e.g., King & Bruner, 2000), and any other potential confounds related
to the variables of interest (e.g., intelligence, socioeconomic status; Foster & Cone, 1995).
Although CFA models provide useful information regarding construct validation, caution is
warranted when interpreting the composition of shared variance captured by latent constructs.
Though concerns have been raised about the construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS (e.g.,
Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Weems & Pina, 2010), the present study was the first to examine
these constructs from a measure-level perspective via CFA. Results of the within-construct
correlational analyses demonstrated most measures were related as predicted. This was supported
by the first-order CFA model, which indicated seven out of nine measures loaded on to their
intended factors. In general, measures of each construct were related to one another, and shared
underlying variance as would be expected based on theory and past empirical work. These
findings provide some of the evidence necessary to establish representational validity and offer
preliminary support for the construct validity of measures of SR, ER, and SPS. Each construct
will be discussed in more detail next.
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Self-Regulation. SR is the ability to monitor, evaluate, and adjust one’s behavior to
achieve desired outcomes and avoid undesired outcomes (Bandura, 1991; Barkley, 1997a). This
process includes a collection of skills and systems required to maintain progress toward goals in
dynamic environments (Nigg, 2017). The inherent complexity of this construct understandably
complicates the process of operationalization and measurement (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). In
particular, the underlying mechanisms of SR (e.g., EFs) are typically measured separately from
the functional outcomes of SR (e.g., goal attainment; Allom et al., 2016). Assessment of SR is
often accomplished through self-report measures and behavioral tasks. Evidence suggests selfreport measures are better able to capture multiple aspects of SR simultaneously as compared to
behavioral tasks (Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Paap & Sawi, 2016).
The present study investigated three commonly used self-report measures of SR: SSRQ
(Carey et al., 2004), ASRI (Moilanen, 2007), and BSCS (Tangney et al., 2004). Though they are
based on differing conceptualizations of SR and are comprised of multifactorial structures, the
total scores of these measures all have been utilized across studies as general indicators of SR
(e.g., Lazuras et al., 2019; Tangney et al., 2018). In past work, the SSRQ was found to be
positively correlated with the BSCS (Gonzalez et al., 2019). The ASRI had not been included in
published studies with the SSRQ or BSCS but was found to be positively correlated with the
original, 63-item SRQ in a pilot study conducted by the thesis author (Buffie & Nangle, 2018).
These previous correlations were considered large in magnitude (as per Cohen, 1988; .10 is
“small,” .30 is “medium,” and above .50 is “large”). In the present study, correlations among
measures of SR were considered large and in the expected directions. This indicated the
measures were related to each other as predicted and provided initial support for within-construct
convergence of measures of SR.
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Consistent with the findings at the correlational level, the results of the first-order CFA
suggested that all three measures loaded onto the latent factor thought to represent the underlying
construct of SR. All factor loadings were considered large in magnitude and did not differ
between the original and modified models. In particular, the lack of modifications requiring
additional paths to other constructs suggested the measures were more related to each other than
the other constructs included in the model (Keith, 2019). This indicated the measures share
underlying variance as predicted and, in conjunction with correlational findings, provides
additional support for within-construct convergence.
The SSRQ (Carey et al., 2004) and the ASRI (Moilanen, 2007) were both designed as
comprehensive measures of overall SR, but the BSCS focuses specifically on top-down or
effortful SR, an element termed ‘self-control’ (Tangney et al., 2004). This difference in
operationalization was not reflected at the correlational level but was apparent in the somewhat
lower factor loading for the BSCS on the latent construct thought to represent SR in the firstorder CFA model. This could be due to the broad measures sharing additional variance relevant
to bottom-up SR (e.g., stimulus-driven responses), whereas self-control only includes top-down
elements (e.g., effortful responses; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Shulman et al., 2016). Though the
composition of shared variance and the significance of this difference in magnitude were not
directly tested, this pattern provides an additional piece of evidence that the measures are
functioning as predicted based on measure development and theory.
Overall, an examination of the within-construct variance of SR demonstrated that the
measures were related, and shared underlying variance as would be expected based on theory.
These findings provide support for representational validity, such that measures designed to
assess SR should correlate with one another (Foster & Cone, 1995). Further, these results offer
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preliminary support for the construct validity of SR given that a significant amount of the
variance in SR measures was generated by the same latent construct (Byrne, 2016). Theories of
SR would suggest that the shared variance among measures of SR is driven by underlying EFs
(e.g., inhibition, attention, planning), as well as functional outcomes (e.g., balance of
consequences, short- versus long-term goal attainment; Barkley, 1997a; Nigg, 2017). However, it
is unclear whether the shared variance observed in the present model is reflective of SR’s
theorized nomological net. Information regarding convergent, discriminant, and predictive
validity to be discussed later in this chapter provides additional information regarding the
construct validity of measures of SR. Future investigations that include multiple traits (e.g., selfefficacy, impulse control, delay of gratification), as well as multiple methods (e.g., behavioral EF
tasks), can further enhance understanding of SR as a construct.
Emotion Regulation. ER is the ability to monitor, evaluate, and adapt emotional
responding to be in line with goals (Thompson, 1994). Emotional responding includes both the
experience and expression of emotions, which require regulation across behavioral, cognitive,
and physiological modalities (Gross, 2014). Like SR, the wide range of elements involved in ER
have been operationalized and measured in a multitude of ways (Bridges et al., 2004; Weems &
Pina, 2010). For instance, a variety of methods are utilized to assess emotional responding (e.g.,
induction techniques, physiological indicators), whereas the underlying skills needed for
regulation (e.g., EFs) are often assessed via behavioral tasks (Adrian et al., 2011; Fernandez et
al., 2016). Regarding self-report, some measures focus on overall ER ability, some focus on
specific modalities of ER (e.g., cognitive, behavioral), whereas others focus on strategy
implementation (Bridges et al., 2004). Despite the variety of methods used to tap ER, self-report
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measures are widely utilized, and, the DERS and ERQ are the two most well-validated measures
of ER (e.g., Ireland et al., 2017; Preece et al., 2018).
The present study investigated three commonly used self-report measures of ER: DERS
(Gratz & Roemer, 2004), PERCI (Preece et al., 2018), and ERQ (Gross & John, 2003). These
measures are comprised of multifactorial structures and reflect differing operationalizations of
ER, yet their total scores are widely used as indicators of general ER (e.g., Lafrance et al., 2014;
Wasylkiw et al., 2020). The DERS and the PERCI have not previously been compared, but
previous investigations have found small correlations between the ERQ subscales and both the
DERS and the PERCI (Preece et al., 2018; Salsman & Linehan, 2012). In the present study, the
correlation between the DERS and the PERCI was considered large and in the expected
direction. The correlations between the ERQ subscales and DERS and PERCI ranged from small
to medium. Though this is in line with past studies investigating the ERQ, relationships between
measures purporting to capture the same construct were expected to be stronger. Overall, except
for the ERQ, correlational analyses provided partial support for within-construct convergence of
measures of ER.
The results of the first-order CFA corresponded with these findings, such that two out of
the three measures loaded onto the latent factor thought to represent the underlying construct of
ER. The factor loadings for the DERS and PERCI were considered large in magnitude and did
not differ between the original and modified models. In contrast, the factor loadings for the ERQ
subscales were lower in magnitude and required additional modifications to account for unique
variance. This indicates variance captured by the ERQ does not map cleanly onto the latent
construct thought to represent ER. Despite these considerations for the ERQ, no modifications
involving additional paths to other constructs were required, which suggests the constructs were
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more related to each other than the other included constructs (Keith, 2019). In line with findings
at the correlational level and when considering discrepancies with the ERQ, these findings
provided partial support for within-construct convergence.
Similar to SR, the included measures of ER were intended to capture somewhat different
elements of the construct. The DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and the PERCI (Preece et al.,
2018) were designed to assess overall ER abilities, whereas the ERQ was designed to assess
specific strategy implementation (Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ is divided into two subscales
that assess the ER strategies of cognitive reappraisal (ERQ_C) and suppression (ERQ_S; Gross
& John, 2003). This difference in operationalization could explain discrepancies with the ERQ at
the correlational and factor-analytic levels. This pattern could be due to the broad measures
sharing variance relevant to emotional responding or underlying EFs (e.g., inhibition, attention,
planning), whereas the ERQ only includes behaviors specific to the strategies assessed (i.e.,
cognitive reappraisal and suppression; Gross, 2014; McRae et al., 2012). It is therefore possible
that the observed pattern indicates the measures are functioning as would be expected based on
theory. The ERQ was included in the present study due to its wide use in the field as general
indicator of ER abilities (e.g., Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). However, concern regarding the
quality of the ERQ as a measure of ER surfaces in a variety of ways across models and warrants
further consideration. Thus, the ERQ will be specifically addressed in a later section.
With the exception of the ERQ, examination of the within-construct variance of ER
demonstrated that the measures were related, and shared underlying variance as predicted.
Representational validity was partially supported, such that measures designed to assess ER
should correlate with one another, but only two out of three demonstrated strong relationships
(Foster & Cone, 1995). The significant amount of variance shared between the DERS and the
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PERCI offers preliminary support for the construct validity of ER (Byrne, 2016). Theories of ER
might suggest this shared variance stems from elements of emotional responding (e.g., positive
and negative affective states, emotional cognitions) or skills related to regulation (e.g., EFs, ERspecific strategies; Barkley, 2015; Gross, 2014; McRae et al., 2012). Not enough information
was gathered in the present study to determine whether this shared variance is reflective of ER’s
nomological net. However, examination of convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity can
shed additional light on this question and discussed later in this chapter. To better understand ER
as a construct, future studies might include a multitrait-multimethod investigation that separates
emotional responding from regulation abilities and considers the roles of baseline mood, affect
changes, and contextual stress.
Social Problem-Solving. SPS is the process by which individuals understand, appraise,
and adapt to problems in daily living (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1990). This involves skills across
modalities related to problem-solving steps (e.g., gathering information, generating solutions,
evaluating consequences), as well as problem orientation and style (D’Zurilla et al., 2004;
Heppner et al., 2004). In comparison to the assessment of SR and ER, SPS has been confined to
a smaller number of operationalizations and methods of measurement. SPS assessment primarily
includes measures of process, or an individual’s strengths or deficits in SPS, as well as measures
of outcome, or the effectiveness or quality of solutions to specific problems (D’Zurilla et al.,
2004). Questions have been raised as to whether process and outcome measures are assessing the
same components of SPS, as well as the degree of overlap among measures within each category
(Anderson et al., 2009; 2011). Typically, self-report measures focus on process elements and aim
to capture broad SPS abilities; this is the most common approach to SPS assessment (Nezu,
2004).
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The present study investigated three commonly used self-report measures of SPS: SPSI-R
(D’Zurilla et al., 2002), PSI (Heppner & Peterson, 1982), and NPOQ (Robichaud & Dugas,
2005a). All three measures are based on different conceptualizations and elements of problemsolving, yet their total scores have been used as general indicators of SPS (e.g., D’Zurilla &
Nezu, 2010; Hetrick et al., 2014). In past work, overall indices of the PSI and the SPSI-R were
found to be positively correlated (Dreer et al., 2004; Hawkins et al., 2009; Maydeu-Olivares &
D’Zurilla, 1997). The NPOQ was found to be correlated with the NPO subscale of the SPSI-R,
as well as the two maladaptive problem-solving styles, but had not yet been included in studies
with the overall indices of the SPSI-R or PSI (Pawluk et al., 2017; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a).
In the present study, correlations among measures of SPS were considered large and in the
expected directions; one exception was the correlation between the NPOQ and the PSI, which
was medium in magnitude. This indicated the measures were related as predicted and provided
initial support for within-construct convergence of measures of SPS.
The results of the first-order CFA suggested that two out of the three measures loaded
onto the latent factor thought to represent the underlying construct of SPS. The factor loadings
for the SPSI-R and PSI were considered large and did not differ between the original and
modified models. In contrast, the NPOQ’s factor loading was lower in magnitude and was
substantially changed between the original and modified models. One of the modifications
involved adding a path from ER to the NPOQ, suggesting a portion of the variance in the NPOQ
is generated by the latent construct thought to reflect ER. Except for the NPOQ, these findings
largely demonstrate shared variance among measures of SPS as predicted and provide partial
support for within construct convergence.
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Previous factor-analytic investigations of SPS have identified a multifactorial structure
that includes elements related to problem-solving orientation, appraisal, approach, and
implementation (e.g., Heppner et al., 2004; Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1996). As such,
measures of this construct differentially reflect these complimentary elements. The SPSI-R and
PSI were designed to capture general SPS abilities; thus, they include subscales as well as overall
indices (D’Zurilla et al., 2002; Heppner & Peterson, 1982). In contrast, the NPOQ was designed
to assess one specific element of SPS, NPO, which is a response set in which individuals view
problems as a threat to well-being and doubt their ability to solve them (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010;
Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). Relationships at the correlational level, as well as within the firstorder CFA model, reflected this difference.
Variance within the broad measures may reflect problem-solving steps (e.g., gathering
information, generating solutions, evaluating consequences), as well as appraisal and style
(D’Zurilla et al., 2004; Heppner et al., 2004), whereas the NPOQ likely only includes variance
reflective of the behaviors, cognitions, and emotions related to problem orientation (D’Zurilla &
Nezu, 2010). Thus, it is possible these within-construct relationships suggest the measures are
functioning as would be expected based on theory. The NPOQ was included in the present study
due to NPO’s identified role in the relationship between SPS and psychopathology (e.g., Fergus
et al., 2015; Humphrey, 2016) as well as limited measures that capture overall SPS (e.g.,
D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). However, the indication that the NPOQ additionally shares variance
with the latent construct of ER is a question that surfaces across models and warrants further
consideration. Like the ERQ, the NPOQ will be specifically addressed in a later section.
With the exception of the NPOQ, examination of the within-construct variance of SPS
demonstrated that the constructs were related, and shared underlying variance as predicted.
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Representational validity was partially supported, such that measures designed to assess SPS
should correlate with one another, but only two out of three demonstrated strong relationships
(Foster & Cone, 1995). The significant amount of variance shared between the SPSI-R and the
PSI offers preliminary support for the construct validity of SPS (Byrne, 2016). Theories of SPS
might suggest this shared variance is generated by cognitions, emotions, and skills related to the
appraisal, implementation, and evaluation of problems (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Heppner et al.,
2004). Consideration of measures of SPS’s convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity
discussed in the next section can provide more information regarding the possible composition of
this shared variance. More work is needed that includes a multitrait-multimethod investigation of
both process and outcomes measures of SPS, as well as a closer look at the pervasive
contribution of NPO and its role within the construct.
Overall, findings at this stage largely support within-construct convergence of commonly
used measures of SR, ER, and SPS at the correlational and factor-analytic levels. This offers
support for the representational validity of these constructs and signifies a necessary but not
sufficient step in evaluating their construct validity.
Between-Construct Variance. The second goal of the study was to assess how
commonly used measures of SR, ER, and SPS relate to one another. Theoretically, these
constructs share a significant amount of overlap. All three constructs involve skills related to
self-monitoring, considering short- and long-term consequences, and adapting behavior across
contexts (Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Gross, 2015). Not only are the outcomes of
regulation and problem-solving similar, but the overlap in required skillsets implies they also
share underlying mechanisms (e.g., Barkley, 1997a; Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Despite these
notable commonalities, each construct holds a unique place in theoretical models. That is, SR is
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focused on balancing consequences to achieve goals, ER is specific to the experience of
emotions, and SPS is limited to situations involving a problem (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Gross,
2014; Strauman, 2017). Whether or not these distinguishing features are captured in the
measurement of SR, ER, and SPS is up for debate (Eisenberg et al., 2011; Weems & Pina, 2010;
Zhou et al., 2012). Yet, no study to date has examined the theoretical overlap of these constructs
from a measurement perspective.
Considering the common versus distinct elements of SR, ER, and SPS relates to the
convergent and discriminant validity of their measures. Convergent validity demonstrates that a
measure of a construct is related to measures of other constructs as expected, whereas
discriminant validity indicates that a measure of a construct is not related to or can be
distinguished from measures of other constructs (Foster & Cone, 1995). Convergent and
discriminant evidence supports representational validity, such that if a measure captures what it
aims to capture, its relationships with other measures should reflect that. This process is likened
to “sharpening” the representative accuracy of measurement tools by demonstrating what the
captured construct “is” and “is not” (e.g., Southam-Gerow et al., 2016). Ultimately, this provides
evidence for construct validity by showing that the measure includes the necessary elements and
does not include unnecessary elements as they relate to the construct’s nomological net
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
One approach to examining convergent and discriminant validity is through testing
competing CFA models that reflect different possible relationships between observed variables
and latent constructs (Byrne, 2016; e.g., Salekin et al., 2014). In other words, models that reflect
cross-construct convergence, divergence, or possibilities in between can be compared against
each other to determine which is most reflective of the underlying data (e.g., Credé & Harms,
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2015). At the measure level, identifying the structure of latent variables can help to differentiate
variance that is unique versus shared among the measures (Keith, 2019). This information can
support constructs functioning as distinct entities or identify areas of overlap.
The present study was the first to examine the convergent and discriminant validity of
measures of SR, ER, and SPS in the context of one another. It could be reasonably expected that
relationships between measures of these constructs might be medium in magnitude (as per
Cohen, 1988; .10 is “small,” .30 is “medium,” and above .50 is “large”). In other words, they
should be related to one another, but not more related than measures of the same construct.
Within-construct relationships should always be stronger than between-construct relationships
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Foster & Cone, 1995). Results of correlational analyses and rival CFA
model indicated a high level of convergence among measures of SR, ER, and SPS. Given the
noted theoretical overlap and similar operationalizations of these constructs, congruence in their
measurement was expected. However, the independent literature bases and distinguishing
features of each suggest they should not be redundant constructs. The substantial amount of
convergence observed in the present study calls into question the representational validity and
ultimate construct validity of SR, ER, and SPS. This will be discussed first at the correlational
level followed by the factor-analytic level. Then, additional alternatives to the underlying factor
structure of these measures will be reviewed.
Cross-Construct Correlations. Most of the past work that focused on evaluating how
measures of SR, ER, and SPS relate to one another investigated pairs of the constructs (e.g., SR
and ER) rather than all three considered together (e.g., Gagne et al., 2021; Orobio de Castro et
al., 2003). Published studies that utilized the specific measures included in the present study
were limited and often demonstrated varied results. Within these studies, correlations between
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measures of SR and ER were found to range from small to medium (e.g., Aka et al., 2020;
Lazuras et al., 2019), and correlations between measures of ER and SPS ranged from small to
large (Kuzucu, 2016; Turner et al., 2012). The selected measures of SR and SPS did not appear
to have been included in published studies together. A pilot study conducted by the thesis author
utilizing a subset of the included measures found correlations ranging from medium to large
between the constructs (Buffie & Nangle, 2018).
The results of the present study identified several, large, cross-construct measure
correlations. In fact, over half of the total between-construct correlations were considered large
in magnitude, with estimates as high as r = .82. Further, though not directly tested, the magnitude
of within-construct correlations did not appear to be substantially different from betweenconstruct correlations. These findings indicate a high level of convergence among measures of
the constructs. As noted, only a moderate level of convergence was expected, and the betweenconstruct measure correlations should certainly not exceed within-construct correlations
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Foster & Cone, 1995). This provides initial evidence that does not
support against representational validity of these measures from a between-construct perspective.
It is important to note that capturing the balance of distinct and common features of these
constructs is likely more complicated than what can be reflected by correlational relationships.
Thus, these questions will be explored in more detail in the context of the CFA results.
Rival CFA Models. The present study was the first empirical investigation of the
common and distinct elements of SR, ER, and SPS via comparison of multiple measure-level
CFA models. Four rival CFA models representing different underlying structures were tested
against each other. The models were evaluated to determine whether the measures used to assess
SR, ER, and SPS were more so reflective of: (a) three distinct constructs (first-order model), (b)
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three constructs containing both distinct and common features (higher-order model), (c) three
distinct constructs with an external common influence (bifactor model), or (d) one common
construct (one-factor model). Identification of the best-fitting model by this approach provides
valuable information regarding the extent to which measures of these constructs converge or
diverge with each other.
It was predicted that measures of SR, ER, and SPS would be comprised of variance that
is specific to each construct, as well as shared among the constructs (i.e., common and distinct
features). Considering overlap in underlying mechanisms and connection to EFs highlighted in
theoretical models of these constructs, it was thought that the variance shared among them would
be generated by the constructs themselves. That is, the shared variance was predicted to stem
from overlap in the core aspects of SR, ER, and SPS (i.e., skills related to monitoring,
evaluating, and adjusting behavior; e.g., Barkley, 1997a). This balance of distinct and shared
features generated by the constructs was best represented by the higher-order model, which was
hypothesized to be the best-fitting model. Contrary to this prediction, however, the bifactor
model emerged as the best-fitting model.
The bifactor model suggests that a common factor separate from the first-order factors
explains a portion of the shared variance among all nine measures of the constructs. The loadings
for most measures onto the common factor were stronger in magnitude than the loadings onto the
latent constructs thought to represent SR, ER, and SPS. This pattern corresponds with the high
level of convergence among measures observed at the correlational level. Taken together, these
findings indicate the nine measures share substantial overlap in what they capture. Although the
bifactor model supports the general prediction that SR, ER, and SPS are comprised of common
and distinct elements, it suggests that the extent to which measures of these constructs reflect this
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balance is limited. Instead, the present results indicate that measures of SR, ER, and SPS are
largely reflective of commonalities among the constructs. These results will be considered first
from a methodological perspective, then a theoretical perspective.
The substantial overlap among measures of SR, ER, and SPS raises questions regarding
the accuracy of the path from theory to operationalization to measurement for these constructs.
From a representational validity perspective, high convergence indicates measures are not
sufficiently capturing what a construct “is” and “is not” (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Foster &
Cone, 1995). When measures do not function as predicted, Cronbach and Meehl (1955) note it is
challenging to determine whether the issue is a result of inadequate measures or if the theories
underlying the constructs need to be redefined. These concerns have been evident in past studies
and call for clarification in the measurement of these constructs have been numerous. In
particular, concerns regarding a siloed approach (e.g., Zhou et al., 2012), contrasting
operationalizations (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2019), and shared method variance (e.g., Weems &
Pina, 2010) have been voiced regarding the measurement of these constructs across areas of
study.
These possibilities can be problematic in a variety of ways. If the measures are
inadequate, their development in terms of operationalization and content validity should be
reexamined (Foster & Cone, 1995). In addition, concern regarding redundancy in measurement
is warranted. If measures of two constructs are largely reflective of the same nomological net, it
is inefficient to interpret them as unique constructs (Strauss & Smith, 2009). In other words, if
measures of ER and SPS are capturing the same collection of behaviors, characteristics, or traits,
then only one measure is necessary to include in future investigations. On the other hand, if not
enough work has been done at the theoretical level to differentiate the constructs, then cross-
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construct communication or consensus as to the common and distinct features of each is needed
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). An evaluation of what comprises the variance shared among
measures of these constructs may provide more information regarding possible areas of
adjustment along the path from theory to measurement.
It is important to note that it is possible the bifactor model was identified as the best
fitting model over the higher-order model due to mathematical reasons. Notably, bifactor models
have been found to fit data well across studies, in large part because they allow for high
complexity with minimal constraints (e.g., Cucina & Byle, 2017; Reise, 2012). That is, they
account for differing forms of shared variance without the need for several individual paths
between multiple observed variables. However, a study involving Monte Carlo simulations
found that bifactor models did not generally produce a better fit when the true underlying
structure was not a bifactor one (Morgan et al., 2015). The bifactor models were found to fit best
when the correlations among latent factors were roughly equal, but when they were unequal,
models that allowed relationships among latent factors to vary seemed to fit the data best. This
pattern of fit with a bifactor structure aligns with the present results, as the correlations among
latent factors were found to be strong and similar.
Theoretically, ER and SPS can be conceptualized within the framework of Barkley’s
(1997a) model of SR, mapping on to the affect/motivation/arousal and reconstitution
components, respectively. Within this framework, SR, ER, and SPS all depend on the EF of
response inhibition (i.e., stopping an initial response to a stimulus) and work in conjunction with
other EFs (e.g., working memory, internalized speech, task-switching) to adapt behavior
(Barkley, 1997a; Riggs et al., 2006; Schmeichel & Tang, 2015). The shared features and
underlying mechanisms contribute to similar functional outcomes for these constructs, namely
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reaching goals and solving problems (Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Thompson,
1994). Still, each construct holds its own theoretical foundation, operational definition, and range
of dedicated assessment tools. The existing literature bases of SR, ER, and SPS therefore reflect
a complicated balance of common and distinct features of these constructs.
The data collected, and models tested, in the present study do not provide enough
information to be able to characterize what comprises the shared variance within the common
factor. As such, what underlies the common elements of SR, ER, and SPS remains unknown;
hypotheses can be generated, but future investigations are needed to gain a deeper understanding
of the shared variance. Considering these limitations, two possible explanations will be briefly
explored: (1) potential unmeasured variables and (2) the influence of shared method variance.
The bifactor model fitting better than the higher-order model suggests the common
variance stems directly from the measures rather than the latent constructs thought to represent
SR, ER, and SPS. Throughout earlier chapters, it was hypothesized that the shared variance
depicted in the bifactor model could not underly the first-order factors and instead had to be a
separate entity. Possible features proposed included constructs like self-efficacy, baseline affect,
or stress (e.g., Bandura, 1991; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). Indeed, connections between these
constructs and SR, ER, and SPS have been identified in past investigations (e.g., Chang, 2017;
Buruck et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2018). Additional considerations include constructs that tend to
have a pervasive impact on psychological functioning, such as intelligence, years of education,
or socio-economic status (e.g., Foster & Cone, 1995). It is possible that any of these unmeasured
variables could influence an individual’s responding on all nine measures in a manner that is
separate from the latent constructs thought to reflect SR, ER, and SPS and contribute to the
shared variance captured by the common factor.
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Investigations of global intelligence offer an alternative perspective. Historically, global
intelligence (i.e., the g factor) was understood within the framework of a higher-order model,
such that g was generated by shared variance among broad abilities (e.g., fluid intelligence,
crystallized intelligence, processing speed), which in turn were generated by shared variance
among related subtests of intelligence assessments (e.g., vocabulary, coding; Canivez &
Watkins, 2010). However, recent investigations have found substantial support for a bifactor
model of global intelligence (Beaujean, 2015; Cucina & Byle, 2017; Gignac & Watkins, 2013).
These alternative conceptualizations do not propose g is comprised of something different
because it is separated from the broad abilities in the bifactor model, but rather it is viewed as
more directly impacting performance on the subtests (Cucina & Byle, 2017). By this line of
reasoning, it is possible the common factor in the present study could be reflective of the same
elements hypothesized in the higher-order model, namely EFs (Barkley, 1997a). Perhaps the
bifactor model indicates that a common, underlying factor (e.g., EFs, intelligence) has a direct
impact on all nine measures.
It is also certainly possible the common factor is inflated by shared method variance, as
all nine measures are self-report assessments of one’s own cognitions, emotions, and behaviors.
Shared method variance suggests that demonstrated relationships between constructs may be due
to similar measurement formats rather than an underlying relationship between the constructs
themselves (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). In other words, variation in scores on a measure could
reflect variation in underlying abilities the measure aims to capture, or they could reflect factors
related to how the measure was completed, or a combination of these factors. The present study
utilized self-report measures, which typically overlap methodologically via two pathways:
similar formats and the influence of response bias (Fernandez-Ballesteros, 2004). Structurally, all
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measures were administered electronically, included a set of relative statements, and were rated
based on Likert scales. Response biases that could impact self-report might include factors
related to social desirability (e.g., King & Bruner, 2000) or tendencies to fake good, fake bad, or
fake mad (e.g., Furnham & Henderson, 1982).
Despite these concerns, self-report continues to be the most widely utilized form of
assessment in psychological research, and methods to maximize fidelity are numerous (Crano et
al., 2014; Turkkan, 2000). Further, regardless of whether the common factor was inflated due to
shared method variance, the measures included in the present study are widely used in practice as
predictors of outcomes also typically assessed via self-report (e.g., Duckworth & Kern, Weems
& Pina, 2010). Thus, this issue extends beyond considerations of the present study and relates to
how much of psychological research is typically conducted. These concerns and potential ways
to address them will be discussed in more detail in the limitations and future directions sections.
Alternative Models. In addition to the bifactor model, three other CFA models were
tested in the present study. The higher-order model has been discussed throughout as it is the
most conceptually similar model to the bifactor model, such that both models represent a level
“in between” convergence and divergence. In comparison, the first-order model represented the
highest level of divergence, such that the constructs of interest were conceptualized as being
distinct entities that are related without sharing underlying variance. This was not the best-fitting
model, which provides support for the hypothesis that the constructs as measured are not just
related, but indeed share underlying variance (e.g., Barkley, 1997a). In fact, shared underlying
variance helps to explain the strong correlational relationships observed between measures of the
constructs (Keith, 2019).
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On the other end of the spectrum, the one-factor model represented the highest level of
convergence, such that the constructs of interest were conceptualized as converging to the extent
that they do not function as distinct entities and instead should be considered one common factor.
This was also not the best-fitting model, which provides support for the hypothesis that the
constructs as measured include distinguishing features that should be differentiated (e.g.,
D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Gross, 2014). Taken together, the patterns across all four models
indicate measures of SR, ER, and SPS are capturing both common and distinct features of these
constructs and as such, a model that blends convergence and divergence is most appropriate.
It is important to highlight that only four possible CFA models reflecting different levels
of convergence and divergence were evaluated. There are additional possibilities that could be
explored, both in terms of the configuration of constructs as well as the constructs included. For
example, only one common factor was depicted in the models, but it is possible that more than
one construct could impact the shared variance among the nine constructs. In addition, shared
variance was evaluated at the predictor level, but not the outcome level. That is, depressive
symptoms may also share common variance with SR, ER, and SPS, either stemming from theory
or measurement, that was not able to be investigated in the chosen models. A combination of the
higher-order and bifactor models is also possible, such that the three first-order constructs may
share underlying variance in addition to separate shared variance across the nine measures.
Future empirical work is needed to evaluate these alternative possibilities.
Measurement Summary. Most of the work differentiating SR, ER, and SPS has been at
the theoretical level rather than the measurement level (e.g., D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Gross,
2014; Nigg, 2017). The present study addressed this gap in the literature through an in-depth
evaluation of the within-construct and between-construct relationships among commonly used
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measures of SR, ER, and SPS. Although within-construct findings largely supported the
representational validity of the included measures, between-construct findings highlighted a
substantial amount of convergence. Results of the bifactor model indicated the convergence
stemmed from a common factor generated by variance shared among all nine measures. These
findings raise important questions regarding the adequacy of the included measures and the
possible need for theoretical refinement. Overlap in the measurement of SR, ER, and SPS has
significant implications for the interpretation of predictive findings. To draw connections
between observed variables and outcomes, fully understanding what measures capture is critical.
These concerns are addressed in more detail in the next section.
Stage 2: Structure & Elaborative Validity
In the structural stage, the predictive ability of commonly used measures of SR, ER, and
SPS was examined. Specifically, how well common and distinct elements of the constructs as
structured by the best-fitting CFA model were able to predict depressive symptoms was assessed
via a latent variable SEM model. This allowed for the measures to be evaluated from a utility
perspective. Results from the structural stage are considered in the context of elaborative
validity, overall construct validity, and theoretical implications.
Common & Distinct Pathways to Depression. The third and final goal of the study was to
evaluate how well measures of SR, ER, and SPS predict depressive symptoms in the context of
one another. These constructs have all been identified as significant contributors to depressive
symptoms and integrated into multiple models of depression (Anderson et al., 2009; Joormann &
Stanton, 2016; Strauman, 2017). Given the noted concerns regarding measurement overlap, it is
possible that common elements might better explain observed connections between the
constructs and depressive symptoms. Conversely, if each construct holds a unique connection to
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depressive symptoms, it may be more efficient to target the unique aspects directly. Despite these
overlap concerns, most past investigations have examined the connection between each construct
and depression in isolation (e.g., Hasegawa et al., 2018; Noreen et al., 2015; Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987). The present study was the first to examine how well the common and distinct
elements of SR, ER, and SPS predict depressive symptoms in the context of one another.
Evaluation of a measure’s ability to predict other constructs relates to criterion-related
validity, which involves linking scores on a measure to a practically useful criterion (Foster &
Cone, 1995). This can be examined via several methods, one of which being latent variable
SEM. This approach has notable advantages, namely that it allows for an evaluation of predictive
relationships free of measurement error (Byrne, 2016). Further, the two-stage process of
measurement (CFA) and structural (latent SEM) considerations permitted questions of
convergent and discriminant validity to be addressed prior to predictive questions (Keith, 2019).
These advantages provide a clear picture of how much variance in an outcome can be accounted
for by a predictor. A measure’s predictive ability (i.e., criterion-related validity) is the primary
component of elaborative validity and helps to justify the measure’s reason for being (Foster &
Cone, 1995). This is another necessary but not sufficient step in the process of evaluating
construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
Within the bifactor model, predictive paths between each of the constructs and depressive
symptoms, as well as between the common factor and depressive symptoms were evaluated.
Results indicated that only the common factor and the latent construct thought to reflect ER
emerged as significant predictors of depressive symptoms. The ER latent variable also included
shared variance with a measure of NPO, suggesting that element of SPS is also predictive of
depressive symptoms; this finding will be discussed in more detail in a later section focused on
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NPO. After accounting for the common factor, the general constructs of SR and SPS did not
significantly predict depressive symptoms. These results will be considered first from a
methodological perspective, then from a theoretical perspective.
The substantial overlap among measures of SR, ER, and SPS identified in the
measurement stage had predictive implications that emerged in the latent variable SEM model.
After accounting for the variance within the common factor, the distinct features of SR and SPS
were not predictive of depressive symptoms. This does not support the elaborative validity of
these measures and calls into question their utility (Foster & Cone, 1995). That is, if measures of
SR and SPS are more so reflective of common elements (highly convergent) and are unable to
predict relevant outcomes (lack criterion-related validity) then their value becomes limited (e.g.,
Strauss & Smith, 2009). It is possible this issue can be addressed from a measure development
perspective, such that commonly used tools could be sharpened to better capture what their
intended constructs “are” or “are not” (Foster & Cone, 1995). It is also possible this issue calls
for a reconsideration of theory, such that clearer boundaries between related constructs are
warranted.
As discussed in the context of representational validity, whether the issue is with
inadequate measures or a need for theoretical recasting is unclear (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
What is clear, however, is that studies investigating the predictive ability of these constructs in
isolation may be misattributing findings to the construct’s distinct features when in fact, it
appears that common features are driving predictive relationships. Notably, it is rare for
measurement considerations relevant to construct validity to be raised in limitation sections of
studies. Instead, measures that are widely used in practice are assumed to capture the constructs
they purport to assess. It is ultimately the responsibility of the researcher to evaluate and balance

227

these considerations prior to selecting measures to be used in criterion-related studies (Foster &
Cone, 1995).
Theoretically, the predictive ability of the common factor in relation to depressive
symptoms is not surprising given the strong connections among SR, ER, SPS, and depression
(Anderson et al., 2009; Joormann & Stanton, 2016; Strauman, 2017). As noted earlier in this
chapter, the data collected, and models tested, in the present study do not provide enough
information to be able to characterize what comprises the shared variance within the common
factor. The possible constructs proposed as potentially being reflected in the common factor (i.e.,
EFs, intelligence, years of education, socio-economic status, self-efficacy, baseline affect, stress)
would all have intuitive connections to depressive symptoms. It is also possible that shared
method variance between the construct measures (SR, ER, and SPS) and outcome measure
(depressive symptoms) inflates the predictive relationship (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Without a
deeper understanding of what comprises the shared variance among the nine measures,
interpretation of this relationship should be approached with caution.
The finding that ER significantly predicted depressive symptoms aligns with the body of
literature suggesting that depression is a disorder of ER. In fact, it has been suggested that
individuals with depression do not necessarily experience higher levels of negative emotions
than other people, but that they are less able to regulate those emotions (Joorman & Stanton,
2016). The maladaptive ER strategy of rumination and its connection to depression has a
particularly prominent, well-established evidence base (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Given
these strong connections between this construct and depression, ER has been integrated into
diverse conceptualizations of depressive symptoms. Evidence suggests impairment at any stage
of the ER process can serve to initiate or maintain depressive episodes, including deficits in the
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engagement of ER abilities, the selection of maladaptive strategies, and failure to effectively
implement ER strategies (Sheppes et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2020).
If an individual fails to engage ER abilities, the original emotion persists, which could
contribute to prolonged periods of negative affect (Sheppes et al., 2015). In the case of emotional
impulsivity (i.e., failure to inhibit an immediate emotional reaction), inability to engage ER
could create negative consequences for the individual (Barkley & Fischer, 2010). For instance, if
an individual receives negative feedback from their boss and they are unable to inhibit their
initial reaction and employ ER, they may make an inappropriate comment and be reprimanded,
leading to additional negative consequences. Regarding the selection of ER strategies, evidence
from meta-analyses suggest that individuals with depression tend to select more maladaptive
strategies, such as rumination or suppression, than non-depressed individuals (Visted et al., 2018;
Zhou et al., 2020). Deficits at this stage are particularly detrimental, as the individual believes
they are addressing the issue by employing a strategy, but the strategy serves to exacerbate the
problem (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Finally, if an individual fails to effectively
implement an ER strategy, a similar accumulation of consequences can occur. For instance,
cognitive reappraisal can be a challenging skill, thus if an individual attempts this strategy but is
unable to execute it, their original emotion is likely to persist (e.g., Joorman & Stanton, 2016).
Extensive evidence therefore suggests that deficits at any stage of the ER process can
impact the onset or development of depression (Sheppes et al., 2015). Further, the overlap
between the experience of emotions captured by the constructs of ER and depression could
contribute to similarities in their operationalization and measurement (e.g., Kessler & Bromet,
2013). More specifically, measures that assess ER and depression likely both contain content
related to one’s emotional experience. Overall, the established connection between deficits in ER
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and depressive symptoms, the overlap in emotional content, and the possibility of inflation due to
shared method variance might all contribute to the significant, predictive relationship observed
between the latent construct thought to represent ER and depressive symptoms.
In contrast to ER, the finding that SR and SPS did not significantly predict depressive
symptoms was unexpected given the extensive literature bases connecting these constructs to
depression. Regarding SR, Strauman (2017) presented a model of depression that suggests the
onset of a depressive episode may follow a failure in goal attainment due to deficits in SR.
Similarly with SPS, Nezu (1987) presented a model of depression positing a negative cycle in
which deficits in SPS lead to an accumulation of problems and related negative consequences
that can elicit and exacerbate depressive symptoms over time. There are several potential reasons
why these robust connections between SR, SPS, and depression did not emerge in the context of
distinct variance predictions. It is possible that the underlying mechanisms of the relationships
between SR, SPS, and depression can be fully accounted for by shared variance between
regulation and problem-solving. Indeed, both processes involve self-monitoring, evaluation of
consequences, and adjusting behavior (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Strauman, 2017). Differences in
shared variance (accounted for by the common factor) could therefore reflect both processes.
It is also possible that ER deficits serve to disrupt SR and SPS abilities to the extent that
their influence on depressive symptoms is no longer impactful. This relates to the load
hypothesis proposed by Muraven and Baumeister (2000) which suggests that resources directed
toward ER come at the cost of other available resources, or resources that could otherwise be
directed toward SR or SPS. For example, say an individual is working toward a goal or
attempting to solve a problem. If the individual becomes distressed, they then must employ ER
abilities while maintaining progress toward the goal or problem resolution. This not only
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decreases the overall cognitive resources available but is more challenging when deficits in ER
are present (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). On the other hand, ignoring the distress could serve
to disrupt SR or SPS abilities (Bridget et al., 2013; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). With either
possibility, SR and SPS abilities are impeded, and the individual is left with an unmet goal or an
unsolved problem. In this manner, the pervasive impact of ER deficits could serve to exacerbate
depressive symptoms over time. This pattern could lead to ER abilities being more crucial to the
development or maintenance of depressive symptoms than domain-general SR or SPS.
Structural Summary. Most of the work examining the effects of SR, ER, and SPS on
depression has been done in isolation, rather than inclusion of all three constructs (e.g.,
Hasegawa et al., 2018; Noreen et al., 2015). The present study addressed this gap in the literature
through evaluation of a model that allowed for the common and distinct elements of these
constructs to differentially predict depression. Results indicated the common features and distinct
features of ER significantly predicted depressive symptoms. This pattern fails to provide
evidence for the elaborative validity of measures of SR or SPS. These findings extend questions
raised in the measurement stage regarding the adequacy of the included measures and the
possible need for refinement. Regardless, given the lack of clarity as to what comprises the
common factor underlying all nine measures, caution is warranted when making interpretations
regarding the predictive ability of the included measures. As Campbell and Fiske (1959)
emphasized, one must have confidence in a measure of a trait before using it to test relationships
between traits.
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
Across analyses, the ERQ stood out as a measure that did not seem to function in the
same way as the other included measures. At the correlational level, the ERQ demonstrated low

231

within-construct relationships with other measures of ER, as well as low between-construct
relationships with measures of other constructs. The low magnitude of relationship strength
carried over into the CFA and SEM models, with factor loadings for the ERQ being the lowest
across models. This was the case for both paths to the latent construct thought to reflect ER and
the common factor thought to reflect shared variance among all nine measures. The path between
the ER latent variable and the ERQ_C (cognitive reappraisal subscale) was one of the only
nonsignificant paths identified across models. Interestingly, added modifications indicated the
ERQ_C shared variance with the ER latent variable that is separate from the shared variance
among the other measures of ER. Finally, the ERQ_S (suppression subscale) was the only
measure that required its intercept be allowed to vary when investigating invariance between
males and females. This suggests the ERQ_S might not have the same “zero” or start point
across groups. As such, the observed mean-level difference (males reported higher use of
suppression than females) could be attributed to the measure itself rather than true underlying
differences (e.g., Keith, 2019).
The ERQ is described as one of the most well-validated measures of ER (e.g., Ireland et
al., 2017; Preece et al., 2018) and is frequently utilized in overall investigations of ER (e.g.,
Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Meyer et al., 2014). Importantly, the ERQ operationalizes the
construct of ER in a different manner than the other included measures of ER, with a specific
focus on strategy implementation rather than overall abilities (Gross & John, 2003). When
measures are the result of differing operationalizations, interpretation of small correlations
between them becomes challenging (Foster & Cone, 1995). Small correlations could represent a
disconnect between theory and measurement, or it could indicate specific issues with the
reliability or validity of the measures. On the other hand, all three included measures could be
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appropriate assessments of ER that happen to operationalize and capture different aspects of
ER’s nomological net (e.g., Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Indeed, calls for clarification in the
measurement of ER have suggested that ER is likely best accounted for by multiple measures
(e.g., Weems & Pina, 2010). Whether the concerns that emerged with the ERQ in the present
study are the result of the ERQ being an inadequate measure of ER, a reflection of differing
operationalizations, or a disconnect between theory and measurement, caution is warranted when
utilizing this measure as a general indicator of ER abilities, and further clarification of its
intended use is needed.
Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire (NPOQ)
The second measure that stood out, the NPOQ, demonstrated a unique relationship with
measures of ER. Across models, it was apparent that a portion of the variance underlying the
NPOQ was generated by the latent construct thought to reflect ER, rather than being solely
generated by its overarching construct, SPS. This either involved correlating the NPOQ error
term with the error terms of ER measures or directly adding a path from the ER latent variable to
the NPOQ measure. Without this added path, the factor loading between the NPOQ and the
latent variable thought to reflect SPS was nonsignificant in the bifactor model. Taken together,
these findings highlight a unique relationship between the NPOQ and measures of ER.
The NPOQ specifically measures NPO, an element of SPS that reflects a maladaptive set
in which an individual tends to appraise problems as a threat to well-being, believe that problems
are unsolvable, doubt one’s own ability to solve problems, and become frustrated or upset when
confronted with problems (Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1996). From this definition, the
overlap between ER and NPO, particularly in terms of the emotional experience, is clear. In fact,
similarities in content between measures of ER and NPO helped to generate the impetus for the
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present study. For example, one of the NPO items on the SPSI-R is, “I feel threatened and afraid
when I have an important problem to solve” (D’Zurilla et al., 2002). Another example is, “When
my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I get very frustrated.” These items help to demonstrate
potential similarities in the content these measures are capturing. Specifically, both measures
may be assessing the individual’s emotional experience and skills needed for regulation or
problem-solving in the face of negative affect.
The shared variance between NPO and ER emerged in the context of predicting
depressive symptoms, such that the latent variable thought to reflect ER included a path (and
thus shared variance) to the NPOQ. This latent variable was the only distinct construct that
significantly predicted depressive symptoms. Of note, the shared content identified at the item
level between NPO and ER additionally overlaps with the assessment of depressive symptoms
(e.g., Kessler & Bromet, 2013). For instance, example items on the CES-D include, “I felt sad,”
and “I felt that everything I did was an effort” (Radloff, 1977). A closer look at the overlap
among NPO, ER, and depressive symptoms at the measure level and theoretical level appears to
be warranted.
As an independent construct, NPO has been identified as being a particularly influential
component of the effect of SPS on internalizing symptoms (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). It is
therefore possible that the combined impact of ER and NPO depicted in the latent variable SEM
model overtook the predictive ability of the other measures. Evidence from past studies suggests
the interaction between high NPO and ER deficits could function to disrupt SR and SPS abilities.
When problems are viewed as unsolvable and frustration is elicited, ER abilities must be
employed, detracting resources from SR and SPS abilities (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).
Indeed, the interaction between deficits in SR and high NPO have been found to exacerbate
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depressive symptoms (Buffie & Nangle, 2021), and high NPO has been found to hamper the SPS
process (Chang, 2017). Thus, the pervasive influence of both high NPO and deficits in ER (both
captured by the latent ER variable) could potentially account for the decreased impact of
domain-general SR and SPS in predicting depressive symptoms.
Gender Differences
Although examining gender differences was not a primary goal of the present study, past
investigations of SR, ER, SPS, and depression indicated possible variation between genders
should be evaluated across relationships. As such, differences between males and females were
examined at the mean level and at the measurement level. Previous studies have demonstrated
that females tend to report more difficulties with ER and higher NPO compared to males,
whereas males tend to employ the ER strategy of suppression more than females (Bell &
D’Zurilla, 2009; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Further, it is well-established that females experience
depression at a rate of 2:1 as compared to males (Salk et al., 2017). In the present study, these
patterns were supported at the mean level. Contrary to prediction, however, females reported
lower levels of SR and overall SPS ability than males.
Results of past empirical work examining gender differences in SR and SPS have been
mixed (Anderson et al., 2009; Hosseini-Kamkar & Morton, 2014; Nezu, 2004). More
specifically, studies investigating gender differences in SR have not identified clear patterns of
differences (Hosseini-Kamkar & Morton, 2014). In terms of related elements, a meta-analysis of
277 studies found no gender differences in EF and only a small advantage for females in the
domain of effortful control (Cross et al., 2011). Regarding SPS, multiple studies have failed to
find gender differences related to overall SPS abilities (e.g., Anderson et al., 2009; Haugh, 2006;
McCabe et al., 1999; Reinecke et al., 2001), but some have found that females report higher NPO
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and lower PPO than males (Bell & D’Zurilla, 2009; Roy et al., 2019). It is possible the even
distribution of sample size between males and females in the present study allowed for gender
differences to emerge. It is also possible that the previously noted impact of COVID-19
pandemic could have differentially impacted males and females (Deng et al., 2021). Future work
should examine variation across the gender spectrum for a more nuanced understanding of these
mean-level differences.
Despite mean-level differences, multigroup analyses at the measurement (first-order
CFA) and structural levels (latent variable SEM model) demonstrated configural, metric, and
partial intercept invariance between females and males. These findings suggest that the latent
variables as measured appear to represent the same constructs for females and males, and that
proposed models and corresponding relationship patterns do not differ between groups. This is in
line with past theoretical and operational work in which no structural differences between males
and females were observed (e.g., Grissom & Reyes, 2019; Nezu, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012).
Though gender continues to be an important, the results of the present study do not suggest
differences in underlying relationships or structure for the constructs of interest.
Limitations
Although the present study had notable strengths, its limitations should also be
considered. Possible limitations, including measure selection (e.g., self-report, shared method
variance), construct selection, sample characteristics (e.g., focus on undergraduate students,
representation of racial/ethnic and gender minorities, and non-clinical sample), and crosssectional design are described in the following sections.
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Measure Selection
Perhaps the most important limitation to consider is the notion of shared method
variance, which was first introduced in Chapter I and discussed at length throughout the present
chapter. When common methods are utilized to evaluate different constructs, it is impossible to
disentangle the influence of the method from the true underlying relationship between constructs
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959). This can be due to both a shared format (i.e., online administration,
Likert scales) as well as overlapping concerns related to response bias (i.e., social desirability,
tendency to fake good/bad/mad; Fernandez-Ballesteros, 2004; Furnham & Henderson, 1982;
King & Bruner, 2000). Shared method variance can interfere with interpretations related to
convergent, discriminant, and overall construct validity (Foster & Cone, 1995). Further, shared
method variance can muddle relationships between predictors and outcomes (Williams &
McGonagle, 2016). Potential ways to address these pervasive issues will be considered in the
context of future directions.
Despite concerns related to shared method variance, a primary goal of the study was to
evaluate the construct validity of measures of SR, ER, and SPS that are commonly used in
practice. Self-report continues to be the most widely utilized form of assessment in psychological
research (Crano et al., 2014; Turkkan, 2000) and is a particularly prominent method in
investigations of SR, ER, and SPS (e.g., Duckworth & Kern, Weems & Pina, 2010). Not only do
self-report measures capture different elements of the constructs than behavioral tasks, but they
can also be uniquely informative regarding individual’s self-perceptions of adaptive skills,
deficits, and psychological experiences (Allom et al., 2016; Friedman & Banich, 2019; Keefer,
2015). Thus, although the noted concerns warrant consideration, use of self-report measures in
the present study was deemed justified.
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Construct Selection
Another important limitation to consider is the scope of constructs included in the present
study. As noted, the common and distinct features of SR, ER, and SPS were investigated due to
the previously established connections between constructs (Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Nigg,
2017), as well as their connection to depressive symptoms (Anderson et al., 2009; Joormann &
Stanton, 2016; Strauman, 2017). However, other related constructs, such as intelligence,
foundational EFs, self-efficacy, baseline affect, or general stress could also have been included in
the proposed models and likely would have been informative. Decisions regarding the included
constructs necessitated an evaluation of scope. Future investigations should include a wider
range of constructs to help establish a more comprehensive picture of these relationships.
Sample
It is important to note that a non-clinical sample was utilized. Data regarding formal
diagnoses of depressive disorders was not collected, and participants with any level of depressive
symptoms were included in the study. In addition, co-occurring concerns were not assessed.
Though undergraduate samples have historically been considered ‘healthy,’ accumulating
findings have raised questions regarding the overall mental health of today’s students (Conley et
al., 2014). Estimates suggest approximately one-fourth of incoming undergraduate students in
the US experience some form of psychopathology (Auerbach et al., 2018). The present study
found endorsement of depressive symptoms to be like past undergraduate samples, if not slightly
higher (Table 5). Though not a formally clinical sample, the high rates of mental health concerns
experienced by undergraduate students suggest investigations utilizing this population can
provide valuable insight into clinical concerns.
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Another factor to consider was that participants in the present sample identified primarily
as White (89.9%); the remaining individuals identified as 3.5% Asian, 2.9% Multiple Racial
Identities, 1.5% Black, 1.5% Latinx, and .3% American Indian/Native American or Alaska
Native. While this is reflective of a typical undergraduate population in New England, it is
limited when compared to the demographics of undergraduate populations nationwide. As of
2022, only 54.3% of college students in the US identified as White (Hanson, 2022). The sample
is also limited when compared to the demographics of the general population. As of 2022, the
U.S. Census Bureau estimated the racial demographics of the general population as follows:
White 76.3%, Hispanic or Latinx 18.5%, Black or African American 13.4%, Asian 5.9%,
Multiple Identities 2.8%, American Indian or Alaska Native 1.3%, and Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander 0.2%. These differences suggest racial/ethnic minorities were not adequately
represented in the present study.
Importantly, no differences across racial/ethnic groups were identified across the
literature for the measures of interest. However, an individual’s racial/ethnic identity could
impact their experience of emerging adulthood, particularly in terms of differences in cultural
values, approaches to family functioning, and the interacting element of socioeconomic status
(Syed & Mitchell, 2013). Further, racial/ethnic identity differentially impacts stress and overall
well-being during emerging adulthood through the effects of potential discrimination (e.g., Lee
et al., 2020), health disparities (e.g., NeMoyer et al., 2020), and access to resources (e.g., Museus
& Neville, 2012). These differences have implications for the study results given the detrimental
impact of stress on both regulation (e.g., Park et al., 2012) and problem-solving (e.g., Creswell et
al., 2013). Thus, future research is needed to examine the influence of racial/ethnic identity on
the relationships examined in the present study.
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A strength of the sample was the even distribution of individuals who identified as female
(51.9%) and male (46.6%). This allowed for gender differences at the mean level and construct
measurement level to be explored. However, gender minorities, including non-binary (1.0%),
female to male transgender (.3%), not sure (.2%), and male to female transgender (0%)
individuals were less well-represented. The prevalence of gender minority identification in the
U.S. ranges from 100 to 500 per 100,000 individuals, thus low sample size is a common issue
across research studies (Glick et al., 2018). Future investigations could consider using a targeted
sampling approach to better capture the perspectives of these populations (Bonevski et al., 2014).
A final limitation to consider within this domain is that an undergraduate student sample
was utilized to investigate the relationships of interest during emerging adulthood. Several
developmental theorists posit the proposed characteristics associated with emerging adulthood do
not generalize to those 18- to 29-year-olds who do not pursue higher education (Bynner, 2005).
While it is likely there are several trajectories for emerging adulthood that differ across
individuals, a significant portion of emerging adults do engage in post-secondary education
(NCES, 2019). Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the developmental period of
emerging adulthood is not synonymous with a population of undergraduate students. The present
sample was comprised of mostly younger students (Mage = 19.02, SDage = 1.50) enrolled in
introductory psychology courses. Although samples of this type are typical in psychological
research, this limitation should be considered when generalizing results beyond undergraduate
populations (Henrich et al., 2010).
Cross-Sectional Design
It is important to consider the study results within the context of a cross-sectional design.
Cross-sectional studies capture a single timepoint of processes that develop continuously over
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the lifespan. As such, temporal associations between variables can be assumed but should not be
conceptualized as causal (Keith, 2019). Longitudinal studies are therefore considered the gold
standard in terms of assessing relationships among developmental processes (Knowland et al.,
2015). The present study only assessed one set of predictive relationships that were dependent on
a temporal process: the connections between SR, ER, SPS and depressive symptoms. Within the
model, it was assumed the underlying skills related to the constructs of interest developed first,
and that adaptive skills versus deficits in these domains would lead to depressive symptoms over
time. This assumption is in line with the directionality proposed in models of the constructs (e.g.,
Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010; Gross, 2015), as well as past investigations connecting
the constructs to depressive symptoms (e.g., Anderson et al., 2009; Joormann & Stanton, 2016;
Strauman, 2017).
This temporal limitation also leads to a lack of clarity regarding reciprocal relationships
among variables; for example, depression is thought to negatively affect SR abilities over time
(Strauman, 2017). Specifically, as depressive episodes accumulate, the individual’s approachavoidance system is thought to be permanently altered, which impacts motivational processes
and ultimately the ability to work towards goals (Strauman & Wilson, 2010). This direction of
effects was unable to be evaluated in the present study given the single timepoint of data
collection. Future studies should explore these relationships across at least two time points to
better evaluate the temporal relationship between the constructs of interest and the onset of
symptoms.
Future Directions
As noted throughout this chapter, several questions raised by the present findings warrant
further investigation. Perhaps the most logical next step to better understand the shared variance
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among SR, ER, and SPS would be an investigation via a multitrait-multimethod matrix approach
(MTMM; Campbell & Fiske, 1959). The MTMM is a proposed framework that can help to
organize evaluations of validity, namely convergent and discriminant, as they relate to construct
validity (Foster & Cone, 1995). A key feature of this approach is the inclusion multiple traits and
multiple methods. This allows for an evaluation of relationships specific to each trait and specific
to each method, as well as relationships across traits and across methods (Campbell & Fiske,
1959). Comparison of these relationships via an MTMM helps to sharpen measurement tools and
aids in the process of determining what a construct “is” and “is not” (Foster & Cone, 1995).
Though multiple traits were included, a multimethod approach was not incorporated into
the present study but would serve to significantly extend the present findings. This is because
convergent and divergent validity are best assessed via independent methods to remove the
potential influence of shared method variance (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Take for example the
latent construct of SR: in the context of a monomethod approach, there is not enough information
to determine whether shared variance among the measures is reflective of SR’s nomological net
or variance related to all measures being administered in a survey format. With a multimethod
approach, shared variance within the latent construct could not be due to features of the method
and are more likely to reflect variation in the construct (e.g., Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
Say, for example, one wanted to use a two-by-two MTMM approach (i.e., two methods,
two traits) to further investigate the constructs of SR and ER. Potential methods that have
historically been used to assess both traits are self-report measures and behavioral EF tasks (e.g.,
Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Weems & Pina, 2010). For SR, the SSRQ (Carey et al., 2004) could
be selected as the self-report measure, and the Go/No-Go task (Newman et al., 1985) as the
behavioral EF task. To assess ER, the DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) could be used as a self-
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report measure, and the Emotional Go/No-Go task (Murphy et al., 1999) could be used as a
behavioral EF task. Evaluation of the correlation matrix generated by this two-by-two MTMM
approach would generate valuable information regarding the validity of SR and ER assessment
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Specifically, the following elements can be evaluated: (a)
convergence within traits (e.g., relationship between the SSRQ and Go/No-Go task), (b)
convergence within methods (e.g., relationship between the Go/No-Go and Emotional Go/No-Go
tasks), (c) and a comparison of relationships across methods and traits. By including maximally
different methods, this approach helps to clarify trait- versus method-specific contributions to
relationships between constructs (Foster & Cone, 1995).
Interestingly, recent investigations have utilized CFA as an approach to evaluating
MTMM data (e.g., Dickinson & Adelson, 2016; Montero-Marin et al., 2018). CFA models
generate covariance matrices demonstrating relationships among the included variables, which
aligns with the information evaluated as part of an MTMM approach (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
A major advantage of a CFA-MTMM approach is the opportunity to distinguish systematic
method variance from measurement error (Kyriazos, 2018). That is, the inclusion of multiple
methods (i.e., core element of MTMM approach) and the ability to estimate and separate out
measurement error (i.e., core element of CFA analyses) allow for a thorough examination of the
contributions of extraneous variance that may impact relationships among variables of interest.
Further, CFA models are founded in testing theoretical predictions (in contrast to EFA, which is
exploration-based) and thus allow for predicted relationships among measures to be directly
tested (Keith, 2019). A CFA-MTMM approach would therefore be a logical and informative next
step in this line of research.
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As noted in the MTMM example, alternatives to self-report exist for the assessment of
SR, ER, and SPS. For SR, a multimethod approach might include a battery of EF tasks, such as
measures of inhibition, planning, or decision-making (e.g., Duckworth & Kern, 2011). In the
case of ER, affective/emotion/mood induction techniques could be utilized to generate an
emotional experience, and biological or physiological indicators could be used to capture the
physical elements of emotion (e.g., Adrian et al., 2011; Britton et al., 2012). Regarding SPS,
measures of both the SPS process and outcomes of problem-solving could be included (e.g.,
D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). Inclusion of these alternative methods would help to clarify
convergence both within constructs and between constructs. Ultimately, this would speak to the
construct validity of measures of SR, ER, and SPS and would likely lead to a deeper
understanding of the substantial overlap observed in the present study.
In addition to including multiple methods, several other traits were identified that would
provide valuable information if included in future studies. Constructs such as underlying EFs,
self-efficacy, baseline affect, or stress have demonstrated relationships with the variables of
interest and could be considered (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Barkley, 1997a; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).
As noted, connections between these constructs and SR, ER, and SPS have been identified in
past investigations (e.g., Chang, 2017; Buruck et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2018). Further, traits
that pervasively impact psychological functioning, such as intelligence, years of education, or
socio-economic status warrant inclusion (e.g., Foster & Cone, 1995). Future investigations might
also consider the outcome variable of depressive symptoms as a trait to be included in the
examination of convergent and discriminant validity of measures of SR, ER, and SPS given the
overlap in common methods (e.g., self-report) and shared item content (e.g., emotional
experience) with that particular criterion (e.g., Joorman & Stanton, 2016).
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A final worthwhile focus of future studies is on the specific role of NPO across these
relationships. As noted, NPO has been identified as a key element of SPS in the context of
depressive symptoms (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). Moreover, given the evidence that NPO can
interact with and even hamper regulation and problem-solving abilities, it may have a pervasive
influence across constructs (e.g., Buffie & Nangle, 2021; Chang, 2017). If multiple measures of
NPO were included, the distinct versus common elements of ER and NPO could be
differentiated, both regarding the underlying latent structure as well as the impact of these
variables on depressive symptoms. As noted, NPO shares a notable amount of theoretical and
operational overlap with ER and depressive symptoms, as well as similar item-level content on
assessment measures of these constructs. Thus, a more focused investigation of these
relationships could be informative.
Conclusion
The present study sought to examine the relationships among three psychological
constructs: SR, ER, and SPS, and their connection to depressive symptomology. These
constructs arose from independent, well-established literature bases, yet they share several
common features. This study was the first to empirically investigate the validity of these
constructs in the context of one another. In addition, the combined influence of these constructs,
including both their distinct and common elements, on depressive symptoms had not yet been
assessed. A major advantage of the present study was the complexity of analyses conducted,
which allowed for an error-free examination of the relationships of interest.
This study was the first to demonstrate and explore the high levels of convergence among
SR, ER, and SPS as commonly measured in practice. Evaluation at the bivariate and structural
levels indicated a substantial amount of shared variance among the constructs and provided a
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complicated picture of construct validity. It appears that measures often used to assess these
constructs are capturing more common features than investigators may be aware of, which has
notable implications for the interpretation of findings. The goal of clinical research is to identify
and characterize contributing factors that impact psychopathology to better inform effective
prevention and intervention approaches. By empirically synthesizing these constructs and
examining their combined influences on depressive symptoms, the present study took important
steps in that direction. Future investigations that include a multitrait-multimethod examination of
common and distinct pathways from SR, ER, and SPS to depressive symptoms would serve to
further clarify these relationships.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Sona Recruitment Summary
You must be between the ages of 18 and 29 to participate in this study. This study will ask you to
answer questions about your self-regulation, emotion regulation, problem-solving abilities, and
psychological functioning. Additionally, you will be asked for demographic information and if
you have experienced any distress related to the coronavirus. Your identity and responses will
remain completely anonymous. Completion of the questionnaires should take approximately 90
minutes, and you will earn two Sona credits for your participation. If you have questions about
participating in this project, please contact Michelle Buffie, michelle.buffie@maine.edu.
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Appendix B
Informed Consent
Dear Participant,
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Michelle Buffie, M.A., a
psychology graduate student, and Dr. Douglas Nangle, a Professor in the Department of
Psychology at the University of Maine. The purpose of this research is to learn more about how
college students’ ability to regulate behavior and solve problems affects psychological
functioning. You must be between 18 and 29 years of age to participate in this study. Your
participation will help further the understanding of the skills and processes that impact
psychological functioning.
What will you be asked to do during this study?
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to take an anonymous survey. It should take you
about 90 minutes to complete.
● You will be asked for demographic information about yourself (e.g., age, race, gender)
● You will be asked if you have experienced any anxiety related to COVID-19
● You will be asked to respond to items such as:
○ “I am able to accomplish goals I set for myself”
○ “When I’m upset, I acknowledge my emotions”
○ “Whenever I have a problem, I believe that it can be solved”
○ “I felt sad”
What are the Risks?
Some questions may make you feel uncomfortable or distressed. You may skip any question that
you do not wish to answer and can elect to end your participation in the study at any time. If you
would like to speak with a professional about your experiences, you are encouraged to contact
the University of Maine Counseling Center (207-581-1392), which provides free services to
UMaine students. Information about the Counseling Center, including their hours of operation,
can be found at http://umaine.edu/counseling/contact-us/
The risks associated with completing the online questionnaires at Qualtrics are thought to be no
greater than the risks encountered during routine internet access. Qualtrics has enhanced security
and safety measures in place to protect the website and its users from fraud, and states that
customers’ information will not be used for any other purposes. You can find out more
information about their security by clicking on the privacy statement found at
www.qualtrics.com.
What are the Benefits?
Although there is no direct benefit to you for participating in this research, your responses will
inform our understanding of behavior and well-being. This knowledge may help psychologists
design more effective intervention programs for individuals experiencing psychological distress.
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Is there Compensation?
You will receive two research (Sona) credits for your participation.
Confidentiality
Your answers are completely anonymous. No IP addresses will be collected. A unique ID code
will be included in the survey link URL that will anonymously assign credit in Sona without the
researchers ever seeing the data. Names will not be attached to the data collected and the
information will only be used for research purposes. Participant responses will be downloaded to
a desktop computer stored in a locked laboratory room that is only accessible to the principal
investigators and research assistants. All data will be password protected. If the data are used for
a research publication or conference presentation, they will be presented in a summary format
only. The data will be kept indefinitely. The online data will be deleted from Qualtrics within
one year of concluding the study (expected end date: 5/20/2022).
Is this Voluntary?
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose to withdraw from the study at any
point and skip any questions that you do not want to answer and will still receive compensation.
Questions or Concerns?
If you have any questions about this study, please contact me at michelle.buffie@maine.edu.
You may also reach the faculty advisor on this study at dnangle@maine.edu. If you have any
questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Office of Research
Compliance, University of Maine, 207/581-2657 (or e-mail umric@maine.edu).
Sincerely,
Michelle Buffie, M.A.
Graduate Student in the Clinical Psychology Ph.D. Program
University of Maine
I have read and understood the above information and I understand that clicking this box
indicates my consent to participate in the project. I understand that I have the right to skip
any questions that I wish and to stop my participation at any time.
I read and understood the above information and I do not consent to participate in this
project.
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Appendix C
Demographic Questionnaire
1. Age_________
2. What gender do you identify with?
______ Female
______ Female to male transgender
______ Male
______ Male to female transgender
______ Non-binary
______ Not sure
______ Other (please specify): _____________
3. What race do you identify with?
____ Multiple racial identities
____ White
____ Black
____ Latino/a
____ Asian
____ American Indian/Native American
____ Other (please specify): _____________
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Appendix D
Short Form Self-Regulation Questionnaire (SSRQ)
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Appendix E
Adolescent Self-Regulatory Inventory (ASRI)
Rate how true each statement is for you ranging from Not at all true for me to Really true for me.
Circle the number under the rating that best applies to you.

1. It’s hard for me to notice when I’ve had
enough (sweets, food, etc.)

2. When I’m sad, I can usually start
doing something that will make me
feel better.
3. If something isn’t going
according to my plans, I change my
actions to try and reach my goal.
4. I can find ways to make myself
study even when my friends want to
go out.
5. I lose track of the time when I’m
doing something fun.
6. When I’m bored I fidget or can’t
sit still.
7. It’s hard for me to get started on
big projects that require planning in
advance.
8. I can usually act normal around
everybody if I’m upset with
someone.

9. I am good at keeping track of lots of
things going on around me, even when I’m
feeling stressed.
10. When I’m having a tough day, I stop
myself from whining about it to my family
or friends.
11. I can start a new task even if I’m
already tired.
12. I lose control whenever I don’t get my
way.
13. Little problems detract me from my
long-term plans.

Not at
all true
for me

Not very
true for
me

Neither
true nor
untrue for
me

Somewhat
true for me

Really
true for
me

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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14. I forget about whatever else I need to
do when I’m doing something really fun.
15. If I really want something, I have to
have it right away.
16. During a dull class, I have trouble
forcing myself to start paying attention.
17. After I’m interrupted or distracted, I
can easily continue working where I left
off.
18. If there are other things going on
around me, I find it hard to keep my
attention focused on whatever I’m doing.
19. I never know how much more work I
have to do.
20. When I have a serious disagreement
with someone, I can talk calmly about it
without losing control.
21. It’s hard to start making plans to deal
with a big project or problem, especially
when I’m feeling stressed.
22. I can calm myself down when I’m
excited or all wound up.
23. I can stay focused on my work even
when it’s dull.
24. I usually know when I’m going to start
crying.
25. I can stop myself from doing things like
throwing objects when I’m mad.
26. I work carefully when I know
something will be tricky.
27. I am usually aware of my feelings
before I let them out.
28. In class, I can concentrate on my work
even if my friends are talking.
29. When I’m excited about reaching a
goal (e.g., getting my driver’s license,
going to college), it’s easy to start working
toward it.
30. I can find a way to stick with my plans
and goals, even when it’s tough.
31. When I have a big project, I can keep
working on it.
32. I can usually tell when I’m getting tired
or frustrated.
33. I get carried away emotionally when I
get excited about something.

1
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4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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5
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4

5
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2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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4

5

1
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4

5

1
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4

5

1
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3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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34. I have trouble getting excited about
something that’s really special when I’m
tired.
35. It’s hard for me to keep focused on
something I find unpleasant or upsetting.
36. I can resist doing something when I
know I shouldn’t do it.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix F
Brief Self-Control Survey (BSCS)
For each of the following statements please indicate how much each of the following statements
reflects how you typically are.

1. I am good at resisting temptation.
2. I have a hard time breaking bad habits.
3. I am lazy.
4. I say inappropriate things.
5. I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun.
6. I refuse things that are bad for me.
7. I wish I had more self-discipline.
8. People would say that I have iron self-discipline.
9. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting
work done.
10. I have trouble concentrating.
11. I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals.
12. Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something,
even if I know it is wrong.
13. I often act without thinking through all the
alternatives.
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Not at
all
(1)
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

(2) (3) (4)

Very much
(5)

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Appendix G
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS)
Please indicate how often the following statements apply to you by writing the appropriate
number from the scale below on the line beside each item.
1---------------------------2---------------------------3---------------------------4---------------------------5
almost never
sometimes
about half the time
most of the time almost always
(0-10%)
(11-35%)
(36-65%)
(66-90%)
(91-100%)
_____ 1) I am clear about my feelings.
_____ 2) I pay attention to how I feel.
_____ 3) I experience my emotions as overwhelming and out of control.
_____ 4) I have no idea how I am feeling.
_____ 5) I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings.
_____ 6) I am attentive to my feelings.
_____ 7) I know exactly how I am feeling.
_____ 8) I care about what I am feeling.
_____ 9) I am confused about how I feel.
_____ 10) When I’m upset, I acknowledge my emotions.
_____ 11) When I’m upset, I become angry with myself for feeling that way.
_____ 12) When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way.
_____ 13) When I’m upset, I have difficulty getting work done.
_____ 14) When I’m upset, I become out of control.
_____ 15) When I’m upset, I believe that I will remain that way for a long time.
_____ 16) When I’m upset, I believe that I will end up feeling very depressed.
_____ 17) When I’m upset, I believe that my feelings are valid and important.
_____ 18) When I’m upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things.
_____ 19) When I’m upset, I feel out of control.
_____ 20) When I’m upset, I can still get things done.
_____ 21) When I’m upset, I feel ashamed at myself for feeling that way.
_____ 22) When I’m upset, I know that I can find a way to eventually feel better.
_____ 23) When I’m upset, I feel like I am weak.
_____ 24) When I’m upset, I feel like I can remain in control of my behaviors.
_____ 25) When I’m upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way.
_____ 26) When I’m upset, I have difficulty concentrating.
_____ 27) When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.
_____ 28) When I’m upset, I believe there is nothing I can do to make myself feel better.
_____ 29) When I’m upset, I become irritated at myself for feeling that way.
_____ 30) When I’m upset, I start to feel very bad about myself.
_____ 31) When I’m upset, I believe that wallowing in it is all I can do.
_____ 32) When I’m upset, I lose control over my behavior.
_____ 33) When I’m upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else.
_____ 34) When I’m upset I take time to figure out what I’m really feeling.
_____ 35) When I’m upset, it takes me a long time to feel better.
_____ 36) When I’m upset, my emotions feel overwhelming.
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Appendix H
Perth Emotion Regulation Competency Inventory (PERCI)
This questionnaire asks about how you manage and respond to your emotions. Please score the
following statements according to how much you agree or disagree that the statement is true of
you. Circle one answer for each statement. The first half of the questionnaire asks about bad or
unpleasant emotions, the means the emotions like sadness, anger, or fear. The second half asks
about good or pleasant emotions, this means emotions like happiness, amusement, or excitement.
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Appendix I
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you
control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct
aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside.
The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk,
gesture, or behave. Although some of the following questions may seem similar to one another,
they differ in important ways. For each item, please answer using the following scale:

1. ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change
what I’m thinking about.
2. ____ I keep my emotions to myself.
3. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change
what I’m thinking about.
4. ____When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.
5. ____When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way
that helps me stay calm.
6. ____ I control my emotions by not expressing them.
7. ____When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about
the situation.
8. ____ I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.
9. ____When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.
10. ____When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about
the situation.
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Appendix J
Social Problem-Solving Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R)
Instructions: Below are some ways that you might think, feel, and act when faced with
PROBLEMS in everyday living. We are not talking about the common hassles and pressures
that you handle successfully every day. In this questionnaire, a problem is something important
in your life that bothers you a lot but you don't immediately know how to make it better or stop it
from bothering you so much. The problem could be something about yourself (such as your
thoughts, feelings, behavior, appearance, or health), your relationships with other people (such as
your family, friends, teachers, or boss), or your environment and the things that you own (such as
your house, car, property, money). Please read each statement carefully and choose one of the
numbers below which best shows how much the statement is true of you. See yourself as you
usually think, feel, and act when you are faced with important problems in your life these
days. Put the number that you choose on the line before the statement.
0 = Not at all true of me
1 = Slightly true of me
2 = Moderately true of me
3 = Very true of me
4 = Extremely true of me
1. I spend too much time worrying about my problems instead of trying to solve them.
2. I feel threatened and afraid when I have an important problem to solve.
3. When making decisions, I do not evaluate all my options carefully enough.
4. When I have a decision to make, I fail to consider the effects that each option is likely to
have on the well-being of other people.
5. When I am trying to solve a problem, I often think of different solutions and then try to
combine some of them to make a better solution.
6. I feel nervous and unsure of myself when I have an important decision to make.
7. When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I know if I persist and do not give up too
easily, I will be able to eventually find a good solution.
8. When I am attempting to solve a problem, I act on the first idea that occurs to me.
9. Whenever I have a problem, I believe that it can be solved.
10. I wait to see if a problem will resolve itself first, before trying to solve it myself.
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11. When I have a problem to solve, one of the things I do is analyze the situation and try to
identify what obstacles are keeping me from getting what I want.
12. When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I get very frustrated.
13. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I doubt that I will be able to solve it on my
own no matter how hard I try.
14. When a problem occurs in my life, I put off trying to solve it for as long as possible.
15. After carrying out a solution to a problem, I do not take the time to evaluate all of the
results carefully.
16. I go out of my way to avoid having to deal with problems in my life.
17. Difficult problems make me very upset.
18. When I have a decision to make, I try to predict the positive and negative consequences
of each option.
19. When problems occur in my life, I like to deal with them as soon as possible.
20. When I am attempting to solve a problem, I try to be creative and think of new or
original solutions.
21. When I am trying to solve a problem, I go with the first good idea that comes to
mind.
22. When I try to think of different possible solutions to a problem, I cannot come up with
many ideas.
23. I prefer to avoid thinking about the problems in my life instead of trying to solve them.
24. When making decisions, I consider both the immediate consequences and the long-term
consequences of each option.
25. After carrying out my solution to a problem, I analyze what went right and what went
wrong.
26. After carrying out my solution to a problem, I examine my feelings and evaluate how
much they have changed for the better.
27. Before carrying out my solution to a problem, I practice the solution in order to increase
my chances of success.
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28. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I believe I will be able to solve it on my own
if I try hard enough.
29. When I have a problem to solve, one of the first things I do is get as many facts about
the problem as possible.
30. I put off solving problems until it is too late to do anything about them.
31. I spend more time avoiding my problems than solving them.
32. When I am trying to solve a problem, I get so upset that I cannot think clearly.
33. Before I try to solve a problem, I set a specific goal so that I know exactly what I want
to accomplish.
34. When I have a decision to make, I do not take the time to consider the pros and cons of
each option.
35. When the outcome of my solution to a problem is not satisfactory, I try to find out what
went wrong and then I try again.
36. I hate having to solve the problems that occur in my life.
37. After carrying out a solution to a problem, I try to evaluate as carefully as possible how
much the situation has changed for the better.
38. When I have a problem, I try to see it as a challenge, or opportunity to benefit in some
positive way from having the problem.
39. When I am trying to solve a problem, I think of as many options as possible until I
cannot come up with any more ideas.
40. When I have a decision to make, I weigh the consequences of each option and compare
them against each other.
41. I become depressed and immobilized when I have an important problem to solve.
42. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I go to someone else for help in solving it.
43. When I have a decision to make, I consider the effects that each option is likely to have
on my personal feelings.
44. When I have a problem to solve, I examine what factors or circumstances in my
environment might be contributing to the problem.
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45. When making decisions, I go with my "gut feeling" without thinking too much about the
consequences of each option.
46. When making decisions, I use a systematic method for judging and comparing
alternatives.
47. When I am trying to solve a problem, I keep in mind what my goal is at all times.
48. When I am attempting to solve a problem, I approach it from as many different angles
as possible.
49. When I am having trouble understanding a problem, I try to get more specific and
concrete information about the problem to help clarify it.
50. When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I get discouraged and depressed.
51. When a solution that I have carried out does not solve my problem satisfactorily, I do
not take the time to examine carefully why it did not work.
52. I am too impulsive when it comes to making decisions.

306

Appendix K
Problem Solving Inventory (PSI)
Directions: People respond to personal problems in different ways. The statements on this
inventory deal with how people react to personal difficulties and problems in their day-to-day
life. The term “problems” refers to personal problems that everyone experiences at times, such
as depression, inability to get along with friends, choosing a vocation, or deciding whether to get
a divorce. Please respond to the items as honestly as possible so as to most accurately portray
how you handle such personal problems. Your responses should reflect what you actually do to
solve problems, not how you think you should solve them. When you read an item, ask yourself:
Do I ever behave this way? Please answer every item.
Read each statement and indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement,
using the scale provided. Mark your responses by circling the number to the right of each
statement.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Strongly Agree
Moderately Agree
Slightly Agree
Slightly Disagree
Moderately Disagree
Strongly Disagree

___ 1. When a solution to a problem has failed, I do not examine why it didn’t work.
___ 2. When I am confronted with a complex problem, I don’t take the time to develop a
strategy for collecting information that will help define the nature of the problem.
___ 3. When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I become uneasy about my ability to handle
the situation.
___ 4. After I solve a problem, I do not analyze what went right and what went wrong.
___ 5. I am usually able to think of creative and effective alternatives to my problems.
___ 6. After following a course of action to solve a problem, I compare the actual outcome with
the one I had anticipated.
___ 7. When I have a problem, I think of as many possible ways to handle it as I can until I can’t
come up with any more ideas.
___ 8. When confronted with a problem, I consistently examine my feelings to find out what is
going on in a problem situation.
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___ 9. When confused about a problem, I don’t clarify vague ideas or feeling by thinking of
them in concrete terms.
___ 10.
I have the ability to solve most problems even though initially no solution is
immediately apparent.
___ 11.

Many of the problems I face are too complex for me to solve

___ 12.

When solving a problem, I make decisions that I am happy with later.

___ 13.
solve it.

When confronted with a problem, I tend to do the first thing that I can think of to

___ 14.
Sometimes I do not stop and take time to deal with my problems, but just kind of
muddle ahead.
___ 15.
When considering solutions to a problem, I do not take the time to assess the
potential success of each alternative.
___ 16.
next step.

When confronted with a problem, I stop and think about it before deciding on a

___ 17.

I generally act on the first ideal that comes to mind in solving a problem.

___ 18.
When making a decision, I compare alternatives and weigh the consequences of
one against the other.
___ 19.
work.

When I make plans to solve a problem, I am almost certain that I can make them

___ 20.

I try to predict the result of a particular course of action.

___ 21.
When I try to think of possible solutions to a problem, I do not come up with very
many alternatives.
___ 22.
When trying to solve a problem, one strategy I often use is to think of past
problems that have been similar.
___ 23.
me.

Given enough time and effort, I believe I can solve most problems that confront

___ 24.
When faced with a novel situation, I have confidence that I can handle problems
that may arise.
___ 25.
Even though I work on a problem, sometimes I feel like I’m groping or wandering
and not getting down to the real issue.
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___ 26.

I make snap judgments and later regret them.

___ 27.

I trust my ability to solve new and difficult problems.

___ 28.

I use a systematic method to compare alternatives and make decisions.

___ 29.
When thinking of ways to handle a problem, I seldom combine ideas from various
alternatives to arrive at a workable solution.
___ 30.
When faced with a problem, I seldom assess the external forces that may be
contributing to the problem.
___ 31.
When confronted with a problem, I usually first survey the situation to determine
the relevant information.
___ 32.
There are times when I become so emotionally charged that I can no longer see
the alternatives for solving a particular problem.
___ 33.
anticipated.

After making a decision, the actual outcome is usually similar to what I had

___ 34.
situation.

When confronted with a problem, I am unsure of whether I can handle the

___ 35.
When I become aware of a problem, one of the first things I do is try to find out
exactly what the problem is.
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Appendix L
Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire (NPOQ)
People react in different ways when faced with problems in their daily lives (e.g., health
problems, arguments, lack of time, etc.). Please use the scale below to indicate to what extent
each of the following items corresponds to the way you react or think when confronted with a
problem. Please circle the number that best corresponds to you for each item.
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Appendix M
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D)
Below is a list of ways you might have felt or behaved. Please circle the number that indicates
how often you have felt this way during the past week.
0
Rarely or none
of the time
(less than 1 day)

1
Some or a little
of the time
(1-2 days)

2
Occasionally or a
moderate amount of time
(3-4 days)

3
Most or all
of the time
(5-7 days)

1. I was bothered by things that didn’t usually bother me.
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family and friends.
4. I felt I was just as good as other people.
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
6. I felt depressed.
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort.
8. I felt hopeful about the future.
9. I thought my life had been a failure.
10. I felt fearful.
11. My sleep was restless.
12. I was happy.
13. I talked less than usual.
14. I felt lonely.
15. People were unfriendly.
16. I enjoyed life.
17. I had crying spells.
18. I felt sad.
19. I felt that people dislike me.
20. I could not get “going.”
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Appendix N
Coronavirus Anxiety Scale (CAS)
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Appendix O
Resources
Thank you for participating in this research study. If you would like to speak with a professional
about your experiences, you are encouraged to contact the University of Maine Counseling
Center (207-581-1392), which provides free services to UMaine students. Information about the
Counseling Center, including their hours of operation, can be found at
http://umaine.edu/counseling/contact-us/ A list of additional resources is provided below.
Campus Resources
The Counseling Center
(Free to UMaine students only)

5721 Cutler Health Center

Psychological Services Center
(Sliding fee scale)

330 Corbett Hall

207-581-1392

207-581-2034

Community Resources
Community Health
& Counseling Services

42 Cedar Street
Bangor, ME 04401

Penobscot Community Health Care

Locations in Old Town,
Bangor, and Brewer

Acadia Hospital

268 Stillwater Ave
Bangor, ME 04402

207-947-0366

207-404-8000

207-973-6100

Maine Mental Health Services Locator: http://www.mymainetherapist.com/
Contact your Primary Care Provider (PCP)
Hotline and Crisis Resources
Local:

Community Health and Counseling Services Crisis Service

1-888-568-1112

State:

Maine Statewide Crisis Hotline (24-hour Hotline)

1-888-568-1112

National: National Suicide Prevention Lifeline (24-hour Hotline)

1-800-273-8255

(Note: Any fees charged for clinical services are your responsibility).
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